Section 9 interim relief cannot pre-empt corporate meetings or statutory governance powers without satisfying settled injunction tests.

An interim injunction under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot ordinarily be used to block a company from convening board or general meetings to consider removal of a director. Section 169 requires an opportunity of hearing before removal, and Section 173(3) permits shorter board notice for urgent business subject to statutory conditions; a short-notice challenge alone did not justify pre-emptive restraint. The order below also failed to apply the settled tests for interim relief, as it did not clearly establish prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable harm. The restraint order was therefore set aside, and the parties were left to pursue remedies under the company-law and arbitral framework.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether an interim injunction under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 could restrain the company from convening board and general meetings to consider removal of a director; (ii) whether the notices for the meetings were vitiated for non-compliance with the notice and hearing requirements under Sections 169 and 173(3) of the Companies Act, 2013; (iii) whether the impugned order satisfied the settled requirements for grant of interim relief.

Issue (i): whether an interim injunction under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 could restrain the company from convening board and general meetings to consider removal of a director.

Analysis: The relief granted by the court below effectively prevented the company from exercising its statutory and internal governance powers to convene meetings and place the proposed removal before the shareholders. The power under Section 9 is equitable and discretionary, and it is meant to preserve the arbitral subject matter, not to freeze corporate decision-making or confer final relief at the interim stage. The statutory framework governing company meetings permits such meetings to be convened, and judicial interference in the convening of meetings is exceptional.

Conclusion: The injunction restraining the convening of the meetings was not justified.

Issue (ii): whether the notices for the meetings were vitiated for non-compliance with the notice and hearing requirements under Sections 169 and 173(3) of the Companies Act, 2013.

Analysis: Section 169 requires a reasonable opportunity of being heard before removal of a director, while Section 173(3) prescribes seven days' notice for board meetings but also permits shorter notice for urgent business, subject to statutory conditions. The court found that the impugned order placed undue emphasis on the short notice allegation without properly accounting for the urgency of the business and the statutory exception permitting shorter notice. The legality of the proposed meeting could not be pre-emptively interdicted merely on the basis of such challenge.

Conclusion: The notices were not shown to be so defective as to warrant an injunction restraining the meetings.

Issue (iii): whether the impugned order satisfied the settled requirements for grant of interim relief.

Analysis: The order below did not record clear findings on prima facie case, balance of convenience, or irreparable harm. Instead, it restrained the company from proceeding with the meetings in a manner that amounted to a pre-emptive adjudication of contested facts and an impermissible interference with corporate functioning. The statutory and equitable tests for interim protection were therefore not properly applied.

Conclusion: The requirements for interim relief were not met.

Final Conclusion: The appellate court set aside the restraint order and left the parties to pursue their remedies in accordance with law, including the statutory company-law framework and arbitration.

Ratio Decidendi: An interim order under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot be used to pre-emptively restrain corporate meetings or the exercise of statutory governance powers unless the established tests for interim relief are clearly satisfied and the statutory scheme is shown to be violated in a manner warranting such exceptional interference.

---