2025 (9) TMI 327 - HC - Indian Laws

Petition allows refund claim under Stamp Act as Section 5 Limitation Act condones delay due to government approval

HC allowed petition challenging rejection of a refund application under the Stamp Act filed by the petitioner and quashed the authority's order that ... Rejection of application filed by Petitioner u/s 47(c)(1) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958 for refund of Stamp Duty - rejection solely on the ground of limitation - condonation of delay - HELD THAT:- Supreme Court in the in case Mool Chandra vs. Union of India & Anr. [2024 (8) TMI 1528 - SUPREME COURT] observed that it is not the length of delay that would be required to be considered while examining the plea for condonation of delay, it is the cause for delay which has been propounded which will have to be examined. If the cause for delay would fall within the four corners of “sufficient cause”, irrespective of the length of delay, then the same deserves to be condoned. Supreme Court in the case of Bano Saiyed Parwad [2024 (6) TMI 38 - SUPREME COURT] has held that when State deals with a citizen it should not ordinarily rely on technicalities and if the State is satisfied that the case of citizen is a just one, even though legal defences may be open to it, it must act, as an honest person. Furthermore, it held that that period of limitation prescribed under any law should not come in the way because it may bar the remedy, but not the right. On analysis of the Stamp Act, it is found that there is no provision which excludes applicability of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to the Stamp Act and more particularly under Section 48 of the said Act which provides for the time limit for making Application for refund of Stamp Duty. Though equally speaking Authority constituted under the Stamp Act does not have the power to condone the delay if Application is made beyond the time specified in Section 48 of the said Act. However it is seen that the merits have not been considered while passing the impugned order. Hence the moot question is 'Is the Petitioner remediless?' In the present case Petitioner has averred that delay was due to pendency of Government Approval which later came to be rejected 8 months later after payment of Stamp Duty due to which Petitioner could not have filed the Refund Application earlier. Conduct of Petitioner is not in question. Petitioner was entirely reliant on the Government approval. Once that was rejected, the SPA fell through and could not be fructified even though it was executed by parties. However that would prima facie not result into Respondent – State retaining the stamp duty amount. In the present case, delay in seeking refund arose on account of compliance of mandatory procedure before the Government Authority, which was beyond the control of Petitioner. In view thereof, on the pretext of adherence to the strict period of limitation, Government cannot unjustly enrich itself by forfeiting the stamp duty amount deposited by Petitioner on the SPA. Furthermore, it is found that a litigant cannot be penalized for the time consumed before a Government Authority. To deny refund solely on the ground of limitation would offend equity, justice and fairness in the present case. Thus, this is a fit case where interference is warranted and Application for refund of Stamp Duty deserves to be allowed. The impugned order dated 09.10.2023 passed by Respondent No. 2 is unsustainable. It is quashed and set aside - Petiiton allowed. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether an application for refund of stamp duty paid on a share purchase agreement (SPA) that became unenforceable due to subsequent rejection of mandatory governmental approval is barred by the six-month limitation in Section 48(3) of the Maharashtra Stamp Act, 1958. 2. Whether Section 47(1)(c) of the Stamp Act (allowance for impressed stamps 'found to be absolutely void in law from the beginning') applies where the instrument became unenforceable only after a later governmental action. 3. Whether the Authority's rejection of a refund application solely on limitation grounds, without consideration of merits or the cause of delay (governmental process beyond applicant's control), offends principles of equity, natural justice and results in unjust enrichment. 4. Whether principles of limitation law (including the scope for condonation under the Limitation Act or equitable doctrines) and precedents permit relief despite statutory limitation language. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - 1. Applicability and scope of Section 48(3) (limitation) to refund claims Legal framework: Section 48 prescribes time-limits for applications under Section 47: generally six months from date of purchase of stamps (cl.3), with specific clauses for other situations. Section 47 permits Collector to allow refund for specified categories if application is made within period prescribed in Section 48. Precedent treatment: The Court considered Supreme Court authority (Committee-GFIL, Rajeev Nohwar, Bano Saiyed Parwad, Mool Chandra) which recognize that limitation may bar remedy but not the substantive right; in certain circumstances courts have construed limitation periods flexibly to prevent injustice where delay arises from causes beyond applicant's control. Interpretation and reasoning: Clause (3) of Section 48 is residuary and prescribes six months from date of purchase. However, the statute does not expressly oust application of Section 5 of the Limitation Act or expressly deny condonation. More importantly, the Stamp Act does not proximately forbid judicial or equitable intervention where the statutory limitation produces an unjust result. The Court emphasized that the material consideration is the cause of delay; where delay arises from mandatory governmental procedure preventing earlier application, strict reliance on the six-month period to deny refund would be inequitable. