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Issues: (i) Whether non-service of notice or failure to record satisfaction concerning assets and liabilities establishes a right to restoration. (ii) Whether the company was carrying on business or in operation when struck off. (iii) Whether restoration was otherwise just in view of the leasehold asset and the proposed settlement of liabilities.
Issue (i): Whether non-service of notice or failure to record satisfaction concerning assets and liabilities establishes a right to restoration.
Analysis: An application under Section 252(3) of the Companies Act, 2013 must satisfy its independent restoration tests. Service of individual notice was not shown, but the material said to have been withheld from the Registrar was considered in the restoration proceedings. The statutory framework also preserves assets for liabilities, continues relevant personal liabilities and permits winding up after strike-off.
Conclusion: Neither procedural lapse alone established a right to restoration.
Issue (ii): Whether the company was carrying on business or in operation when struck off.
Analysis: Financial statements showed nil operational revenue and income, while inventory and borrowings remained unchanged. The company acknowledged that business on the property had ceased years before strike-off. Accounts, tax returns, bank transactions and utility payments principally reflected compliance or upkeep of the asset.
Conclusion: The company had not established that it was carrying on business or in operation at strike-off.
Issue (iii): Whether restoration was otherwise just in view of the leasehold asset and the proposed settlement of liabilities.
Analysis: The grounds for restoration under Section 252(3) are alternatives. The otherwise-just ground requires consideration of the purpose of restoration and its effect on affected interests. The leasehold interest was assumed to subsist, but restoration was sought to realise it and close the company's affairs, not to resume business. No specific creditor was identified as prejudiced, and statutory protections remained available.
Conclusion: Restoration was not otherwise just on the facts presented.
Final Conclusion: The earlier observations about lease conditions do not determine the lease's status; lease rights and statutory safeguards remain unaffected.
Ratio Decidendi: The existence of an asset does not automatically make restoration of a struck-off company otherwise just; the purpose of restoration and its effect on affected interests must be considered.
Issues: Whether prior sanction was required before cognizance of the money-laundering complaint against the public servant.
Analysis: Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure protects a public servant removable only with government sanction where the alleged offence has a reasonable connection with acts done in the discharge or purported discharge of official duty. The allegations concerned disproportionate assets accumulated while the petitioner was performing official duties; the record did not explain how the wealth was amassed outside those duties. No sanction for the money-laundering prosecution had been obtained before cognizance.
Conclusion: Prior sanction was required. In its absence, the cognizance order and the money-laundering complaint were quashed.
Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could entertain the challenge to the sanction before trial; (ii) Whether the bank's board was competent to sanction prosecution of its managing director; (iii) Whether the sanction was vitiated by non-application of mind.
Issue (i): Whether the High Court could entertain the challenge to the sanction before trial.
Analysis: The restrictions in Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act did not bar the Court's writ and inherent jurisdiction to examine an alleged absence of valid sanction. The challenge was raised before framing of charges, and the competence of the sanctioning authority presented a jurisdictional question distinct from an evidentiary challenge to a sanction.
Conclusion: The Court had jurisdiction to entertain the challenge before trial.
Issue (ii): Whether the bank's board was competent to sanction prosecution of its managing director.
Analysis: Section 19 requires previous sanction from the authority competent to remove the public servant. The Banking Regulation Act gives its provisions overriding effect and requires Reserve Bank approval for termination of a managing director's appointment; it also confers removal powers on the Reserve Bank. The bank's articles and company law could not override that statutory framework.
Conclusion: No. The Reserve Bank of India, not the bank's board, was the competent sanctioning authority.
Issue (iii): Whether the sanction was vitiated by non-application of mind.
Analysis: A sanctioning authority must independently assess the relevant investigative material, including material favourable to the accused. The board had only the investigating agency's letter and report; the underlying material was not placed before it, and neither the sanction nor the board minutes demonstrated scrutiny of that material.
Conclusion: The sanction was vitiated by non-application of mind, causing prejudice and a failure of justice.
Final Conclusion: Cognizance of the specified corruption offences lacked a valid sanction from the competent authority.
Ratio Decidendi: Previous sanction for prosecution must be granted by the authority competent to remove the public servant; sanction granted by an incompetent authority is a nullity and cannot support cognizance.
Issues: Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the statutory appeal remedy and expiry of its limitation period, in light of alleged defects in notice and hearing.
