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<h1>Remittance to Adjudicating Authority set aside; Joint Commissioner CGST Appeals ordered to decide appeals afresh; petition disposed</h1> <h3>M/s Anand And Anand (Law Firm) Versus Principal Commissioner Central Goods And Services And 2 Others</h3> M/s Anand And Anand (Law Firm) Versus Principal Commissioner Central Goods And Services And 2 Others - 2025:AHC:156502 ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether, under sub-clause (11) of Section 107 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, the Appellate Authority has power to remit an appeal back to the Adjudicating Authority that passed the impugned decision or order. 2. Whether an appellate order directing remand to the adjudicating authority is sustainable where the Appellate Authority has instead the statutory options to confirm, modify or annul the impugned order. 3. Ancillary issue: effect of the provisos to Section 107(11) regarding enhancement of fee/penalty or altering tax/ITC/refund and the requirement of notice to show cause and time limits under Sections 73/74/74A, insofar as these affect appellate powers and procedural fairness. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1 - Appellate Authority's power to remit back under Section 107(11) Legal framework: Section 107(11) prescribes that the Appellate Authority shall, after such further inquiry as may be necessary, 'pass such order, as it thinks just and proper, confirming, modifying or annulling the decision or order appealed against but shall not refer the case back to the adjudicating authority that passed the said decision or order.' The provision contains provisos requiring opportunity to show cause before enhancement of fee/penalty or altering refund/ITC and, where tax is found unpaid/short-paid/erroneously refunded or ITC wrongly availed, a notice to show cause and adherence to time limits under Sections 73/74/74A. Precedent Treatment: The Court referred to a Division Bench decision of the High Court which construed the same statutory prescription to preclude remittance and held that the Appellate Authority's power is confined to confirm/modify/annul; remand to the original adjudicating authority was regarded as inconsistent with the statutory scheme and was set aside in that precedent. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court adopted a plain-text reading of Section 107(11), holding the bar on referring a case back to the adjudicating authority to be mandatory. Because the statute expressly enumerates only three outcomes for the Appellate Authority (confirm, modify, annul) and then explicitly disallows reference back, the Court reasoned that no incidental or inherent power remains to remit proceedings to the original authority. The Court observed that an Appellate Authority must exercise its jurisdiction within the statutory contours; remitting proceedings where the statute prohibits such referral amounts to a failure to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with law. Ratio vs. Obiter: The holding that Section 107(11) mandates that the Appellate Authority shall not refer matters back to the adjudicating authority is treated as the ratio decidendi concerning the appellate power question. Observations about the need for natural justice while adjudicating on the merits are ancillary and thus obiter to the core statutory construction point. Conclusions: The Appellate Authority does not have power under Section 107(11) to remit a matter back to the adjudicating authority that passed the impugned order; any appellate direction effecting such remand is legally impermissible and liable to be set aside. Issue 2 - Validity of an appellate order remitting matters and the consequences Legal framework: Same statutory provision (Section 107(11)) and its enumeration of permissible appellate outcomes; administrative/tribunal practice must conform to these options. Precedent Treatment: The Court followed the Division Bench authority holding that an appellate order remitting to the adjudicating authority was ultra vires and could not be sustained, and that such an order must be set aside so the Appellate Authority can exercise its statutory jurisdiction afresh. Interpretation and reasoning: The impugned appellate order remitted nine appeals to the adjudicating authority to re-determine place of supply and to allow the procedure of natural justice. The Court found that the Appellate Authority had not carefully considered the statutory bar in Section 107(11) and that the remand portion of the order was inconsistent with the scheme. Although earlier portions of the impugned order contained findings favourable to the petitioner, the later remand direction conflicted with the statutory prohibition and was not sustainable. The Court noted that where the Appellate Authority has failed to exercise its jurisdiction in accordance with law (by remitting contrary to Section 107(11)), the remand order cannot be sustained and must be set aside; the appropriate course is that the Appellate Authority shall decide the appeals in accordance with law. Ratio vs. Obiter: The declaration that the remand direction is void for being contrary to Section 107(11) is ratio. Comments that the adjudicating authority should follow principles of natural justice and examine documents on charge of place of supply are obiter insofar as they do not alter the statutory limitation on remand. Conclusions: The remand direction in the appellate order is set aside. The appeals must be decided afresh by the Appellate Authority within the statutory framework (i.e., by confirming, modifying or annulling), and not by referring the matter back to the original adjudicating authority. Issue 3 - Provisos to Section 107(11): procedural safeguards and time-limits Legal framework: The provisos to Section 107(11) require that an order enhancing fee/penalty/fine in lieu of confiscation or confiscating goods of greater value or reducing refund/ITC not be passed unless the appellant is given a reasonable opportunity to show cause; and where tax/ITC/refund issues arise, no order requiring payment or adjustment shall be passed unless notice to show cause is given and the order is passed within the time limits under Sections 73 or 74(1) [or 74A]. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court noted these provisos to emphasize that while the Appellate Authority's substantive powers are limited to confirm/modify/annul and remand is not permitted, the statute nevertheless preserves procedural safeguards before adverse enhancement or tax/ITC adjustments are ordered. These procedural protections must be observed by the Appellate Authority when exercising its confirm/modify/annul powers. Ratio vs. Obiter: The observation that the provisos impose mandatory procedural safeguards is part of the Court's interpretative reasoning and operative guidance (ratio as to procedure); however, detailed instruction on timing and implementation in any particular appeal would be factual and hence obiter here. Conclusions: Even though remand to the adjudicating authority is prohibited, the Appellate Authority, when passing orders that may enhance liabilities or affect refunds/ITC, must comply with the provisos-giving notice and opportunity to show cause and respecting time limits under Sections 73/74/74A. Disposition and Directions The portion of the impugned appellate order that remitted the matters to the adjudicating authority is set aside. The Appellate Authority is directed to decide the appeals afresh in accordance with Section 107(11) (i.e., by confirming, modifying or annulling the impugned orders), observing applicable procedural safeguards under the provisos and the time-limit provisions referenced in Sections 73/74/74A.