Memorandum of Cross-Objection admissibility under Section 35G restricted to post-admission hearing; premature cross-objections are dismissed.

Whether a memorandum of cross-objection may be heard before formal admission of a restricted statutory appeal turns on the requirement that a substantial question of law be established at the admission stage; the court reasons that cross-objections are derivative rights contingent on valid admission and notice for merits hearing, and that respondents lack locus to litigate merits pre-admission. Adjudicating cross-objections before admission would bypass the statutory admissibility filter, so the cross-objection was dismissed as premature and cannot be entertained until the appeal is admitted.

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Issues: Whether a Memorandum of Cross-Objection can be heard and decided prior to the formal admission of an appeal filed under Section 35G of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

Analysis: An appeal under Section 35G is a restricted statutory appeal maintainable only upon satisfaction that a substantial question of law is involved; the procedure is governed by Section 35G(9) and Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. A Cross-Objection is a derivative right contingent upon the main appeal having been validly admitted and notice directed for hearing on the merits. At the Hearing on Admission the focus is confined to whether substantial questions of law are framed; the respondent lacks locus to litigate merits by way of Cross-Objection before admission. Permitting adjudication of a Cross-Objection at the pre-admission stage would circumvent the statutory filter and adjudicate merits prior to determination of jurisdiction to entertain the appeal.

Conclusion: The Cross-Objection (OCOT 6 of 2025) is dismissed as premature; this conclusion is in favour of the Appellant.

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