2025 (8) TMI 1637 - HC - GST

Appeal dismissed as filed beyond maximum condonable period; Article 226 cannot override CGST statutory limitation

The HC dismissed the petition, holding the appeal was filed beyond the maximum condonable period and no non-communication of the original order was shown ... Condonation of delay in filing appeal - Appeal was presented beyond the maximum prescribed condonable period of one month - HELD THAT:- On perusing the appeal memo and the application for condonation of delay, or rather, the reasons for delay, it is evident that no case of non-communication of the order dated 23 May 2023 was made out. Certain difficulties have no doubt been cited, but they do not relate to non-communication of the Order-in-Original or that the period of limitation should commence from the date of communication. In short, it is evident from the record that the appeal was sought to be instituted even beyond the maximum condonable period as prescribed, i.e., beyond four months from the date of the communication of the order. As such, we can detect no fault in the order of 19 December 2023 by which the Petitioner’s appeal was not entertained. It is well settled that this Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution should not be exercised by ignoring the legislative intent behind the provisions like Section 107(1) and 107(4) of the CGST Act. In the case of Assistant Commissioner (CT) LTU, Kakinada & Ors Vs Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer Health Care Limited [2020 (5) TMI 149 - SUPREME COURT], the Hon’ble Supreme Court has explained that the power of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution is wide, but certainly not wider than the plenary powers bestowed on the Hon’ble Supreme Court under Article 142 of the Constitution. The Hon’ble Supreme Court noted that even while exercising power under Article 142, the Court is required to bear in mind the legislative intent and not render any statutory provision otiose. The Court held that the circumstance that the petitioner might have a good case on merits is not a relevant circumstance where no appeal is lodged within the maximum condonable period. To the same effect is the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Abhyudaya Co-operative Bank Ltd Vs Union of India through Joint Secretary & Ors [2021 (3) TMI 88 - BOMBAY HIGH COURT], where the Coordinate Bench observed that it is trite that when the statute prescribes a period of limitation along with the period for extending the period of limitation, the provisions of Section 5 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 would not apply. The Court noted that it has been settled by decisions of this Court as well as of the Hon’ble Supreme Court that when the law prescribes a period of limitation as well as an extended period of limitation, there is no provision for condonation of delay beyond the extended period of limitation. In such a situation, even a Petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, either for challenging the appeal Court’s order declining to entertain the appeal or the original order was entertained. Petition dismissed. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether the High Court's extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 can be invoked to circumvent statutory limitation bars and the maximum condonable period prescribed under Section 107(1) and Section 107(4) of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. 2. Whether non-communication of the Order-in-Original was pleaded and established so as to defer the commencement of the limitation period for filing the statutory appeal. 3. Whether delay in presenting the statutory appeal beyond the maximum condonable period (four months from communication) can be condoned by the appellate authority or by the High Court in exercise of writ jurisdiction. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1: Permissibility of invoking Article 226 to evade statutory limitation and maximum condonable period under Sections 107(1) and 107(4) CGST Act Legal framework: Section 107(1) prescribes the statutory period for appeal against an Order-in-Original; Section 107(4) permits condonation of delay for a further limited period (one month) if sufficient cause is shown, thereby creating a maximum condonable window (three months prescribed + one month condonable = maximum four months from communication). Precedent treatment: The Court relied on higher court jurisprudence establishing that extraordinary writ jurisdiction is not a vehicle to bypass clear statutory limitation schemes and that delays beyond a statute's maximum condonable period cannot be remedied through writ powers. The principle that legislative intent behind limitation provisions must be respected was applied. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court reasoned that the extraordinary nature of Article 226 cannot be used to negate or render otiose specific statutory limitation provisions. Where the statute prescribes both the period for filing appeal and a defined maximum period for condonation, permitting writ relief to circumvent those limits would subvert legislative intent. The Court noted that even a strong arguable case on merits does not countermand the bar created by failure to file within the prescribed/maximum condonable period. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - The Court's ruling that Article 226 cannot be employed to avoid statutory limitation and maximum condonable periods under the CGST framework is determinative of the case. Obiter - Any ancillary observations about the breadth of Article 142 compared with Article 226 are explanatory of principle but not necessary to the disposal. Conclusions: The Court held that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 should not be invoked to permit scrutiny of merits where the statutory appeal was not filed within the prescribed and maximum condonable period; the petition invoking writ jurisdiction for effectively an out-of-time appeal must fail. Issue 2: Sufficiency of the plea of non-communication to defer commencement of limitation Legal framework: Limitation for filing a statutory appeal ordinarily commences from the date of communication of the impugned order; absence of communication, if pleaded and proved, delays commencement accordingly. Precedent treatment: The Court applied established procedural principles that non-communication must be specifically pleaded and supported by the record to shift the commencement date of limitation; mere invocation of difficulties is insufficient. Interpretation and reasoning: On scrutiny of the appeal memo and the condonation application, the Court found no particularized or credible case of non-communication of the Order-in-Original. The reasons cited did not relate to non-receipt or non-communication that would justify re-calculation of limitation from a later date. Consequently, the statutory period was treated as having commenced from the communicated date and the appeal was filed beyond the maximum condonable window. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - A plea of non-communication must be specifically made out on the record to defer limitation; otherwise the presumption that the order has been communicated stands. Obiter - General comments on types of difficulties that might justify non-communication are explanatory only. Conclusions: The Court concluded that non-communication was not established; therefore the appeal's filing was not within the prescribed or maximum condonable period and could not be entertained. Issue 3: Condonation of delay beyond the maximum condonable period - limits on powers of appellate authority and the High Court Legal framework: The statute itself prescribes both the ordinary period and a limited extended period for condonation. When a statutory regime prescribes a maximum condonable period, supplemental provisions (e.g., Section 5 of the Limitation Act) or exceptional relief under writ jurisdiction cannot be used to extend that maximum. Precedent treatment: The Court followed authoritative decisions holding that where a statute prescribes a maximum condonable period, courts must respect that limit; even successful invocation of equitable jurisdiction at an earlier stage does not validate an appeal instituted beyond the maximum condonable window when the jurisdictional objection is later taken. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court applied these precedents to the facts, observing that the appeal before the appellate authority was presented beyond the maximum permitted 120 days (four months). The appellate authority correctly dismissed the appeal as barred by limitation. The High Court cannot, in exercise of Article 226, grant relief to effectively enlarge the statutory maximum condonable period, because that would negate the legislative scheme and permit circumvention of a jurisdictional bar. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Delay beyond the statute's maximum condonable period renders the appeal not maintainable and cannot be remedied by exercise of Article 226. Obiter - Illustrative references to situations where courts have condoned short delays are incidental. Conclusions: The Court affirmed that delay beyond the maximum condonable period cannot be condoned by the appellate authority nor by the High Court under writ jurisdiction; dismissal of the appeal on limitation grounds was upheld. Cross-references and final disposition Cross-references: Issues 1 and 3 are interlinked - both address the prohibition on using writ jurisdiction to extend or evade the statute's prescribed limitation and maximum condonable period. Issue 2 feeds into Issues 1 and 3 by determining whether the limitation clock ever ran. Disposition: Applying the statutory scheme and binding precedents, and finding no established non-communication, the Court held that the appeal was filed beyond the maximum condonable period and that Article 226 relief could not be granted to circumvent the statutory limitation; the petition was therefore dismissed without costs.