Statutory presumptions under the NI Act upheld where signature admitted and defence failed to rebut liability.

Admission of the drawer's signature on the cheque triggered the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, and a cheque described as security still attracted Section 138 where contemporaneous material showed a legally enforceable liability on presentation. The accused's plea of a smaller loan, repayment, and interpolation in the affidavit failed because it was unsupported by evidence and a Section 313 CrPC statement is not substantive defence evidence; the presumptions therefore remained unrebutted on a preponderance of probabilities. Revisional interference with the one-year simple imprisonment and compensation was unwarranted because no patent illegality, perversity, or miscarriage of justice was shown.

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Issues: (i) Whether the cheque, though asserted to be a security cheque, attracted liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when the accused admitted his signatures and the complainant's version was supported by contemporaneous material. (ii) Whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by alleging a smaller loan, repayment, and interpolation in the affidavit. (iii) Whether the sentence of simple imprisonment for one year and compensation awarded for dishonour of the cheque called for interference in revision.

Issue (i): Whether the cheque, though asserted to be a security cheque, attracted liability under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 when the accused admitted his signatures and the complainant's version was supported by contemporaneous material.

Analysis: Once the accused admitted his signatures on the cheque, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 arose in favour of the holder of the cheque. A cheque described as security does not, by itself, take the matter outside Section 138 if a legally enforceable liability existed on the date of presentation. The materials on record, including the affidavit acknowledging the loan transaction and the dishonour memo showing insufficiency of funds, supported the complainant's case. The accused led no evidence to show discharge of liability.

Conclusion: The cheque was covered by Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and liability was made out against the accused.

Issue (ii): Whether the accused rebutted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by alleging a smaller loan, repayment, and interpolation in the affidavit.

Analysis: The accused's plea that only a smaller amount was borrowed and repaid remained unsupported by evidence. A statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is not substantive defence evidence. The interpolation allegation regarding the affidavit also failed because the witness was not cross-examined on that aspect, and the accused admitted his signatures on the document. In the absence of cogent rebuttal, the presumption of consideration and legally enforceable liability remained unrebutted on the standard of preponderance of probabilities.

Conclusion: The accused failed to rebut the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issue (iii): Whether the sentence of simple imprisonment for one year and compensation awarded for dishonour of the cheque called for interference in revision.

Analysis: Revisional interference is narrow and is confined to patent illegality, jurisdictional error, perversity, or manifest miscarriage of justice. The conviction rested on concurrent factual findings and no perversity was shown. The sentence was considered commensurate with the deterrent object of Section 138 proceedings, and the compensation was held justified having regard to the cheque amount, the lapse of time, and the complainant's loss and litigation burden.

Conclusion: No interference was warranted with the sentence or compensation.

Final Conclusion: The revision was found to be devoid of merit, and the conviction and sentence under the cheque dishonour law were left undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Admission of signature on a cheque triggers the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, and a drawer can displace them only by a probable defence supported by evidence; a cheque issued as security may still attract Section 138 if a legally enforceable liability exists on the date of presentation.

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