Limitation runs from open-court pronouncement, and later portal upload does not extend time for appeal filing.

Limitation for an appeal runs from the date the order is pronounced in open court when the parties are present, and later uploading of the order does not defer the start of time. Authorities dealing with cases where no substantive order was pronounced on the hearing date were distinguished. On the facts, the appeal period was computed from 11.06.2025, making the filing late; the delay exceeded the condonable limit, so condonation was refused and the appeal was rejected.

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Issues: Whether limitation for filing the appeal against the impugned order commenced from the date of pronouncement in open court or from the later date on which the order was uploaded on the portal, and whether the delay in filing the appeal could be condoned.

Analysis: The order was found to have been pronounced in open court on 11.06.2025 in the presence of the appellant and its counsel. The appellant's own pleadings and the material from the committee meeting recorded that the matter had been heard and an order was passed on that date. The later uploading of the order on 04.07.2025 did not postpone the commencement of limitation. The authorities relied upon by the appellant were distinguished because they concerned situations where no substantive order had been pronounced on the hearing date. The governing principle applied was that limitation runs from the date of pronouncement, and the time for obtaining a certified copy can be excluded only in accordance with the applicable limitation rules. Since the appeal was filed beyond the permissible period counted from 11.06.2025, the delay exceeded the condonable limit.

Conclusion: Limitation commenced on 11.06.2025, not on 04.07.2025, and the delay was not condonable. The application for condonation of delay was rejected, and the appeal also stood rejected.

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