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Where delay in seeking refund results from mandatory governmental processes beyond applicant's control and the underlying transaction becomes unenforceable only upon later governmental action, the six-month period in Section 48(3) should not operate to defeat the substantive right to refund; courts may afford relief. Obiter - Observations on non-exclusion of Section 5 Limitation Act are persuasive but ancillary. Conclusion: The six-month limitation in Section 48(3) does not conclusively bar refund where the cause of delay is the pendency and eventual rejection of mandatory government approval; the Authority's sole reliance on limitation was unsustainable in these circumstances. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - 2. Application of Section 47(1)(c) where instrument becomes void only after later governmental action Legal framework: Section 47(c)(1) contemplates instruments 'afterwards found ... to be absolutely void in law from the beginning'; other sub-clauses address instruments later found unfit or failing of intended purpose. Precedent treatment: Authorities recognize that mis-labelling of a statutory provision in the application does not oust entitlement where substantive statutory rights exist (citing Rajeev Nohwar and related decisions). Interpretation and reasoning: Clause (c) of Section 47 is primarily directed to instruments used by parties (executed instruments). In the present facts, the stamp was purchased for an executed SPA which only became unenforceable following Government refusal; the statutory language of Section 47(c) did not strictly encompass an instrument that was valid at the time of purchase but later rendered unenforceable by external governmental action. Nevertheless, the Court held form should not defeat substance: incorrect invocation of Section 47 does not preclude a legitimate refund claim where entitlement otherwise flows from statute and equity. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - A refund claim should be considered on its substantive basis even if the applicant cites an inapplicable sub-provision of Section 47; statutory formality is not fatal to a genuine entitlement. Obiter - Detailed parsing of each sub-clause's scope beyond present facts. Conclusion: Section 47(1)(c) in strict terms did not directly apply, but mis-reference to that provision did not preclude relief; the entitlement to refund must be assessed on substance and equitable considerations. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - 3. Equity, unjust enrichment and denial of refund on technical limitation grounds Legal framework: Equitable maxims (e.g., actus curiae neminem gravabit), restitution principles (Section 65 Contract Act reasoning), and jurisprudence stating State should not rely on technicalities against citizens. Precedent treatment: The Court followed and applied Committee-GFIL, Rajeev Nohwar and Bano Saiyed Parwad where the Supreme Court permitted refund despite limitation where delay arose from circumstances beyond applicant's control (court/authority proceedings or mandatory procedures) and emphasized that limitation may bar remedy but not the right. Interpretation and reasoning: Denial of refund solely because the applicant could not apply within six months due to mandatory governmental approval would amount to unjust enrichment of the State. The Court emphasized that conduct of applicant was bona fide, delay was caused by a statutory governmental process beyond the applicant's control, and the SPA became unenforceable only upon governmental rejection; fairness and justice mandate refund with interest. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Where denial of refund on technical limitation alone would cause unjust enrichment and arise from delays due to mandatory governmental processes beyond applicant's control, equity requires grant of refund notwithstanding statutory time-limit. Obiter - Broader policy remarks on State conduct and technicalities. Conclusion: Rejection of the refund application on limitation alone offended equity and amounted to unjust enrichment; the refund claim merited allowance with interest. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - 4. Role of Limitation Act and remedial power to condone delay Legal framework: Limitation Act, 1963 (Section 5) permits condonation where sufficient cause is shown; absence of express exclusion in Stamp Act suggests Limitation Act applicability; courts can exercise equitable jurisdiction to prevent injustice. Precedent treatment: The Court relied on Mool Chandra and other authorities recognizing that the cause of delay determines condonation; Committee-GFIL and Rajeev Nohwar support reading limitation periods in light of equity when statutory text does not cover the factual eventuality. Interpretation and reasoning: The Stamp Act lacks a provision that expressly bars application of Section 5 Limitation Act or ousts judicial equitable intervention; therefore where delay is shown to have arisen from unavoidable governmental action, condonation or equitable relief is justified. The Authority's failure to consider merits and to apply equitable principles rendered its order legally unsustainable. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - In absence of statutory exclusion, the Limitation Act and equitable doctrines are relevant to prevent injustice caused by delay beyond claimant's control; administrative rejection without considering these aspects is reviewable. Obiter - Observations on scope of administrative condonation powers under Stamp Act. Conclusion: The cause of delay (mandatory government approval process) constituted sufficient cause to treat the limitation bar as non-determinative; the refund claim required allowance with interest and the impugned order rejecting it on limitation alone was quashed. FINAL DISPOSITION The Court found the impugned order unsustainable, quashed it, allowed the refund claim on substantive and equitable grounds, and directed repayment of stamp duty with simple interest, holding that denial solely on limitation and/or incorrect statutory reference would result in unjust enrichment and offend equity and fairness.