Analysis: Writ jurisdiction may be invoked despite an alternative remedy where proceedings lack jurisdiction or violate natural justice. The petitioner knew of the notice and hearing date but did not appear or file a reply. The procedure substantially complied with statutory requirements, and the delay in approaching the Court after expiry of the appeal period was unexplained.
Conclusion: The writ petition was not maintainable. Exceptionally, and not as a precedent, the petitioner was permitted to file a statutory appeal within four weeks.
Ratio Decidendi: An alternative statutory appeal may justify declining writ jurisdiction where procedural requirements have been substantially complied with and neither lack of jurisdiction nor a breach of natural justice is established.
Issues: (i) Whether a corporate guarantee for a related person is a taxable supply of services and who is its recipient; (ii) whether the guarantee is excluded as an actionable claim or security; (iii) whether the prescribed valuation and input tax credit proviso are valid; (iv) when the supply occurs and which valuation regime applies to guarantees executed in different periods; and (v) whether the administrative circulars are valid.
Issue (i): Whether a corporate guarantee for a related person is a taxable supply of services and who is its recipient.
Analysis: Section 7 and Schedule I of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 dispense with consideration for a supply between related persons made in the course or furtherance of business. An explicit guarantee provides credit support through the guarantor's present assumption of default risk. The business connection is assessed with reference to the guarantor. The recipient definition turns on rendition of the service rather than privity with the lender.
Conclusion: The guarantee is a taxable supply of services even without consideration, and the related borrower is its recipient. The issue is decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the guarantee is excluded as an actionable claim or security.
Analysis: The Schedule III exclusion concerns an actionable claim that is itself supplied. The supply to the borrower consists of credit support, not the lender's claim against the guarantor. The statutory exclusion for securities concerns the specified class of securities, not collateral merely described as security.
Conclusion: The guarantee is excluded from the levy neither as an actionable claim nor as a security. The issue is decided against the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the prescribed valuation and input tax credit proviso are valid.
Analysis: Sections 15 and 164 permit delegated valuation of related-person supplies. Rule 28(2) uses a deemed value of one per cent of the guarantee amount per annum or actual consideration, whichever is higher. A presumptive value addresses difficulty in finding comparables, but a compulsory minimum is arbitrary where a lower open market value can be established. The agreed related-party price or absence of consideration alone is insufficient evidence. The proviso accepting invoice value where the recipient is eligible for full input tax credit reflects revenue neutrality.
Conclusion: Rule 28(2) and its proviso are valid, but the deemed value is a rebuttable presumption that gives way to a lower open market value established by cogent and verifiable material. The issue is partly in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): When the supply occurs and which valuation regime applies to guarantees executed in different periods.
Analysis: Assumption of risk occurs on execution; continued subsistence and invocation do not create recurring supplies. A gratuitous guarantee lacks the periodic payment obligations required for a continuous supply of services. Sections 13 and 31 govern the time of supply, while valuation for the entire tenure is computed at that time. Section 34 permits a credit note for premature discharge within its conditions and time limits. Earlier valuation rules supplied a machinery before Rule 28(2), and the 2024 amendment was partly beneficial and partly clarificatory.
Conclusion: A supply occurs on execution and afresh on renewal, extension or enhancement. Guarantees executed before 1 July 2017 are not taxable unless subsequently renewed, extended or enhanced. Guarantees executed from 1 July 2017 through 25 October 2023 are taxable under the valuation rules then in force, without a uniform one per cent measure. Rule 28(2) applies to relevant supplies from 26 October 2023, and the retrospective 2024 amendment is valid. The issue is decided partly in favour of the assessee.
Issue (v): Whether the administrative circulars are valid.
Analysis: Circulars under Section 168 cannot create or enlarge a levy. Their treatment of corporate guarantees, guaranteed amounts and renewals operates within the statutory framework, subject to the limits established for valuation and the time of supply.
Conclusion: The circulars are valid but cannot prevent proof of a lower open market value or treat continued subsistence of a pre-26 October 2023 guarantee as a fresh supply. The issue is decided partly in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: Qualifying related-person guarantees are taxable subject to the established limits on valuation, timing and prospective application.
Ratio Decidendi: Presumptive valuation of a related-person corporate guarantee must be rebuttable by cogent and verifiable evidence of a lower open market value.
Issues: Whether fresh adjudication is warranted to verify alleged errors in outward supply returns against accounting records.
Analysis: The tax demand arose from a discrepancy between outward liability reported in GSTR-1 and GSTR-3B. The claimed duplicate and incorrect invoice entries required verification against the uploaded sales register and audited profit and loss account.
