2025 (10) TMI 1042 - AT - IBC

Section 7 CIRP Petition Dismissed: Default Date Falls Within Section 10A Exclusion, Appeal Rejected despite dispute over payment receipt

Mr. Raja Som Sehrawat Versus Optiemus Infracom Limited, Delhi

NCLAT (Principal Bench) upheld the NCLT's dismissal of the Section 7 application seeking initiation of CIRP, holding the asserted date of default ... Dismissal of application filed u/s 7 of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (IBC) requesting for initiating CIRP - rejection of application on the grounds that cheque for the financial debt was in the name of the Corporate Debtor - HELD THAT:- In this case there is serious dispute regarding the nature of receipt of Rs. 3.3 crores by the Corporate Debtor. The Appellant herein claims its a loan given by him to the Corporate Debtor, whereas the version of the Corporate Debtor is that the said amount is repayment of interest due on loans given earlier by the Corporate Debtor to the companies controlled by the Appellant herein. The said receipt has been recognised as income by the Corporate Debtor in its books of accounts. However, since the Ld. NCLT has dismissed the application under Section 7 of the IBC on the ground that the date of default claimed by the Appellant is in the exclusion period prescribed under Section 10A of the IBC, 2016 the examination is restricted at this stage only to the issue as to whether the date of default falls under the prohibited period prescribed under Section 10A of the IBC and whether on that ground the application under Section 7 of the IBC was rightly dismissed by the Ld. NCLT. The appellant had specified the date of default as 22.10.2020, and this appeal has to proceed on that basis, as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ramesh Kymal v. Siemens Gamesa Renewable Power Private Limited [2021 (2) TMI 394 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed that the date of default given in the notice of demand should be followed. It was further held in the case of Ramesh Kymal v. Siemens Gamesa Renewable Power Private Limited [2021 (2) TMI 394 - SUPREME COURT] that “Section 10A does not contain any requirement that the Adjudicating Authority must launch into an enquiry into whether, and if so to what extent, the financial health of the corporate Debtor was affected by the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic”. The Hon’ble Supreme Court held in the said case that “the embargo contained in Section 10A must receive a purposive construction which will advance the object which was sought to be achieved by enacting the provision.” Since the date of default has been identified as 22.10.2020 by the appellant in the demand notice dated 30.09.2021, the date of default falls within the exclusion period specified in Section 10A of the IBC, 2016. As per provision of Section 10A of the IBC, 2016 CIRP cannot be initiated where the date of default falls in the exclusion period. There are no reasons to interfere with the order of the Ld. NCLT - appeal dismissed. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether an application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code is barred where the date of default, as specified in the creditor's demand notice/Form-3, falls within the exclusion period prescribed by Section 10A. 2. Whether the adjudicating authority must treat the date of default stated in the demand notice/Form-3 as determinative for the purpose of applying Section 10A, even if the creditor subsequently asserts an extended or later date of default based on alleged verbal extensions. 3. Whether absence of documentary evidence of any extension of the repayment date permits a creditor to change the date of default for the purpose of overcoming the Section 10A bar. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Whether Section 10A bars initiation of CIRP where the date of default falls within the exclusion period Legal framework: Section 10A suspends initiation of corporate insolvency resolution process for defaults arising on or after 25 March 2020 for a prescribed exclusion period; the proviso clarifies that no application shall ever be filed for defaults occurring during that period. Precedent treatment: The Tribunal applied governing authority that the date of default stated in the demand notice/Form-3 must be followed and that Section 10A must be given a purposive construction to effectuate its protective object. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court examined the creditor's own Form-3/demand notice which identified the date from which the debt fell due; that date fell within the statutorily excluded period. The Tribunal observed that Section 10A creates an absolute bar for defaults occurring during the specified period and that the protective purpose was to prevent insolvency filings prompted by pandemic-related temporary distress. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - the Section 10A bar applies where the date of default, as specified in the demand notice/Form-3, falls within the exclusion period; the adjudicating authority is bound to apply the statutory embargo without further factual inquiry into pandemic-related impact on corporate financial health. Conclusion: The application under Section 7 was not maintainable because the creditor's stated date of default fell within the Section 10A exclusion period; dismissal on that ground was upheld. Issue 2: Whether the date of default stated in the demand notice/Form-3 is determinative for applying Section 10A Legal framework: Procedural rule and settled approach require that the date of default specified in statutory demand documentation is to be treated as the operative date for initiating insolvency proceedings; the creditor's pleadings (Form-3/Form-1 Part-IV) form the basis for computation of the default date. Precedent treatment: The Tribunal relied on higher authority endorsing the proposition that an attempt to retrospectively or prospectively alter the date of default contrary to the demand notice is untenable; accordingly, the demand notice date governs subsequent steps. Interpretation and reasoning: The creditor's own Form-3 and Part-IV disclosed a date from which the debt fell due; absent documentary support for any later date, the Tribunal held that the pleadings must be followed. The Court declined to permit re-characterisation of the default date based on unproven verbal extensions or subsequent assertions by the creditor. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - the adjudicating authority shall proceed on the basis of the date of default specified in the demand notice/Form-3; a creditor cannot displace that date in order to evade statutory bars like Section 10A without supporting evidence. Conclusion: The demand notice/Form-3 date was determinative; because that date fell within the exclusion period, the Section 7 application could not be entertained. Issue 3: Effect of alleged verbal extensions and absence of documentary evidence on the determination of the date of default Legal framework: Establishment of default under the Code requires clear pleading of the date on which the debt became 'due and payable'; evidentiary support for any modification of agreed payment terms is necessary to alter that date. Precedent treatment: The Tribunal considered authorities acknowledging that a mistake in a demand notice may not always be fatal, but held that where the creditor's own pleading establishes a default date within the exclusion period, and no corroborating documents exist for an asserted extension, the creditor's later assertion cannot be accepted to override the stated date. Interpretation and reasoning: The creditor claimed oral/implicit extensions but produced no written agreement, correspondence or conduct conclusively evidencing a revised repayment schedule. The respondent denied any request for extension. Given the conflict and absence of documentary proof, the Tribunal refused to treat the asserted later date as effective for purposes of Section 10A; the Court emphasized reliance on the formal notice and pleadings. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - in the absence of documentary evidence, alleged verbal extensions cannot be relied upon to change the date of default for statutory computations; the adjudicating authority need not embark on a detailed factual probe into disputed commercial arrangements where the pleadings themselves fix the date. Conclusion: Allegations of time-to-time extensions unsupported by contemporaneous documents are insufficient to displace the default date stated in the demand notice/Form-3; the absence of proof meant the claimed later default date could not be adopted. Ancillary reasoning on scope of enquiry under Section 10A Legal framework and reasoning: Section 10A's embargo is absolute for defaults occurring during the notified period; it does not mandate the adjudicating authority to conduct an enquiry into whether the corporate debtor's financial health was affected by the pandemic. The provision must be construed purposively to protect companies from insolvency filings arising from temporary pandemic distress. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - the authority is not required to investigate pandemic impact; the statutory bar operates mechanically once the date of default falls within the exclusion period. Conclusion: No further inquiry into pandemic causation or financial impact was required once the default date fell within the excluded period; the Section 7 petition was correctly dismissed on that basis.