2025 (8) TMI 564 - HC - Indian Laws

Section 23A Sand Act: Vehicle Confiscation Orders Are Quasi-Judicial and Protected Under Judges Protection Act

The HC held that the petitioner, acting under Section 23A of the Sand Act, 2001, exercised quasi-judicial powers in ordering confiscation of vehicles used ... Confiscation of vehicles used for illegal transportation - functions performed by the petitioner as the Revenue Divisional Officer, are quasi-judicial in nature or not - HELD THAT:- In the instant case, what was done by the petitioner is exercise of power of confiscation under Section 23A of the Sand Act, 2001, for which, revision and appeal also provided, as argued by the learned counsel for the petitioner under Section 23B and 23C. Going by the allegations in the FIR, the allegations are confined to the erroneous and illegal exercise of power, allegedly benefited undue pecuniary advantage to the vehicle owners in collusion with the officer, as stated by the prosecution. While addressing the question of whether the petitioner exercised power under Section 23A of the Sand Act, 2001 as a quasi-judicial authority falling within the purview of Sections 2(a) and 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, the parameters set out by the Apex Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills's case [1962 (9) TMI 63 - SUPREME COURT], as well as the provisions referred to in Annexure C final order, are relevant to be considered. Going by the Apex Court judgment in Jaswant Sugar Mills's case, in order to find out whether an order passed by the authority of a quasi-judicial nature may not be a nomenclature to the officer to describe him as a Judge or a Judicial Officer and what would require is whether, by the virtue of the said Act, the officer declares rights or imposes obligation upon parties affecting their civil rights and whether the investigation, enquiry or the proceedings are subject to certain procedural articles contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party ascertaining the facts by means of evidence on the fact disputed and if the dispute be on question of law on the presentation of legal arguments and a decision resulting in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon those questions of law and fact. When an authority exercises a statutory power with the above requirements, for which, challenge by way of revision and appeal have been provided by the same statute, the said order should not be relegated as an order either of executive or an administrative nature, such order should be characterized as a quasi-judicial order and the officer, who passed the order, which is the core plank of this crime, thus, entitled to protection under Section 2(a) r/w 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985. Holding so, the FIR registered against the petitioner herein who had exercised quasijudicial functions will not sustain in the eye of law. Petition allowed. ISSUES: Whether the exercise of power under Section 23A(2) of the Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Act, 2001 (Sand Act, 2001) by a Revenue Divisional Officer (RDO) constitutes a quasi-judicial function entitling the officer to protection under Sections 2(a) and 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.Whether the FIR alleging offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and Indian Penal Code can be sustained against an officer exercising powers under the Sand Act, 2001 without obtaining sanction under Section 3(2) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.The criteria to determine whether an act or decision is judicial or quasi-judicial in nature as per established judicial precedents.The scope and effect of Sections 2(a) and 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 on prosecution of officers exercising quasi-judicial functions.The applicability of procedural safeguards and remedies under the Sand Act, 2001 (revision and appeal) in relation to the exercise of confiscation powers. RULINGS / HOLDINGS: The power exercised by the officer under Section 23A(2) of the Sand Act, 2001 is 'quasi judicial in nature,' entitling the officer to protection under Sections 2(a) and 3 of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.The FIR registered against the officer for alleged offences related to the exercise of quasi-judicial functions under the Sand Act cannot be sustained without obtaining the required sanction under Section 3(2) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985.To qualify as a judicial or quasi-judicial act, the decision must (1) be a determination upon investigation by application of objective standards to facts in light of pre-existing legal rules; (2) declare rights or impose obligations affecting civil rights; and (3) be subject to procedural safeguards including opportunity to present the case, ascertainment of facts by evidence, and disposal based on findings of law and fact.Section 3(1) of the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985 bars courts from entertaining civil or criminal proceedings against a person acting in discharge of official or judicial duty, but Section 3(2) preserves the power of appropriate authorities to take civil, criminal, or departmental action.The existence of statutory remedies such as revision under Section 23B and appeal under Section 23C of the Sand Act, 2001 supports characterization of the officer's function as quasi-judicial rather than administrative or executive. RATIONALE: The Court applied the legal framework set out in the Judges (Protection) Act, 1985, specifically Sections 2(a) and 3, which define 'Judge' to include persons empowered to give definitive judgments in legal proceedings and grant protection against prosecution for acts done in discharge of official or judicial duties.Judicial precedents, including the Apex Court's criteria in Jaswant Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Lakshmi Chand, were utilized to determine the nature of the function exercised by the officer, emphasizing the presence of procedural safeguards and the effect on civil rights.The Court distinguished between quasi-judicial and purely administrative acts, holding that the confiscation orders under the Sand Act, 2001, involving investigation, hearing, and statutory remedies, fall within quasi-judicial acts.The Court acknowledged that while protection under the Judges (Protection) Act bars prosecution without sanction, it does not preclude departmental or other actions by competent authorities under Section 3(2) of the Act.Previous decisions of this Court and the Apex Court were considered to analyze the scope of protection for officers exercising quasi-judicial powers, including the necessity of sanction before prosecution.