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<h1>Condonation of delay in tax appeal procedure: statutory 30-day extension limits further judicial enlargement of limitation and relief</h1> The text explains that a statutory provision permitting a 30-day extension beyond a primary 90-day appeal period confines the appellate authoritys ... Condonation of delay beyond prescribed period - statutory limitation and special legislation - sufficient cause - Alternative efficacious remedy - power of Appellate Authority to condone delay - Demand order belatedly after 284 day - powers of High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution - Article 142 of the Constitution - HELD THAT:- Section 107 (4) of the Act grants discretion to the Appellate Authority, to allow additional one month in case he/she is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by “sufficient cause” from presenting the appeal after 90 days, but within a period of 30 days. Thus, the discretion of the Appellate authority ends on the completion of additional 30 days. Such discretion does not extend to powers under Article 226 of the Constitution on India as well. The statute, thus provides additional one month to file the appeal, and all the reasons satisfying the expression “sufficient cause” can be raised by the appellant. Similar expression is found in section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, and Section 29 of Limitation Act, 1963 which deals with “Savings”, which prevents the overriding the provisions of specific statutes that have their own distinct limitation periods. It permits such laws to govern their own timelines while still leveraging the mechanics of the Limitation Act. Thus, when an additional period of 30 days is supplied by the statute over and above the basic period of 90 days, and the same stands exhausted, this Court cannot exercise powers under Article 226 of the Constitution to dilute the intention of the legislature and further extend the limitation by condoning the delay by re-examining the “sufficient cause”. The reason assigned by the appellant is also not palatable, as it is hard to believe, that in todays, era, the appellant and his accountant are not having the knowledge of operating the computers, and hence they did not verify the order DRC-07. We clarify, that even if the appellant had a valid reason and sufficient cause explaining the delay, this Court cannot condone the delay beyond 120 days. The tax payers are supposed to remain vigilant of all the proceedings and have to timely verify the orders on the portal. The taxing statutes operate in very strict time frame, and any relaxation or easing of limitation period will have cascading effect on the functioning of the revenue. So far as the challenge of Demand Order is concerned, having availed its alternative efficacious remedy of filing the appeal, this Court cannot call back and examine the Demand Order. Having availed the remedy of filing an appeal as the petitioner was aware that none of the issues either with regard to violation of the principles of natural justice or the lack of jurisdiction was involved and the issue was only confined with the facts and the appropriate remedy was to file an appeal as provided under the statute, this Court cannot examine the validity or legality of the Order-in-Original. In view of the settled legal precedents, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India condoning the delay. Thus, the writ petition fails and the same is dismissed. Issues: Whether the High Court can, under Article 226 of the Constitution, condone delay beyond the maximum period permitted by the statute (aggregate period of 120 days under Section 107 and its proviso) and entertain a writ challenging rejection of statutory appeal for delay.Analysis: Legal framework: Section 107 provides the statutory right of appeal against a demand/order and Section 107(4) permits the appellate authority to allow an additional period (one month) only upon satisfaction of 'sufficient cause', thereby fixing a maximum condonable period. Provisions of the Limitation Act (Section 5 and Section 29) and the doctrine of special legislation require that when a statute prescribes a maximum limitation period for condonation, courts must give effect to the legislative intent. Precedents of the Supreme Court hold that High Courts, exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226, cannot routinely disregard or extend a statutory maximum limitation period so as to render the legislative prescription otiose. Where an alternative efficacious remedy by way of statutory appeal exists and the appeal is filed beyond the maximum condonable period, the High Court should not entertain the writ petition as a matter of course. Factual application: the appeal was filed beyond the aggregate condonable period and the explanation offered did not constitute a justification sufficient to override the statutory bar.Conclusion: The High Court cannot condone delay beyond the statutory maximum period and therefore cannot entertain the writ; decision is against the assessee.