2025 (10) TMI 234 - HC - Income Tax

Reopening assessment under s.147 invalid after four years where pre-2016 Form 3CL lacked obligation to certify expenditure

HC held that reopening assessment under s.147 after four years was impermissible where pre-2016 law did not obligate the prescribed authority to certify ... Reopening of assessment u/s 147 - Period of limitation - Appellant did not disclose material information in the form of Form 3CL for deduction u/s 35(2AB)(4) - HELD THAT:- It is only after the amendment in the year 2016 that the law mandates that the prescribed authority has to certify allowable expenditure for deduction. No doubt, this case could have been reopened on the grounds of non-consideration of expenditure reflected in Form 3CL, if it had been done within the time. But law does not allow to reopen such assessment after four years merely to rectify such mistake of not adverting to Form 3CL, since it was not obligatory for the prescribed authority to certify the expenditure incurred. Any reference to expenditure in the Form 3CL thus became inconsequential or insignificant for the assessing authority to allow the deduction claimed. In the light of the law as it stood at the time of assessment, it cannot be said that there was willful non-disclosure, as the prescribed authority’s reporting was only to report about approval and not about the expenditure incurred. Therefore, there was no necessity for the assessee to produce Form 3CL except to establish the approval. Since approval is not in dispute, it was obligatory for the assessing officer to verify actual expenditure incurred, including with reference to the non-binding report as to the expenditure reflected in Form 3CL. That omission on the part of the assessing authority to verify the actual allowable deduction cannot be taken for its advantage, unless the blame is squarely attributable to the assessee. Explanation 1 is applicable if facts so available on record itself are material. If independent of such records (here ‘Form 3CL’), an assessment has to be made, then such a fact itself would not constitute non-disclosure of material facts. Therefore, the Tribunal erred in defining non-disclosure of material facts in accordance with statutory provisions. Thus, the appeal stands allowed. The impugned order of the Tribunal is set aside, answering the question of law framed, in favour of the assessee and against the revenue. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether reopening an assessment under Section 147 of the Income Tax Act beyond four years is barred by limitation where the assessing officer did not take into account an approval-report (Form 3CL) quantifying eligible expenditure under Section 35(2AB) that had been communicated to the prescribed authority earlier. 2. Whether non-production of Form 3CL before the assessing officer constituted failure to disclose material facts fully and truly within the meaning of Explanation 1 to Section 147, thereby extending the period of limitation beyond four years. 3. Whether, having regard to the statutory scheme of Section 35(2AB) as it stood for the relevant assessment year, the content of Form 3CL (quantification of expenditure) was determinative of the claim for weighted deduction and therefore material for the purpose of reopening assessment under Section 147. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1 - Limitation for reopening under Section 147 where Form 3CL was not produced Legal framework: Section 147 read with the proviso and Explanation 1 prescribes that reassessment must be initiated within four years from the end of the relevant assessment year unless the assessee failed to disclose fully and truly material facts. Explanation 1 clarifies that production before the Assessing Officer of account books or other evidence from which material evidence could with due diligence have been discovered will not necessarily amount to disclosure. Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal relied on Explanation 1 to treat non-production as a wilful non-disclosure; the appellate authority had earlier ruled otherwise. The Court examined the statutory scheme rather than applying any contrary authority. Interpretation and reasoning: For the relevant assessment year, Section 35(2AB) allowed weighted deduction for in-house scientific research expenditure, but the prescribed authority was only required to report approval (Form 3CL) to the Income Tax authority; it was not obliged to quantify allowable expenditure prior to the 2016 amendment. Thus the assessing officer retained the duty to independently satisfy himself about the amount allowable. Given that Form 3CL was not a binding determinative certificate of allowable expenditure at that time, its non-production did not equate to suppression of a material fact that would extend limitation. