2025 (10) TMI 485 - HC - GST

Claimants entitled to 6% statutory interest on delayed refund after 60 days; 9% applies only in limited post-appeal scenarios

Altisource Business Solutions India Pvt Ltd Versus Union Of India.

HC allowed the petition and set aside the impugned order dated 9 Sept 2024, holding that claimants are entitled to statutory interest at 6% per annum on ... Delay in sanction of refund - entitlement of interest @ 6% on delayed refund - HELD THAT:- In almost similar facts and situations, the coordinate Bench of this Court in Lupin Limited [2025 (8) TMI 703 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT] observed and held that 'Since the two decisions above, of Delhi High Court and Telangana High Court fortify our view, and contain the reasoning, which we concur as even according to us reading of Section 56 together with the explanation, with reference to the application preferred under sub-section (1) of Section 54, clearly lead us to a conclusion that the interest shall be payable on the amount as contemplated under first part, i.e. when the amount is not refunded within 60 days from the date of the order passed by the First Authority, the proper officer and the interest at the rate of 9% from the date when the fresh application was made after the Appellate Authority allowed the appeals filed by the petitioner and revised the order in original, thereby allowing the entire claim of refund.' The contention now advanced confuses between the expressions “First Authority” and “First Appellate Authority”. Even paragraph 15 in terms states that interest at the rate of 6% per annum becomes payable when the amount is not refunded within 60 days from the date of the order passed by the First Authority. If no refund is made within 60 days from the date the order is passed by the Appellate Authority or, alternatively, within 60 days of the assessee applying for a refund based on the Appellate Authority’s order, then the interest payable will be 9%. In this case, the petitioners have not claimed 9% interest, but rather 6% interest, as the amount was not refunded within 60 days from the date of the order passed by the First Authority or the adjudicating authority - Although the refund application was rejected by the order dated 14 September 2020, it has been set aside by the Appellate Authority as of 27 October 2023. Therefore, based on the rejection order dated September 14, 2020, which was found to be illegal and unsustainable by the Appellate Authority, the respondents cannot resist paying statutory interest at the rate of 6% per annum. The impugned order dated 09 September 2024 set aside - petition allowed. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether interest under Sections 54 and 56 of the CGST Act is payable where a refund claim initially rejected is subsequently allowed on appeal, and if so, from which date interest accrues - (a) from the expiry of 60 days from the date of the original refund application, or (b) from the expiry of 60 days from the date of any fresh application filed consequent to the appellate order. 2. Whether the rate of interest applicable differs depending on whether the refund is not paid within 60 days of (a) the original adjudicating authority's order/application (6% per annum) or (b) the Appellate Authority's order/ consequent fresh application (9% per annum), and whether a successful appellant can be denied 6% interest by reason of a later re-application after an appellate order. 3. Whether the proviso and explanation to Section 56 must be read conjunctively with Section 54 so as to (i) treat an order passed by an Appellate Authority as equivalent to an order in original for purposes of the refund scheme, and (ii) preserve the legislature's intention to compensate delayed refund claimants by awarding interest. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1 - Date from which interest under Sections 54 and 56 accrues where initial refund application was rejected but later allowed on appeal Legal framework: Sections 54 and 56 of the CGST Act create a statutory scheme for refund of tax and for payment of interest where refunds are delayed. Section 54(1) contemplates an application for refund; Section 56 prescribes interest where refund is not disbursed within prescribed periods, with a proviso and explanation dealing with refunds consequent to appellate orders. Precedent treatment: The Court follows earlier High Court decisions interpreting Sections 54 and 56, and the reasoning in the Supreme Court's decision dealing with analogous provisions under the erstwhile Central Excise Act, which emphasize that interest provisions must be applied as enacted. A coordinate Bench decision interpreting identical facts is treated as binding for present purposes. Interpretation and reasoning: A conjoint reading of Section 54 with Section 56 (including the proviso and explanation) demonstrates that the statutory scheme contemplates two contingencies: (i) delay in refund after an original application to the proper officer - attracting interest at 6% per annum if not refunded within 60 days of that application; and (ii) delay in refund after an appellate order (or after a fresh application consequent to such an order) - attracting a different rate (9% per annum) under the proviso if not disbursed within 60 days. The legislature's bifurcation of contingencies shows intent to protect a claimant who had earlier applied for refund; where the adjudicating authority's order rejecting refund is subsequently set aside as illegal by an Appellate Authority, the respondent cannot avoid liability for statutory interest by pointing to a later fresh application filed after the