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<h1>SC upholds FIR registration under Section 156(3) CrPC; no jurisdictional error found, proceedings to continue</h1> The SC upheld the Metropolitan Magistrate's order directing registration of the FIR under Section 156(3) CrPC, finding no lack of jurisdiction or failure ... Power of High Court under Section 482 of Code of Criminal Procedure to quash the FIR - filing of an application u/s 156(3) of the CrPC without approaching the police authorities - order passed without application of mind - denial of quashing of order for the reason that the investigations have been completed and the chargesheets have been filed against the accused persons - nature of dispute raised in the offending FIR is of a civil nature or not - present FIR amounts to a successive FIR and to be investigated independently. Whether an application under Section 156(3) CrPC could have been filed without approaching the police authorities? - HELD THAT:- On a conspicuous reading of the provisions of Sections 154, 156 and 190 of the CrPC together, it is crystal clear that an informant who wants to report about a commission of a cognizable offence has to, in the first instance, approach the officer-in-charge of the police station for setting the criminal law into motion by lodging an FIR. However, if such an information is not accepted by the officer-in-charge of the police station and he refuses to record it, the remedy of the informant is to approach the Superintendent of Police concerned. It is only subsequent to availing the above opportunities if he is not successful, he may approach the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC for necessary action or of taking cognizance in accordance with Section 190 of the CrPC. In the instant case, a bare perusal of the application filed under Section 156(3) of the CrPC dated 01.07.2005 would reveal that the informant therein had simply stated that an offence under Sections 420, 120-B and 34 of the IPC have been committed and that the informant had approached the βpolice officialsβ several times but in vain, but the application is completely silent as to when did the informant approach the Police or the Superintendent of Police. The application nowhere states that the informant has ever approached the officer-in-charge of the police station for lodging the FIR in accordance with Section 154 of the CrPC or that on refusal to record such information he has availed the remedy of approaching the Superintendent of Police concerned. The mere bald allegation without any details or proof thereof, that the police authorities were approached several times is not acceptable. The Magistrate ought not to ordinarily entertain an application under Section 156(3) CrPC directly unless the informant has availed and exhausted his remedies provided under Section 154(3) CrPC, but as the Magistrate is otherwise competent under Section 156(3) CrPC to direct the registration of an FIR if the allegations in the application/complaint discloses the commission of a cognizable offence, it is opined that the order so passed by the Magistrate would not be without jurisdiction and would not stand vitiated on this count. Whether the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate is an order passed without application of mind, irrespective of the fact that it states that the parties were βheardβ and the documents were βperusedβ? - HELD THAT:- The provisions of Section 156 (3) of the CrPC have subsequently been interpreted and it has been held that the Magistrate while directing for registering an FIR has to apply his independent mind based upon legal principles and the order so passed has to be a reasoned order. The provision so interpreted exists from its inception. Merely because a judgment by the Court has simply interpreted and reiterated the established principles of law that ought to have been into practice, it would not mean that such principles would be applicable prospectively only from the date of its interpretation. The interpretation made later on would not mean that the provision had a different meaning prior to its above interpretation. Therefore, the High Court manifestly erred in holding that at the relevant time there was no requirement of application of mind and for passing a speaking order, as the judgments of the higher courts holding otherwise have been penned down subsequently. The mere stating in the order that the counsel has been heard and the application and the material produced have been perused, may not be indicative of the fact that the Magistrate had actually applied his mind to the controversy in issue. However, the fact that the perusal of the application and complaint attached to it, satisfied the Magistrate that it discloses a cognizable offence, is very material and relevant which proves the application of mind by him. Once such a satisfaction has been recorded by the Magistrate, even if wrongly, it is not liable to be interfered with in exercise of inherent powers by the higher courts. The powers vested in the court either under Section 482 CrPC or Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India are not for the purposes of appreciating the evidence or examining the correctness of the evidence collected during investigation to record a different conclusion other than recorded by the Magistrate that he is satisfied that a cognizable offence has been disclosed in the application/complaint. In these facts and circumstances, for the reason that the Magistrate not only heard the counsel and perused the documents but has even considered the case law cited and has opined that the information discloses a cognizable offence, implies that he has actually applied his mind to the contents of the application before passing the impugned order directing for the registration of the FIR. Therefore, there is no fault with the order of the High Court in refusing to quash the order. Whether the High Court can deny quashing of the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate and the FIR registered pursuant to it for the reasons that the investigations have been completed and the chargesheets have been filed against the accused persons? - HELD THAT:- In the present case with which we are dealing, we have already opined earlier that there is no legal flaw in the order passed by the Magistrate dated 01.07.2005 directing for the registration of the FIR. The order clearly states that the Magistrate is satisfied that the allegations indeed make out a cognizable offence for the purposes of investigation. The said satisfaction recorded by the Magistrate cannot be disturbed in exercise of inherent powers. Therefore, if in pursuance of the said order, the FIR has