2025 (11) TMI 1863 - AT - IBC

Recall plea on delayed appeal and s.14 Limitation Act fails; fraud claims unrelated to earlier judgment

NCLAT, Principal Bench, dismissed an application seeking recall of its earlier judgment concerning delay in filing an appeal and exclusion of time under ... Seeking recall of judgement - delay in filing the appeal - exclusion of time u/s 14 of the Limitation Act - HELD THAT:- The ground for recall of judgment is well settled. Reference made to the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme court in the case of Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. Prabhjit Singh Soni & Anr. [2024 (2) TMI 681 - SUPREME COURT (LB)] and the judgment of this Court in the case of Union Bank of India vs. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian & Ors. [2022 (1) TMI 1382 - NATIONAL COMPANY LAW APPELLATE TRIBUNAL NEW DELHI] where it was held that 'It is clear that the Appellant never recovered any amount from the payment of ₹ 34 crores, as has been misrepresented by Respondent No. 1. The Adjudicating Authority vide its impugned Order observed that the Appellant has not objected to the said actions of Respondent No. 1 in the COC meetings is contrary to the materials placed before the Adjudicating Authority.' The present recall application does not fall in any of the grounds which are accepted grounds for recall of the judgment. The argument of fraud which is sought to be raised by the Appellant are not with respect to the order dated 21.11.2024 or the application for delay condonation. His submissions are with regard to CIRP being fraudulent which is not a question which can be examined while deciding the application for condonation of delay. The application is dismissed. 1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1.1 Whether the application seeking recall of the order refusing condonation of delay in filing the appeal was maintainable in view of the dismissal of the appeal by the Supreme Court without liberty. 1.2 Whether the grounds urged by the applicant, including alleged fraud in the corporate insolvency resolution process and exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, constituted legally permissible grounds for recall of the Tribunal's judgment rejecting condonation of delay. 2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Maintainability of recall application after dismissal of appeal by the Supreme Court Interpretation and reasoning 2.1 The Tribunal noted that its earlier order dated 21.11.2024 refusing to condone delay in filing the appeal had been challenged before the Supreme Court, and those civil appeals were dismissed on 24.01.2025. 2.2 The Tribunal recorded the contention of the respondent that the Supreme Court had not granted any liberty to approach the Tribunal with a recall or review application, and that all relevant grounds including fraud and Section 14 of the Limitation Act had already been urged before the Supreme Court. 2.3 The Tribunal observed that the appeals before the Supreme Court stood dismissed and that no liberty had been granted by the Supreme Court to the applicant to again agitate those very grounds before the Tribunal. Conclusions 2.4 The Tribunal held that, in the absence of any liberty from the Supreme Court and in view of the dismissal of the appeals, the reliefs sought in the recall application could not be granted. Issue 2: Existence of legally permissible grounds for recall of the judgment rejecting condonation of delay Legal framework 2.5 The Tribunal referred to the settled law governing recall of judgments as laid down by the Supreme Court in Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority v. Prabhjit Singh Soni & Anr., (2024) 6 SCC 767, and by the Tribunal in Union Bank of India v. Dinkar T. Venkatasubramanian & Ors., Company Appeal (AT) (Ins.) No. 729 of 2020, indicating that only limited and specific grounds are recognised for recall. Interpretation and reasoning 2.6 The applicant contended that relevant grounds for condonation of delay, including exclusion of time under Section 14 of the Limitation Act and allegations of fraud, could not be raised earlier in the condonation application, and therefore the order dated 21.11.2024 required recall. 2.7 The respondent pointed out that these very grounds, namely benefit of Section 14 of the Limitation Act and fraud, had already been raised before the Supreme Court in the challenge to the Tribunal's order, as reflected in the questions of law formulated therein. 2.8 The Tribunal held that the present recall application did not fall within the recognised categories of grounds on which a judgment can be recalled. It found that the allegation of fraud was not directed against the Tribunal's order dated 21.11.2024 or the process of deciding the delay condonation application, but instead related to the alleged fraudulent nature of the corporate insolvency resolution process itself. 2.9 The Tribunal reasoned that the alleged fraudulent conduct of the corporate insolvency resolution process is not a matter that can be examined or adjudicated while deciding an application for condonation of delay, and therefore could not be a basis for recalling the order refusing condonation. Conclusions 2.10 The Tribunal concluded that no acceptable or recognised ground for recall of the judgment dated 21.11.2024 was made out. The recall application was held to be devoid of merit and was dismissed.