Conclusion: The claim requires fresh determination after examination of the records. The underlying tax liability remains undecided.
Issues: Whether the ex parte assessment should be set aside and a fresh opportunity to respond provided.
Analysis: The objection concerned the alleged failure to consider an electronically filed adjournment request before the ex parte assessment. The material disclosed a prima facie case for interference; the substantive assessment was not examined on merits.
Conclusion: The assessment was set aside, with an opportunity to respond to the show-cause notice and be heard before a fresh reasoned decision.
Issues: (i) Whether the two-stage anti-dumping duty scheme is inconsistent with Article 14 or the anti-dumping agreement; (ii) whether the Government was required to provide a further hearing before declining to impose anti-dumping duty; (iii) whether the Government's refusal to impose duty despite a positive recommendation was lawful.
Issue (i): Whether the two-stage anti-dumping duty scheme is inconsistent with Article 14 or the anti-dumping agreement.
Analysis: Section 9A of the Customs Tariff Act, 1975 and the 1995 Rules provide for a technical investigation and recommendation by the designated authority, followed by a discretionary decision by the Central Government. Article 9.1 of the anti-dumping agreement permits a decision not to impose duty even where the substantive requirements are met and does not prescribe a single institutional procedure. The discretion is guided by the authority's findings, public interest and the statutory purpose of remedying unfair trade.
Conclusion: The two-stage scheme is not inconsistent with Article 14 or the anti-dumping agreement.
Issue (ii): Whether the Government was required to provide a further hearing before declining to impose anti-dumping duty.
Analysis: The designated authority's investigation is quasi-judicial and affords interested parties a hearing. The subsequent decision whether to impose duty is legislative or quasi-legislative in character and does not redetermine the authority's technical findings. Neither the Act nor the Rules prescribes a further oral hearing at that stage.
Conclusion: A further hearing before the Government was not required.
Issue (iii): Whether the Government's refusal to impose duty despite a positive recommendation was lawful.
Analysis: The exercise of discretion remains subject to judicial review for statutory competence, fundamental rights, rational connection to relevant material, extraneous considerations and mala fides. The Government assessed downstream users' interests and future supply adequacy, including the closure of a domestic producer and assessments obtained from government agencies. Those forward-looking considerations were distinct from the designated authority's inquiry into dumping and past injury.
Conclusion: The refusal to impose duty was lawful and did not call for interference.
Final Conclusion: The statutory framework and the Government's decision not to impose the recommended duty remain effective.
Ratio Decidendi: The Government may decline to impose anti-dumping duty despite a positive technical recommendation through a quasi-legislative public-interest decision, without a further hearing, provided its discretion is exercised within the statute and is supported by relevant material bearing a rational nexus to the decision.
Issues: Whether the bank guarantee condition for provisional release of the seized goods should be removed.
Analysis: Section 110A of the Customs Act, 1962 governs provisional release. The adopted precedent treated a bank guarantee as unnecessary in special circumstances and contemplated production of an end-use certificate.
Conclusion: The bank guarantee condition is removed and the guarantee is to be returned, subject to production of an end-use certificate.
Issues: (i) Whether the best judgment assessments were validly made under section 45 in light of the notice and prescribed procedure; (ii) Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the statutory appeal.
Issue (i): Whether the best judgment assessments were validly made under section 45 in light of the notice and prescribed procedure.
Analysis: Section 45 permits best judgment assessment where returns are not filed or are not considered correct and complete, and requires a reasonable opportunity of hearing. Returns had been filed, while the notice seeking account books concerned audit assessment under section 55 rather than a section 45 assessment. Sections 45 and 55 operate in separate fields; audit assessment must meet the applicable limitation requirements under section 57. Statutory assessment powers must be exercised in the prescribed manner.
Conclusion: The section 45 assessments were invalid for failure to satisfy the statutory requirements and provide a valid opportunity of hearing.
Issue (ii): Whether the writ petition was maintainable despite the statutory appeal.
Analysis: The challenge involved failure to meet mandatory statutory preconditions, violation of natural justice and jurisdictional defects.
Conclusion: The writ petition was maintainable notwithstanding the statutory appeal.
Final Conclusion: The assessments lacked a valid procedural foundation, and the statutory appellate remedy did not preclude writ review of the identified defects.
Ratio Decidendi: A statutory assessment power must be exercised in the prescribed manner, including the required opportunity of hearing.
