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Issues: (i) Whether the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act stood rebutted by the accused; (ii) whether the complainant was required to prove financial capacity in the absence of a foundational challenge in reply to the notice; (iii) whether service of the statutory notice under the Negotiable Instruments Act was duly complied with.
Issue (i): Whether the statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act stood rebutted by the accused.
Analysis: Once execution of the cheque and its dishonour for insufficiency of funds stood established, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act operated in favour of the holder. The accused was required to rebut the presumptions by raising a probable defence on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. Mere denial, without cogent material, was insufficient to displace the presumption of a legally enforceable debt.
Conclusion: The presumptions were not rebutted and the finding of liability was upheld against the accused.
Issue (ii): Whether the complainant was required to prove financial capacity in the absence of a foundational challenge in reply to the notice.
Analysis: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the complainant is not required in the first instance to prove financial capacity unless the accused raises a specific foundational plea at the earliest opportunity, including in reply to the statutory notice. Where no such plea is taken and no supporting material is produced, the burden does not shift back to the complainant to adduce independent proof of means.
Conclusion: The objection to financial capacity failed and the complainant was not required to prove capacity in the facts of the case.
Issue (iii): Whether service of the statutory notice under the Negotiable Instruments Act was duly complied with.
Analysis: Where notice is sent to the correct address by registered post, statutory presumptions of service arise. The drawer cannot deny service after receipt of summons with a copy of the complaint if no payment is made within the statutory period. The notice and acknowledgment placed with the complaint were treated as sufficient compliance with clause (b) of the proviso to Section 138.
Conclusion: Service of the statutory notice was duly established against the accused.
Final Conclusion: The revision failed because the conviction for cheque dishonour was supported by statutory presumptions, no probable defence was made out, and the procedural requirements of notice were satisfied; the conviction and sentence remained intact.
Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution for cheque dishonour, once the foundational facts are proved, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 operate in favour of the complainant, and the accused must rebut them by a probable defence on preponderance of probabilities; absent a timely foundational challenge, the complainant need not first prove financial capacity, and proper dispatch of notice to the correct address satisfies the statutory requirement of service.