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Issues: Whether the appeal should be dismissed for default on account of the appellant's repeated non-appearance, failure to maintain or update address/representation, and non-existence of the unit at the notified address.
Analysis: The Tribunal considered the statutory framework under Section 35C of the Central Excise Act, 1944 which permits adjournments but bars granting more than three adjournments to a party during hearing, and Rule 20 of the CESTAT (Procedure) Rules, 1982 which authorises the Tribunal in its discretion to dismiss an appeal for appellant's default or hear it on merits, while also permitting restoration if sufficient cause is shown. The facts show multiple earlier listings and adjournments, service attempts by RPAD, return of notice with postal remark 'left', a departmental Mahazar recording non-existence of the appellant's establishment at the notified address, and no appearance or request for adjournment on the date fixed. The Tribunal also relied on the Supreme Court's pronouncements deprecating routine or mechanical adjournments and emphasising timely disposal and prevention of dilatory tactics. Given the appellant's lack of representation, absence of any application to decide the matter ex parte on merits, and the availability of restoration remedy under Rule 20 upon showing sufficient cause, the Tribunal concluded that continuing the appeal would not serve any purpose and that dismissal for default was appropriate in the exercise of its discretion.
Conclusion: The appeal is dismissed for default; this dismissal is in favour of the Revenue.