Issues: Whether the defendant was entitled to unconditional leave to defend the summary suit.
Analysis: A defendant raising a fair or reasonable defence involving triable issues is ordinarily entitled to unconditional leave. Conditions may be imposed where there is doubt about the defence's good faith or genuineness, but must not be so severe as to shut out a genuine defence. The disputed transaction, alleged cash payments, repayment and circumstances in which the cheque was handed over required evidence. The acquittal in proceedings arising from the same transaction was also relevant to assessing the defence.
Conclusion: The defendant is entitled to unconditional leave to defend. The deposit condition and the consequent decree are set aside.
Ratio Decidendi: Unconditional leave to defend is ordinarily warranted where a fair or reasonable defence raises triable issues, unless there are strong reasons to impose conditions.
Issues: (i) Whether the distillery licence renewal fee qualifies for treatment as neither a supply of goods nor services under the alcoholic liquor licence notification; (ii) whether the boiler, factory, pollution-control and explosive licence renewal fees qualify for the government service exemption; (iii) whether water charges qualify for the exemption for water; (iv) whether the royalty and District Mineral Foundation contribution tax demand must be determined under the non-fraud provision rather than the fraud provision; and (v) whether the fraud-based penalty is sustainable and may be converted to a non-fraud penalty.
Issue (i): Whether the distillery licence renewal fee qualifies for treatment as neither a supply of goods nor services under the alcoholic liquor licence notification.
Analysis: The notification, applicable retrospectively to the disputed period, contains no limitation requiring alcoholic liquor to be for human consumption. The State excise definition of liquor includes rectified and other spirits, and the notification's reference to fees by whatever name called encompasses renewal fees.
Conclusion: The licence renewal fee qualifies for the notification's treatment. The issue is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the boiler, factory, pollution-control and explosive licence renewal fees qualify for the government service exemption.
Analysis: Entry 47 covers specified government registration, testing and safety-related services. Renewal authorises an activity for a further period, and the entry does not distinguish renewal from an initial grant.
Conclusion: The fees qualify for the exemption. The issue is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether water charges qualify for the exemption for water.
Analysis: The charges were calculated monthly by reference to metered quantities of raw, unbranded water drawn, rather than as a fixed permission fee. Entry 99 contains no invoice requirement, and none of its water exclusions was shown to apply.
Conclusion: The water charges qualify for the exemption. The issue is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether the royalty and District Mineral Foundation contribution tax demand must be determined under the non-fraud provision rather than the fraud provision.
Analysis: Section 74 requires fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade tax; mere non-payment is insufficient. The payments were recorded in the books, the tax treatment of royalty was uncertain, and the explanation for non-disclosure in the return was accepted. Section 75 provides for determination under Section 73 when the fraud-related charge is not established.
Conclusion: The demand is to be recomputed under Section 73. The issue is in favour of the assessee.
Issue (v): Whether the fraud-based penalty is sustainable and may be converted to a non-fraud penalty.
Analysis: Section 122(2)(b) requires fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade tax. Section 122 also provides for a non-fraud penalty, while Section 75 requires adjustment of penalty when the assessed tax is modified.
Conclusion: The fraud-based penalty is unsustainable and is to be converted and reworked under Section 122(2)(a). The issue is in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The exemptions remain available, while tax on royalty and the District Mineral Foundation contribution remains subject to non-fraud determination and a correspondingly revised penalty.
Ratio Decidendi: Mere non-payment of GST, without established fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade tax, does not warrant a fraud-based demand or penalty.
Issues: (i) Whether the purchases were genuine and goods were actually received, entitling the assessee to input tax credit. (ii) Whether the proceedings satisfied the requirements for invoking Section 74.
Issue (i): Whether the purchases were genuine and goods were actually received, entitling the assessee to input tax credit.
Analysis: Section 16 requires actual receipt of goods for input tax credit. The supplier was registered when the transactions occurred, and invoices, e-way bills, returns and accounting records were produced. Its subsequent closure and a later inspection did not alone establish that the purchases were fictitious. However, the goods receipts first produced before the Tribunal contained discrepancies, apparent alterations and erasures. The weighbridge slips were also found unreliable in light of the doubtful transport evidence.
Conclusion: The purchases were fictitious, the goods were not actually received, and the input tax credit was unavailable. The issue was decided against the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the proceedings satisfied the requirements for invoking Section 74.
