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Issues: Whether the criminal complaint and summons under the Central Excise Act, 1944 were liable to be quashed or the appellants discharged on the ground that the departmental adjudication order relied upon at an earlier stage had been set aside and that the allegations in the complaint were therefore groundless.
Analysis: The complaint was not founded solely on the earlier adjudication order, but on the search, investigation, and material collected during the inquiry, which disclosed prima facie allegations supporting prosecution. The earlier departmental order had been set aside on procedural or technical grounds and not on merits, so it did not wipe out the factual basis of the prosecution. The Court also held that adjudication proceedings and criminal prosecution can proceed in parallel under the Central Excise regime, and that the materials before the trial court were sufficient to justify issuance of summons. The plea that the complaint was groundless, or that the discharge jurisdiction had been wrongly exercised, was rejected.
Conclusion: The criminal appeal was dismissed and the refusal to discharge the appellants was upheld.
Ratio Decidendi: Where a departmental order is set aside on procedural grounds and the complaint is independently supported by investigation material, criminal prosecution may continue in parallel and discharge is not warranted merely because the earlier adjudication did not survive.