Committal and transfer of predicate offences under money-laundering law must follow the competent Special Court seized of both matters.

Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 is explained as requiring committal of the scheduled-offence case to the Special Court seized of the money-laundering complaint where the two courts are different, leaving no discretion to retain the matter once the authorised authority applies. The text also notes that where the predicate offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 is already before a Special Court competent to try both enactments, transfer to that court is the proper course. The operative effect is that the money-laundering prosecution should proceed with the predicate-offence trial before the competent Special Court.

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Issues: (i) Whether, on an application under Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, the court taking cognizance of the scheduled offence must commit that case to the Special Court seized of the money-laundering complaint. (ii) Whether the same course applies when the scheduled offence is under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the court trying that offence is itself a Special Court competent to try both matters.

Issue (i): Whether, on an application under Section 44(1)(c) of the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, the court taking cognizance of the scheduled offence must commit that case to the Special Court seized of the money-laundering complaint.

Analysis: Section 44(1)(c) contemplates a situation where the court dealing with the scheduled offence is different from the Special Court that has taken cognizance of the money-laundering complaint. In that event, once an application is made by the authorised authority, the court dealing with the scheduled offence has no discretion to retain the matter and must commit the case to the Special Court. The scheme of Sections 43 and 44 shows that the scheduled offence and the money-laundering complaint are intended to be dealt with by the Special Court under the Act, and the later trial must follow the forum seized of the money-laundering case.

Conclusion: The application for committal under Section 44(1)(c) is maintainable and the court concerned must commit the scheduled-offence case where the statutory conditions are satisfied.

Issue (ii): Whether the same course applies when the scheduled offence is under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and the court trying that offence is itself a Special Court competent to try both matters.

Analysis: The factual position was that the court trying the predicate offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 was also a designated Special Court under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002, while the Special Court under the money-laundering complaint was not designated under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. In that situation, the transfer of the money-laundering case to the Special Court already seized of the predicate offence was treated as the proper course, keeping open the larger question of law. The impugned refusal to transfer was therefore unsustainable.

Conclusion: The case was directed to be tried before the Special Court already seized of the predicate-offence trial, and the order refusing transfer was set aside.

Final Conclusion: The petition succeeded, and the prosecution under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002 was ordered to be tried along with the predicate-offence proceedings before the competent Special Court already in seisin of the corruption case.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the statutory scheme requires the scheduled offence to be dealt with by the Special Court connected with the money-laundering case, a court cannot refuse committal on convenience grounds; and where the predicate-offence court is itself competent to try both enactments, transfer to that court is the appropriate course.

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