Analysis: Section 74 applies to wrongful availment and utilisation of credit by reason of fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression with intent to evade tax. Although the notice and adjudication order did not use those precise expressions, they alleged collusion, fictitious invoices and intent to evade tax. Section 160 protects proceedings from defects or omissions where they conform in substance to the statutory requirements.
Conclusion: Section 74 was properly invoked and the proceedings satisfied its requirements. The issue was decided against the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The reversal of credit and the associated tax, interest and penalty remain in force.
Ratio Decidendi: Omission of the precise statutory expressions in a notice and adjudication order does not invalidate proceedings where their substance sets out the ingredients required for invoking Section 74.
Issues: (i) Whether service of the demand notice at the corporate debtor's corporate office was valid. (ii) Whether the operational debt and default were established without a genuine pre-existing dispute. (iii) Whether alleged third-party dues could be set off to bring the debt below the statutory insolvency threshold.
Issue (i): Whether service of the demand notice at the corporate debtor's corporate office was valid.
Analysis: The demand notice was sent to both the registered and corporate offices. The registered-office notice was returned, while postal records showed delivery at the corporate office. Service at either office satisfies the applicable demand-notice requirement.
Conclusion: Service was valid, against the appellant.
Issue (ii): Whether the operational debt and default were established without a genuine pre-existing dispute.
Analysis: The contractual services and invoices gave rise to an operational debt. A signed reconciliation confirmed the outstanding account; subsequent part payment and the deemed-authenticated information utility record supported the liability. Invoice endorsements, GST-related objections and alleged performance deficiencies lacked contemporaneous evidence of a genuine dispute raised before the demand notice.
Conclusion: The debt and default were established without a genuine pre-existing dispute, against the appellant.
Issue (iii): Whether alleged third-party dues could be set off to bring the debt below the statutory insolvency threshold.
Analysis: The claimed deductions concerned liabilities of separate entities whose asserted relationship with the operational creditor was not established. Such liabilities could not be unilaterally set off against the creditor's claim.
Conclusion: The proposed set-off was unavailable and the debt exceeded the statutory threshold, against the appellant.
Final Conclusion: The corporate insolvency resolution process initiated against the corporate debtor remains effective.
Ratio Decidendi: A dispute must genuinely pre-exist the demand notice to bar admission of an operational creditor's insolvency application; unsupported or subsequently raised allegations do not suffice.
Issues: Whether the refund of customs duty was barred by unjust enrichment.
Analysis: Chartered Accountant's certificates, supported by worksheets and sales invoices, recorded that the duty incidence had not been passed on. The applicable binding precedent treated sales below import cost as relevant to rebutting the presumption of passing on duty and an expenditure entry alone as inconclusive.
Conclusion: Unjust enrichment did not bar the refunds. The issue was decided in favour of the assessees.
Ratio Decidendi: Unjust enrichment does not bar a duty refund where the evidence establishes that the duty incidence was not passed on.
Issues: (i) Whether the writ petition warranted consideration despite an alternative statutory remedy; (ii) whether the supply and installation of the solar power generating systems constituted a works contract involving immovable property; (iii) whether the 70:30 valuation regime was compulsory for the assessee's supplies made from 1 July 2017 to 31 December 2018; and (iv) whether extended limitation could be invoked for those supplies.
Issue (i): Whether the writ petition warranted consideration despite an alternative statutory remedy.
Analysis: The availability of an alternative remedy is not an inflexible bar to writ jurisdiction. The petition raised arguable points and an identical issue had been adjudicated in the assessee's favour in another proceeding.
Conclusion: The writ petition warranted consideration on merits, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (ii): Whether the supply and installation of the solar power generating systems constituted a works contract involving immovable property.
Analysis: Under the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, a works contract concerns activity relating to immovable property, while a composite supply need not meet that requirement. The nature and object of annexation, including whether equipment can be detached and relocated and whether attachment serves the equipment or the foundation, are material. The systems could be detached and used elsewhere; their foundations provided stability for their operation.
Conclusion: The systems were movable property and their supply and installation did not constitute a works contract, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iii): Whether the 70:30 valuation regime was compulsory for the assessee's supplies made from 1 July 2017 to 31 December 2018.
Analysis: The original notification specified the complete solar power generating system at a combined GST rate of 5%. The 70:30 deemed valuation mechanism took effect on 1 January 2019. A subsequent circular issued under the Board's power to ensure uniform implementation stated that the mechanism could be used for the earlier period. A later substitution of the solar entry likewise operated prospectively.
