2025 (10) TMI 2 - SC - Indian Laws

Second Special Leave Petition inadmissible after earlier SLP withdrawn with leave to seek review; finality bars fresh challenge

Satheesh V.K. Versus The Federal Bank Ltd.

SC dismissed the appeal, holding the second special leave petition inadmissible. Where an earlier SLP was withdrawn with leave to seek review and the ... Maintainability of second special leave petition under Article 136 of the Constitution - Invocation of jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam under Article 226 of the Constitution - default in obligation to repay the loan - respondent classified the loan account as Non-Performing Asset (NPA) and initiated measures under section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act - HELD THAT:- The coordinate Bench in S. Narahari [2023 (7) TMI 1598 - SUPREME COURT] was seized of the question as to whether, upon dismissal of a special leave petition against the parent order as withdrawn with liberty to file a review before the high court but without liberty to approach this Court again against the parent order should the review fail, a fresh special leave petition filed against both the parent order and the review rejection order would be maintainable. The Bench pondered whether liberty granted by this Court to approach the high court in review automatically places the said matter in the “escalation matrix”, and makes the remedy of a special leave petition available again. There, the unsuccessful petitioner at the time of dismissal of the special leave petition as withdrawn had prayed for and was granted leave to apply for a review. Upon the review being dismissed, the parent order was challenged once again. There is something very adverse to the appellant. He having sensed that the co-ordinate Bench was not inclined to entertain the special leave petition, did not invite an order of dismissal thereof on merits but went away content with permission to withdraw. Neither permission was sought to apply for review nor was any window kept open by this Court to permit the appellant to approach it once again mounting a challenge to the same order. The principle underlying Order XLVII Rule 7(1), CPC may be understood. Whenever a party aggrieved by a decree or order seeks a review thereof based on parameters indicated in Section 114 read with Order XLVII, CPC and the application ultimately fails, the decree or order under review does not suffer any change. It remains intact. In such an eventuality, there is no merger of the decree or order under review in the order of rejection of the review because such rejection does not bring about any alteration or modification of the decree or order; rather, it results in an affirmance of the decree or order. Since there is no question of any merger, the party aggrieved by the rejection of the review petition has to challenge the decree or order, as the case may be, and not the order of rejection of the review petition. There are no doubt that entertaining a special leave petition in a case of the present nature would be contrary to public policy and can even tantamount to sitting in appeal over the previous order of this Court which has attained finality. The maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium (it is for the public good that there be an end to litigation) would apply in all fours when it is found that proceedings challenging an order were not carried forward by withdrawing the special leave petition and the litigant has returned to the same court after some time mounting a challenge to the self-same order which was earlier under challenge and such challenge had not been pursued. This is a course of action which cannot be justified either in principle or precept. The preliminary objections to the maintainability of the appeals raised by the respondent succeed - Appeal dismissed. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether a second special leave petition under Article 136 is maintainable against an order which was earlier challenged by a prior special leave petition that was withdrawn unconditionally without permission to file a fresh petition. 2. Whether a second special leave petition is maintainable where the earlier challenge before this Court resulted in (a) a dismissal on merits by a brief non-speaking order, or (b) withdrawal with liberty to apply for review but without liberty to re-approach this Court, or (c) a withdrawal unaccompanied by any permission to file afresh - including interaction with the doctrine of merger and Order XLVII Rule 7 CPC. 3. Whether the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 136 should be exercised to entertain a second challenge where the litigant has repeatedly resorted to procedural steps after withdrawing the earlier challenge, in circumstances suggesting an attempt to delay repayment or to 'buy time'. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Maintainability of a second special leave petition after unconditional withdrawal of an earlier SLP Legal framework: Article 136 confers extraordinary discretionary jurisdiction; Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC (withdrawal/abandonment of suit) and its public policy rationale have been extended to writ and appellate practice; Order XLVII Rule 7(1) CPC bars appeal against an order refusing review. Precedent Treatment: The Court follows the rule in Upadhyay & Co. (extension of Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC to special leave petitions) as binding. Earlier coordinate Bench decisions suggesting wider availability of remedies (e.g., decisions focusing on non-speaking dismissals and doctrine of merger) were considered but distinguished on facts. Interpretation and reasoning: Where a party withdraws a special leave petition without obtaining leave to file a fresh petition, public policy and the interests of finality preclude the same party from filing a fresh special leave petition challenging the same parent order. The rationale mirrors the rule applicable to withdrawal of suits - withdrawal without permission to file afresh is treated as abandonment of the remedy in that forum to prevent bench-hunting and misuse of judicial process. Unconditional withdrawal indicates an election not to pursue the extraordinary remedy; the litigant ceases to be a party aggrieved for purposes of re-approach. