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<h1>GST order quashed for being non-speaking despite petitioner's absence from hearings under Section 74</h1> The HC quashed an order passed under Section 74 of the Tamil Nadu GST Act, 2017, finding it to be a non-speaking order that failed to consider the ... Maintainability of petition - time limitation - petitioner has filed this writ petition two days after the expiry of the limitation period for filing an appeal under Section 107 of the TNGST Act, 2017 - ex-parte impugned order - Non-speaking order - violation of principles of natural justice - HELD THAT:- A reading of the impugned order indicates that it is a nonspeaking order and reflects non-application of mind to the reply filed by the petitioner. Therefore, this Court has no option except to quash the impugned order and remit the matter back to the respondent to pass a fresh order on merits, as expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. The petitioner shall file a detailed reply within a period of 30 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. Petition disposed off. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether a quasi-judicial order passed under Section 74 of the TNGST Act, 2017 is liable to be quashed on the ground that it is non-speaking and demonstrates non-application of mind to the reply filed by the taxpayer. 2. Whether failure to expressly consider and deal with documents and submissions (including invoices under Section 16(2) and certificates referred to in Circular No.183-2022 dated 27-12-2022) in the adjudicating order renders the order invalid. 3. Whether the Court should remit the matter for fresh adjudication where the impugned order is found to be non-speaking, and what procedural directions, if any, should be issued on remand (time-limits for fresh adjudication and for filing further replies). 4. Whether a writ remedy can be entertained where an appeal remedy under Section 107 was available but the taxpayer filed the writ two days after the period for filing such appeal had expired (maintainability/relief in spite of delay). ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 1: Validity of a non-speaking adjudication order Legal framework: Administrative law and principles of quasi-judicial adjudication require that orders record the reasons for conclusions reached and demonstrate application of mind to material and submissions placed before the authority; statutory adjudication under Section 74 of the TNGST Act, 2017 must also be reasoned. Precedent Treatment: The Court did not cite or rely on specific precedents in the text; the decision proceeds on established principles requiring speaking orders and consideration of replies. Interpretation and reasoning: The impugned order's operative portion states that the taxpayer 'have not filed reply as per query' and lists non-attendance at personal hearings; the Court found this to be a conclusory approach that treated the taxpayer's filed reply as if it did not address the SCN, without demonstrating examination of the specific submissions/documents tendered. The order therefore fails to record reasons why the particular materials submitted were inadequate, and does not show application of mind. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - A quasi-judicial order that does not demonstrate consideration of the taxpayer's reply and lacks reasoning is liable to be quashed for non-application of mind. Obiter - Observations on the sufficiency of specific documents (e.g., invoices/certificates) are contextual to the impugned order and do not form binding generalizations beyond the need for reasoned adjudication. Conclusion: The impugned order is a non-speaking order reflecting non-application of mind and is therefore liable to be quashed. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 2: Requirement to consider documents and statutory/circular requirements Legal framework: Substantive provisions (noted in the impugned order) include Section 16(2) (requiring production of original invoices and related documents for input tax credit) and administrative guidance (Circular No.183-2022) prescribing documentary/certification requirements. Adjudicating authorities must examine whether statutory/documentary prerequisites are fulfilled before confirming proposals under Section 74. Precedent Treatment: No specific precedent invoked; the Court applied principle that adjudicatory findings must arise from consideration of material placed on record. Interpretation and reasoning: The impugned order purported to confirm the proposal because originals and certificates were not filed; however, the order did not engage with the taxpayer's submissions or demonstrate why the documents proffered (if any) were insufficient. The Court emphasizes that an authority cannot merely record absence of appearance/reminders as conclusive proof of no defence without evaluating the actual replies and materials filed. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Failure to consider or record reasons regarding compliance with statutory/documentary requisites renders the order unsustainable. Obiter - Specific directions on sufficiency of particular forms/certificates would be fact-sensitive and not a general rule. Conclusion: The adjudicating authority's cursory reliance on absence at personal hearings and blanket statements about non-filing of invoices/certificates is inadequate; the matter requires fresh consideration of whether statutory/documentary requirements were met. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 3: Power and propriety of quashing and remitting for fresh adjudication and procedural directions on remand Legal framework: Courts possess power to quash administrative/quasi-judicial orders that are non-speaking or suffer from non-application of mind and to remit for fresh adjudication on merits; equitable exercise of writ jurisdiction permits framing of directions to ensure expeditious disposal on remand. Precedent Treatment: The Court did not rely on or distinguish authorities; it applied established remedial principles to the facts before it. Interpretation and reasoning: Given the impugned order's deficiency, quashing and remittal are necessary to secure a reasoned decision. The Court exercised its remedial power to set timelines to prevent undue delay: remand disposal 'preferably within three months' and an affirmative time for the taxpayer to file a detailed reply within 30 days of receipt of the order. The directions balance the interest of orderly adjudication and the revenue's interest by preserving the respondent's opportunity to re-adjudicate on merits. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - Where an adjudication order is quashed for non-speaking reasoning, remand for fresh adjudication with appropriate timelines is an appropriate and necessary remedy. Obiter - The specific three-month timeframe and 30-day period for filing may be viewed as procedural directions tailored to this matter rather than rigid universal standards. Conclusion: The proper course is to quash the defective order and remit the matter for fresh decision on merits, with the taxpayer given 30 days to file detailed reply and the authority directed to decide preferably within three months from receipt of the court's order. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS - Issue 4: Maintainability of writ despite delay in filing appeal under Section 107 (two days late) Legal framework: Availability of alternative statutory remedies (appeal) is a factor in considering writ jurisdiction; ordinarily, writ will not lie where efficacious alternative remedy exists and is available within limitation. However, courts may exercise writ jurisdiction in the interest of justice where statutory windows are missed by short periods or by consent of parties. Precedent Treatment: No authority was cited; the Court disposed of the petition by consent and addressed the merits rather than dismissing on account of delay. Interpretation and reasoning: The record shows the writ was filed two days after the appeal period under Section 107 expired. The petition was disposed of at the time of admission with the consent of counsel for both sides. The Court did not dismiss on the ground of delay; instead it proceeded to examine the impugned order's merits and grant relief on the basis of non-speaking nature. The manner of disposal indicates that the short delay and the consent of parties obviated the need to entertain a technical objection on limitation. Ratio vs. Obiter: Obiter - The acceptance of the writ despite a two-day delay, in the context of consent disposal and evident defects in the impugned order, is a fact-specific outcome and does not constitute a categorical rule on maintainability of writs where statutory appeals are available. Conclusion: The writ petition was entertained and disposed on merits notwithstanding the two-day delay in initiating the statutory appeal, the result being influenced by consent and the substantive defect in the impugned order; no general precedent on delay was laid down. OVERALL CONCLUSION The impugned order is quashed for being non-speaking and showing non-application of mind to the taxpayer's replies and documents; the matter is remitted for fresh adjudication on merits with the taxpayer afforded 30 days to file a detailed reply and the adjudicating authority directed to decide preferably within three months from receipt of the court's order. The writ was entertained despite a two-day delay in filing a statutory appeal, in view of consent and the substantive infirmity of the impugned order.