Conclusion: The 70:30 regime was optional, not compulsory, for the earlier supplies, in favour of the assessee.
Issue (iv): Whether extended limitation could be invoked for those supplies.
Analysis: Extended limitation based on fraud, wilful misstatement or suppression requires foundational facts supporting the allegation. The disputed supplies preceded the introduction of the valuation regime on which the demand was based.
Conclusion: Extended limitation was not available, in favour of the assessee.
Final Conclusion: The assessee's pre-2019 supplies remained subject to the original 5% regime, without the additional tax and penalties demanded under the later valuation scheme.
Ratio Decidendi: A prospectively introduced GST valuation regime cannot be imposed on earlier supplies under a circular that merely permits assessees to opt for it.
Issues: Restoration of GST registration cancelled for non-filing of returns.
Outcome: The petitioner may apply for revocation within two months. The authority shall facilitate compliance and restore the registration upon satisfaction of the statutory requirements. The cancellation order was not adjudicated on merits.
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1. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED
1.1 Whether the resolution applicant's eligibility under Section 29A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 must subsist only on the date of the first submission of a resolution plan, or at all three stages - submission, consideration by the Committee of Creditors, and approval by the Adjudicating Authority - in light of Clause 1.15 of the Request for Resolution Plan (RFRP) and Regulation 39 of the CIRP Regulations.
1.2 Whether the subsequent plans submitted on 11.11.2022 and 20.01.2023 by the resolution applicant were merely "revised" plans relatable to the original plan dated 21.01.2021 or were, in substance, fresh plans attracting a fresh and continuing obligation of eligibility and disclosure under Section 29A and the RFRP.
1.3 Whether, in view of Clause 1.15 of the RFRP, Regulation 39, and the applicant's own affidavit and undertakings, the failure to file fresh affidavits of eligibility under Section 29A with each subsequent plan, coupled with the applicant's status as a wilful defaulter as on 30.10.2022, rendered the plans non-compliant and ineligible for consideration and approval.
1.4 Whether, in the absence of any challenge to the RFRP conditions and in light of the applicant's express unconditional acceptance of those conditions, the applicant could subsequently contend that Section 29A eligibility was relevant only at the initial plan-submission stage.
1.5 Whether, having regard to subsequent issuance of a fresh Form G, fresh EoIs, and the applicant's participation in the fresh process with a new plan, the appeals warranted interference with the impugned order rejecting the earlier plan.
2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS
Issue 1 - Continuity of eligibility under Section 29A at all three stages
Legal framework
2.1 The Court examined Section 29A of the Code, particularly clause (b) which renders a "wilful defaulter" ineligible to be a resolution applicant. It also considered Section 30(2) and (3) (duty of the resolution professional to present only plans compliant with law), Regulation 39(1)(a) (mandating an affidavit of Section 29A eligibility along with the resolution plan), and Regulation 39(1B)(c) (CoC not to consider non-compliant plans).
2.2 Clause 1.15 of the RFRP was reproduced and emphasised. It expressly provided that the resolution applicant "has to be eligible under section 29A of the IBC ... as on the date of submission of the Resolution Plan, consideration of its Resolution Plan by the CoC and its sanction by the Adjudicating Authority" and that each applicant "shall" submit an affidavit of eligibility under Section 29A along with the resolution plan.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.3 The Court held that, by virtue of Clause 1.15, all prospective resolution applicants, including the appellant, were required to remain eligible under Section 29A at three distinct stages: (a) date of submission of the plan; (b) date of consideration by the CoC; and (c) date of sanction by the Adjudicating Authority.
2.4 The obligation to submit an affidavit under Section 29A with the plan was characterised as mandatory, both under Regulation 39(1)(a) and Clause 1.15 of the RFRP. The word "shall" in Clause 1.15 was noted as indicative of compulsion, not discretion.
2.5 The undertaking/affidavit filed by the appellant on 30.11.2020 was specifically considered. In it, the appellant unconditionally (i) accepted the terms of the RFRP, (ii) undertook to disclose any subsequent change that rendered him ineligible under Section 29A at any stage of the process, and (iii) agreed to forthwith inform the resolution professional and CoC if he became ineligible before approval of his plan.
2.6 The Court found that the appellant's own affidavit clearly recognised and accepted a continuing obligation of eligibility under Section 29A, extending beyond the initial submission date, and encompassing later stages up to approval.