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - A second SLP is not maintainable where the earlier SLP was withdrawn without permission to file afresh; this principle is applied as law. Obiter - references to the discretionary reach of Article 136 in other contexts (e.g., when injustice is palpable) are noted but not applied to override the public policy rule in the circumstances. Conclusions: Second SLP dismissed as not maintainable where the earlier SLP was withdrawn unconditionally; the present appeals fail on this ground. Issue 2: Effect of prior dismissal of an SLP by a non-speaking order, doctrine of merger, and review remedies before the High Court Legal framework: Doctrine of merger (orders in appeal subsuming lower orders) and the treatment of non-speaking dismissals; Order XLVII Rule 7(1) CPC (no appeal against order rejecting review); principles governing when an order refusing special leave is treated as substitutive of the order under challenge. Precedent Treatment: The Court analyses and distinguishes Kunhayammed and Khoday Distilleries (three-Judge Bench holdings) which held that an order refusing special leave (even a non-speaking one) does not attract merger and may leave open the maintainability of a review before the High Court. Those decisions were considered but held distinguishable on facts and not decisive in cases where the petitioner had withdrawn an earlier SLP without permission. S. Narahari (coordinate Bench) was noted as having referred the issue to a larger Bench; that reference does not alter the binding applicability of Upadhyay & Co. where its facts are closer to the present case. Dhakeswari Cotton Mills (on the scope of Article 136) is held inapplicable to the procedural rule under consideration. Interpretation and reasoning: Where an SLP is dismissed by a non-speaking single-line order, Kunhayammed and Khoday permit a review before the High Court because the non-speaking dismissal does not merge with the order under challenge; the High Court's review remains a live remedy. However, that reasoning presupposes that the party did not elect to abandon the remedy before this Court. By contrast, where a party withdraws an SLP unconditionally, the public policy doctrine bars re-invocation of Article 136 without leave. Thus distinctions turn on the precise procedural step taken by the litigant (withdrawal vs. dismissal) and whether leave to re-approach was secured at the time of withdrawal or conferred later. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Kunhayammed/Khoday establish that non-speaking dismissals do not automatically attract merger and may allow a subsequent review in the High Court; ratio of Upadhyay - withdrawal without permission to file afresh precludes later re-challenge before the Apex Court. Obiter - concerns about justice overriding technical finality (Article 136's largesse) are acknowledged but held subordinate to public policy when a litigant elects to withdraw. Conclusions: The present case is governed by the rule in Upadhyay: withdrawal without leave to re-approach bars a later SLP. Distinctions drawn from Kunhayammed/Khoday do not assist where unconditional withdrawal has occurred. Where review is sought and rejected, Order XLVII Rule 7(1) CPC precludes an appeal against the rejection; remedy lies in challenging the original order, not the rejection. Issue 3: Exercise of Article 136 in the face of perceived tactical litigation and interplay with public policy/finality Legal framework: Article 136 is extraordinary and to be exercised sparingly; public policy maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium supports finality; courts may refuse relief where procedural conduct indicates abuse of process or bench-hunting. Precedent Treatment: The Court refers to the broad principles about Article 136's discretionary nature but holds that those principles do not justify permitting a second challenge where unconditional withdrawal has been deliberately used to delay substantive obligations. Earlier authorities recognizing the Court's power to prevent injustice are not treated as permitting disregard of public policy against repeated re-litigation following withdrawal. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court places weight on the litigant's conduct - rapid successive filings and withdrawals without inclination to discharge underlying obligations may justify refusal to exercise extraordinary jurisdiction. Allowing a second SLP in such circumstances would subvert finality and enable dilatory tactics; public interest requires an end to litigation where the forum remedy has been abandoned. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Abuse of process and tactical bench-hunting are valid grounds to deny extraordinary relief and to refuse entertainement of a second SLP after unconditional withdrawal. Obiter - general exhortations about Article 136 bending law to advance justice are noted but not applied to override the public policy rule here. Conclusions: Exercise of Article 136 to permit a second bite would be contrary to public policy and the interest of finality where the litigant has withdrawn the earlier SLP without leave and conduct indicates an attempt to delay contractual obligations; the extraordinary jurisdiction is therefore declined. Disposition and Practical Consequence Because the earlier special leave petition was withdrawn without permission to re-approach, the subsequent special leave petitions challenging the same order are not maintainable; preliminary objections to maintainability succeed and the appeals are dismissed. The Court did not decide merits of the underlying claim; the appellant is at liberty to pursue remedies before appropriate forums in accordance with law, subject to the procedural bar delineated above.