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Issues: (i) Whether the criminal complaint cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the plea that the cheques were security cheques issued in the name of a different proprietorship concern and that no legally enforceable debt existed. (ii) Whether the pendency of a civil suit for eviction and arrears of rent justified quashing of the complaint cases. (iii) Whether the petitions could succeed in a single application for quashing of multiple complaint cases arising out of different causes of action.
Issue (i): Whether the criminal complaint cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 could be quashed in exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the plea that the cheques were security cheques issued in the name of a different proprietorship concern and that no legally enforceable debt existed.
Analysis: The dispute centered on issuance and dishonour of post-dated cheques, the existence of a lease arrangement, and the claim that the cheques were issued in the name of a proprietorship concern of the second petitioner. The Court found that issuance of the post-dated security cheques was not in dispute and that the question whether they represented liability arising out of the transaction, and whether the defence of absence of enforceable debt could succeed, involved matters to be tested at trial. The statutory presumption under Section 139 operates at the threshold and can be rebutted by evidence. The Court held that the materials disclosed a prima facie case and that the issues raised could not be conclusively resolved in quashing proceedings.
Conclusion: Quashing was not warranted on the ground of absence of legally enforceable debt or the nature of the cheques, and the proceedings were allowed to continue.
Issue (ii): Whether the pendency of a civil suit for eviction and arrears of rent justified quashing of the complaint cases.
Analysis: The civil suit and the criminal complaints arose from the same commercial relationship, but the Court held that the mere existence of civil proceedings did not extinguish the criminal liability alleged in the complaint cases. The pendency of a civil remedy was not treated as a ground, by itself, to quash criminal proceedings where the ingredients of the offence were made out prima facie.
Conclusion: The pending civil suit did not justify quashing the complaint cases.
Issue (iii): Whether the petitions could succeed in a single application for quashing of multiple complaint cases arising out of different causes of action.
Analysis: The Court noted that the five complaint cases arose from different causes of action and were instituted on the basis of separate dishonoured cheques. In that backdrop, the objection that all five matters were sought to be quashed by one petition was accepted as a relevant factor against the prayer for blanket quashing.
Conclusion: The challenge to all five complaint cases in a single quashing petition did not merit acceptance.
Final Conclusion: The inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not exercised to interfere with the complaint cases, which were left to proceed before the trial court.
Ratio Decidendi: In quashing proceedings relating to dishonour of cheques, where issuance of the cheques and the underlying transaction are not conclusively displaced, disputes about legally enforceable debt and the effect of the statutory presumption under Section 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 must ordinarily be adjudicated at trial, not in inherent jurisdiction.