Conclusions
2.7 The Court concluded that eligibility under Section 29A was required at all three stages: submission, consideration, and sanction of the resolution plan, in accordance with Clause 1.15 of the RFRP, Regulation 39, and the appellant's own undertaking.
2.8 The appellant could not limit the applicability of Section 29A to the date of initial submission only and could not avoid the continuing eligibility requirement that he had expressly accepted.
Issue 2 - Nature of subsequent plans (revised vs fresh) and impact of wilful defaulter status
Legal framework
2.9 The Court referred to the chronology of events: initial plan dated 21.01.2021; declaration of the appellant as wilful defaulter by Indiabulls Housing Finance Limited on 30.10.2022; submission of a new/revised plan on 11.11.2022; and final plan on 20.01.2023.
2.10 It also relied on Regulation 36B (regulating contents and procedure of RFRP) and Regulation 39 (submission of plan with affidavit of Section 29A eligibility), along with Clause 1.15 of the RFRP.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.11 The appellant argued that the plans of 11.11.2022 and 20.01.2023 were only "revised plans" emanating from the original plan dated 21.01.2021, and therefore his eligibility ought to be tested only as of 21.01.2021, when he was not a wilful defaulter.
2.12 The Court noted the factual position that the plan dated 21.01.2021 was neither deliberated upon nor put to vote in any CoC meeting. It had not been considered or approved, and no Section 29A eligibility verification was carried out at that stage.
2.13 Owing to lapse of time, cost escalations, change in claims, and other material changes, the CoC resolved in its 11th meeting (01.10.2022) to invite revised plans. The plans filed on 11.11.2022 in sealed cover were opened only in the 13th CoC meeting (17.12.2022), with a clear statement that eligibility under Section 29A and compliance with the Code would be examined before placing them for voting.
2.14 On these facts, the Court treated the plan dated 11.11.2022 as, in substance, a new or fresh plan for the purposes of Section 29A and the RFRP, independent of the earlier unconsidered plan of 21.01.2021.
2.15 By 30.10.2022, i.e., prior to submission of the 11.11.2022 plan, the appellant had already been declared a wilful defaulter. Therefore, as on the date of submission of the 11.11.2022 plan, and on the subsequent date of the final plan (20.01.2023), the appellant did not satisfy Section 29A(b).
2.16 The Court rejected the plea that lack of knowledge about being declared a wilful defaulter or subsequent repayment could insulate the appellant from ineligibility under Section 29A, particularly in view of the RBI-guideline-based statutory regime and the appellant's own undertaking to disclose any event making him ineligible.
Conclusions
2.17 The plan dated 11.11.2022 (and the final plan of 20.01.2023) could not be automatically tied to the original plan of 21.01.2021 to freeze the relevant date of eligibility; the 11.11.2022 plan was, in effect, a fresh plan subject to full Section 29A scrutiny at that time.
2.18 Since the appellant had been declared a wilful defaulter on 30.10.2022, he was ineligible under Section 29A(b) on the date of submission and subsequent consideration of the 11.11.2022 and 20.01.2023 plans. Accordingly, he was not eligible to be a resolution applicant for those plans.
Issue 3 - Non-filing of fresh Section 29A affidavits with subsequent plans and validity of the CoC-approved plan
Legal framework
2.19 Regulation 39(1)(a) requires that each prospective resolution applicant "submit resolution plan ... along with (a) an affidavit stating that it is eligible under section 29A".
2.20 Clause 1.15 of the RFRP reiterates that each resolution applicant "is required to submit an Affidavit of eligibility under 29A of IBC ... along with the Resolution Plan."
2.21 Section 30(2) and (3) obligate the resolution professional to place before the CoC only such plans as comply with the Code and applicable regulations, and Regulation 39(1B)(c) directs the CoC not to consider non-compliant plans.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.22 The Court recorded that the only Section 29A affidavit filed by the appellant was dated 30.11.2020, i.e., before submission of the first plan on 21.01.2021. No fresh affidavit of eligibility was filed with the subsequent plans dated 11.11.2022 and 20.01.2023.
2.23 Thus, the mandatory requirement under Regulation 39(1)(a) and Clause 1.15 - to submit an affidavit of eligibility "along with the resolution plan" - was not complied with in respect of any of the later plans.
2.24 The Court held that it was the duty of the erstwhile resolution professional, under Regulation 36A(8), Section 30(2) and (3), and the RFRP clauses, to conduct due diligence regarding Section 29A and to ensure that only compliant plans reached the CoC. The erstwhile resolution professional failed to perform this obligation adequately.