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - where statutory scheme places onus on the assessing officer to determine allowable expenditure and the prescribed authority's report is non-determinative, non-production of that report does not constitute failure to disclose material facts so as to extend limitation under Section 147. Obiter - observations on how the position would differ post-amendment (after 01.07.2016) when the prescribed authority must quantify expenditure. Conclusion: Reopening beyond four years was barred by limitation because non-production of Form 3CL, given its non-determinative character at the relevant time, did not amount to failure to disclose material facts. Issue 2 - Applicability of Explanation 1 to Section 147 to the facts (whether Form 3CL's non-production amounts to suppression) Legal framework: Explanation 1 operates to deprive the protection of the proviso where production of books/evidence before the Assessing Officer is required because such materials would otherwise have enabled discovery with due diligence; the key is whether the material so available was determinative of the claim. Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal applied Explanation 1 to find wilful non-disclosure. The Court distinguished that application because Explanation 1 is decisive only where the Assessing Officer would have been required to rely on the produced material to determine the claim. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court emphasised the distinction between evidence that is determinative of entitlement and evidence that is merely informative. Where the assessing officer must independently assess entitlement (as for Section 35(2AB) pre-amendment), the mere fact that the Form was communicated to another tax/functionary does not relieve the assessee of the obligation to produce it before the Assessing Officer - but equally, its non-production is not inherently suppression of a material fact because the fact (approval) was not itself decisive of quantum of deduction. Explanation 1 is meant to target cases where production of evidence would have enabled the Assessing Officer, with due diligence, to discover material evidence that the assessee had not disclosed. Here, because Form 3CL did not bind the Assessing Officer on quantum, the non-production is not material suppression. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Explanation 1 cannot be invoked to extend limitation where the evidence not produced was not, by itself, determinative of the claim such that the Assessing Officer would have been enabled to make a different assessment with due diligence. Obiter - comments on the assessing officer's omission to verify allowable expenditure and that such omission cannot be taken advantage of by revenue unless blame is squarely on the assessee. Conclusion: Explanation 1 does not apply; non-production of Form 3CL in the circumstances did not amount to suppression of material facts justifying reopening beyond four years. Issue 3 - Whether Form 3CL's quantification of expenditure under Section 35(2AB) was binding or determinative for assessment year in question Legal framework: Section 35(2AB) and Rule 6(7A) as they stood for the assessment year required reporting of approval by the prescribed authority to the Director General (Income Tax) but did not require the prescribed authority to quantify allowable expenditure; post-01.07.2016 amendment, the prescribed authority must quantify expenditure and such quantification becomes binding/decisive for deduction. Precedent Treatment: The Tribunal treated Form 3CL's quantified figure as material and relied upon it; the Court distinguished that approach by focusing on statutory text and legislative change. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court construed the pre-amendment statutory scheme to mean that the assessing authority retained responsibility to satisfy itself as to allowable expenditure; the Form 3CL's reference to expenditure was not a statutory certification of amount allowable. Therefore, while Form 3CL could assist, the assessing officer's independent verification remained essential. Because the Form did not by itself determine entitlement to the weighted deduction, non-production of the Form cannot be equated with suppression of material fact under Explanation 1. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - where the statutory scheme does not confer determinative effect on the prescribed authority's quantification, the Form's content is not automatically material for the purpose of extending limitation; post-amendment treatment is distinguishable. Obiter - the Court noted that had the reassessment been initiated within time to correct the assessing officer's omission, reopening would have been permissible. Conclusion: Form 3CL's quantification was not binding/determinative for the assessment year in question; hence its non-production did not constitute material suppression to justify reopening after four years. Cross-reference and final conclusion Where approval (but not quantum) is not in dispute, the assessing officer is obliged to verify actual expenditure; failure of the assessing officer to verify cannot be converted into a ground for reopening beyond limitation unless the blame for non-disclosure of a determinative material fact lies squarely with the assessee. Applying these principles to the facts, the Court held that the Tribunal erred in invoking Explanation 1 and therefore allowed the appeal, holding reopening beyond four years to be barred by limitation.