been registered which discloses a cognizable offence, the same cannot be struck down at this stage. Once much water has flown down the bridge subsequent to the order of the registration of FIR and the registration of FIR, giving rise to a fresh cause of action to challenge the chargesheets, it is opined that the High Court has rightly refused to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction so as to interfere with the FIR as the investigations have been completed and the chargesheets have been filed. Whether the nature of dispute raised in the offending FIR is of a civil nature and there is no involvement of criminality when both sides have previously lodged FIRs originating from the same MoU dated 11.03.1995? - HELD THAT:- The breach of conditions of the MoU or allegations of false promises in relation to the aforesaid MoU are undisputedly subject matter of the different FIRs lodged by VLS itself. Therefore, violation of those conditions for some reasons have been considered by VLS to be offensive. Therefore, the High Court rightly held that if breach of those conditions of the MoU itself has been considered to be of criminal nature by VLS, it cannot be permitted to turn around and allege that such breach of conditions would be of pure civil nature. Whether the present FIR amounts to a successive FIR based upon the same allegations as contained in an earlier FIR No.326/2004 and as such cannot be investigated independently? - HELD THAT:- It has been well settled that successive FIRs in respect of a same cognizable offence are not maintainable provided that on the basis of the earlier FIR, investigations have been completed and the trial had either resulted in conviction or acquittal of the accused. In the case at hand, FIR No.326/2004 was lodged at Police Station, Connaught Place, New Delhi, whereas the subsequent FIR No.380/2005 was lodged at Police Station, Defence Colony, New Delhi. Both the FIRs may be based on similar allegations but they are not virtually the same. The allegations are different and even the parties against whom the FIRs were filed are not the same. Therefore, such a subsequent FIR may be maintainable but refrained from making any final comment on the above aspect as no such finding on this aspect has been returned by the court below. Since in connection with FIR No.380/2005, investigations have been completed and the High Court has refused to quash the said FIR in exercise of its discretionary power, it is not deemed necessary to exercise discretion to override that of the High Court and leave the matter to proceed further in accordance with law. It is not required to interfere with the orders impugned and the petitions are dismissed. ISSUES: Whether an application under Section 156(3) of the CrPC can be filed without first approaching the police authorities under Section 154 CrPC or the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC.Whether the order dated 01.07.2005 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate directing registration of the FIR was passed without application of mind and without a speaking order.Whether the High Court can refuse to quash the FIR and the Magistrate's order on the ground that investigations have been completed and chargesheets filed.Whether the dispute raised in the FIR is purely civil in nature with no criminality involved, given that both parties had previously lodged FIRs arising from the same Memorandum of Understanding (MoU).Whether the present FIR amounts to a successive FIR based on the same allegations as an earlier FIR and is thus not maintainable or investigable independently. RULINGS / HOLDINGS: The informant must first approach the officer-in-charge of the police station under Section 154 CrPC and, if refused, the Superintendent of Police under Section 154(3) CrPC before moving the Magistrate under Section 156(3) CrPC; filing directly under Section 156(3) without exhausting these remedies is a procedural irregularity but does not render the Magistrate's order illegal or without jurisdiction.The Magistrate's order dated 01.07.2005, which states that the parties were 'heard' and the documents 'perused,' reflects an application of mind and constitutes a speaking order; such satisfaction that a cognizable offence is disclosed cannot be disturbed in exercise of inherent powers.The High Court rightly refused to quash the FIR and the Magistrate's order as the investigation has been completed and chargesheets filed; inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC or Articles 226/227 of the Constitution are discretionary and not to be exercised lightly especially where the FIR discloses a cognizable offence.The nature of the dispute, though involving breach of the MoU (a civil matter), also contains allegations of inducement, criminal conspiracy, and cheating which, if proved, amount to cognizable offences; therefore, the FIR cannot be quashed merely on the ground that the dispute is civil in nature.The present FIR, though based on similar information as the earlier FIR No.326/2004, is not virtually the same and was lodged at a different police station; since there has been no conviction or acquittal arising from the earlier FIR, the subsequent FIR is maintainable and investigable independently. RATIONALE: The Court applied the statutory framework under Sections 154, 156(3), and 190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, emphasizing the procedural sequence for lodging FIRs and the Magistrate's power to order investigation only after exhaustion of police remedies.The Court relied on established precedent that a Magistrate's order under Section 156(3) CrPC must be a reasoned, speaking order reflecting application of mind, consistent with principles of natural justice, citing authoritative rulings on the necessity of reasons in judicial decisions.The Court reaffirmed the discretionary nature of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC and constitutional writ jurisdiction, underscoring that such powers are not to be exercised to interfere with ongoing investigations or chargesheets unless there is a manifest illegality or abuse of process.The Court acknowledged settled principles from prior case law that courts should be slow to interfere with FIRs and investigations, and that the genuineness of allegations and criminality can only be examined after evidence is collected, not at the quashing stage.The Court distinguished between successive FIRs and held that absent conviction or acquittal on the earlier FIR, a subsequent FIR on similar but not identical allegations is maintainable, referencing public policy against harassment by repeated trials but also recognizing independent FIRs filed at different police stations.