2.25 The Court accepted that a pure question of law relating to ineligibility under Section 29A can be raised at any stage of proceedings, without the need to plead new facts, and that such ineligibility, once established, bars approval of the plan irrespective of the stage it has reached.
Conclusions
2.26 The absence of fresh Section 29A affidavits accompanying the plans dated 11.11.2022 and 20.01.2023, combined with the appellant's wilful defaulter status as of 30.10.2022, rendered those plans non-compliant with Regulation 39 and Clause 1.15 of the RFRP.
2.27 A resolution plan submitted by an ineligible person cannot be approved, irrespective of CoC approval, and in light of the statutory mandate the Adjudicating Authority correctly rejected the CoC-approved plan.
Issue 4 - Effect of unconditional acceptance of RFRP and subsequent challenge to its conditions
Legal framework
2.28 The Court considered the appellant's affidavit/undertaking under the RFRP, wherein he gave "unconditional acceptance of the terms and conditions of the RFRP" and undertook to submit plans strictly as per the prescribed forms "without any deviations or conditions."
2.29 The Court referred to precedent holding that where RFRP terms are not challenged, their binding effect is enforced, and non-challenge can be fatal to a resolution applicant's case.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.30 It was noted that Clause 1.15 of the RFRP, mandating eligibility at all three stages and submission of Section 29A affidavits, was never challenged before the Adjudicating Authority or otherwise.
2.31 On a pointed query, the appellant conceded that he had not challenged Clause 1.15 at any stage. Instead, by his affidavit dated 30.11.2020, he had unequivocally accepted the RFRP terms, including Clause 1.15, and specifically undertook to disclose any subsequent ineligibility under Section 29A.
2.32 The Court applied the principle that where an applicant participates in a process on the basis of prescribed terms and conditions, accepts them unconditionally, and does not challenge them in time, he is estopped from later seeking to resile from or contradict those terms to avoid consequences of non-compliance.
Conclusions
2.33 Having unconditionally accepted Clause 1.15 and undertaken to abide by it, the appellant could not later assert that Section 29A eligibility was relevant only at the initial plan submission stage or that the subsequent ineligibility should be ignored.
2.34 The absence of any challenge to the RFRP and the appellant's affirmative acceptance of its terms were held to be fatal to his attempt to dilute or re-interpret the eligibility requirements.
Issue 5 - Subsequent process (fresh Form G, new plan) and necessity of interference with the impugned order
Legal framework
2.35 The Court noted subsequent developments: rejection of the earlier plan by the Adjudicating Authority; extension of CIRP; issuing of fresh Form G; receipt of new EoIs; reconstitution and functioning of the CoC; and submission of a new plan by the appellant after due diligence declared him eligible under Section 29A.
Interpretation and reasoning
2.36 The current resolution professional (Respondent No. 2) pointed out that a fresh Form G was published on 22.10.2024; twelve EoIs were received, eleven applicants were found eligible; and the appellant again participated, submitted his EoI (31.10.2024), was freshly found eligible under Section 29A, and submitted a new resolution plan dated 17.03.2025.
2.37 The appellant also requested that earlier EMDs be adjusted towards the EMD for the new plan, evidencing that he had effectively shifted to the new bidding round, thereby treating the earlier plan as abandoned in practice.
2.38 On these facts, it was observed that the plan under challenge effectively stood superseded/withdrawn by the appellant's own conduct in participating in the fresh process after curing earlier ineligibility.
Conclusions
2.39 The Court held that no prejudice would be caused to the appellant or any stakeholder by allowing the resolution process to proceed on the basis of the fresh Form G and the new round of plans, in which the appellant has already participated.
2.40 Coupled with the substantive ineligibility under Section 29A for the earlier plan, the subsequent developments reinforced the conclusion that there was no ground to interfere with the impugned order rejecting that plan.
Overall Conclusion
2.41 The Court held that the resolution applicant was required to be, and was not, eligible under Section 29A at the relevant later stages; that he failed to comply with the mandatory affidavit and disclosure requirements under Regulation 39 and Clause 1.15 of the RFRP; that he could not resile from the RFRP conditions he had unconditionally accepted; and that, in any event, the subsequent fresh bidding process in which he participated negated any basis for interfering with the impugned order.
2.42 The impugned order rejecting the CoC-approved plan and directing continuation of CIRP was found to be legally correct and free from error. The appeals were dismissed as devoid of merit, with no order as to costs.
TaxTMI