appellate order. Ratio vs. Obiter: The holding - that interest is payable from the expiry of 60 days from the original refund application where that original application led to an unlawful rejection subsequently set aside on appeal - is ratio. Observations that support treating appellate orders as having the status of original orders for certain purposes (subject to the proviso/explanation) underpin the ratio. Remarks about other possible fact patterns or policy considerations are obiter. Conclusion: Interest under Sections 54 and 56 accrues from the expiry of 60 days from the date of the original refund application (where the original rejection is subsequently set aside), and respondents cannot deny the claimant interest by relying on a later re-application after an appellate order. Issue 2 - Applicable rate of interest (6% v. 9%) when refund allowed on appeal and timing of payment Legal framework: Section 56 prescribes interest for delayed refunds; the main part contemplates interest where refund is not paid within 60 days of filing of the application (reflecting the original application), while the proviso contemplates interest where a fresh application is made consequent to an appellate order and the refund is not paid within 60 days of that application, with a higher rate specified. Precedent treatment: The Court aligns with decisions holding that the statute contemplates two distinct contingencies and rates; authoritative decisions treating the appellate order as conferring, for certain purposes, the status of an original order, are followed. Interpretation and reasoning: Where the adjudicating authority's original order rejecting the refund is found illegal and is set aside by an Appellate Authority, the claimant's entitlement to interest measured from the time the original application matured for payment (i.e., 60 days after filing) is preserved. Thus the 6% rate applicable to delays measured from the original application period applies. The 9% rate in the proviso is triggered where the first disbursement obligation arises only after a fresh application consequent to an appellate order - i.e., where no prior valid claim for refund had matured for payment. The scheme does not permit the Revenue to compress these contingencies so as to deprive a successful appellant of the lower-rate interest for delay caused by the initial unlawful refusal. Ratio vs. Obiter: The declaration that the petitioner is entitled to interest at 6% (and not merely at the higher 9%) from expiry of 60 days from the original application date is ratio. Explanatory comments about legislative intent behind differing rates are supportive but not strictly necessary parts of the ratio. Conclusion: Where an original refund application matured (i.e., passed 60 days) and the adjudicating authority's refusal is later set aside, interest at 6% per annum is payable from the expiry of 60 days from the original application date. The 9% rate is applicable only in the distinct contingency contemplated by the proviso where a fresh application after an appellate order is the first occasion for a refund to be disbursed. Issue 3 - Construction of proviso and explanation to Section 56 vis-à-vis Section 54; status of appellate orders Legal framework: The proviso to Section 56 and the accompanying explanation must be read with Section 54 to give meaning to the two-scenario structure of refund entitlement and interest liability. Precedent treatment: The Court follows coordinate decisions that have read the proviso and explanation as recognizing that an appellate order can be given the status of an order in original for purposes of the refund mechanics, while preserving the distinct temporal contingencies and interest consequences laid down by the statute. Interpretation and reasoning: A combined reading shows the legislature contemplated (i) the original application timeline and (ii) the situation where an appellate order necessitates a fresh application; the proviso's grant of a separate (higher) interest rate in the latter situation demonstrates that the legislature intended to treat the appellate order as capable of creating a fresh refund window, but not to negate rights accrued under the original application where the original order was illegitimate. Thus the explanation and proviso operate to ensure both contingencies are covered, without allowing Revenue to circumvent liability for interest accrued due to an unlawful original rejection. Ratio vs. Obiter: The interpretative proposition that the appellate order can be treated as an original order for procedural convenience, while not displacing accrued rights under the original application, forms part of the operative ratio. Policy commentary about legislative consciousness supports but does not form the operative holding. Conclusion: The proviso and explanation must be read conjunctively with Section 54; an appellate order may be treated as having operative status for triggering a fresh refund window, but this does not extinguish a claimant's entitlement to interest where a valid original application had already matured and been unlawfully dismissed. Consequently, statutory interest must be awarded in accordance with the contingency that actually matured. Disposition and directive (operative conclusion linked to the issues) The impugned denial of interest is unsustainable; interest at 6% per annum is payable from the expiry of 60 days from the date of the original refund application(s) where the original rejection was set aside on appeal. The respondents are directed to pay interest at 6% from the respective dates of expiry of 60 days from the original refund applications within the time ordered by the Court.