2025 (6) TMI 2 - SC - Indian Laws

Legal heir cannot seek name deletion after accepting impleadment under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC without objection

SULTHAN SAID IBRAHIM Versus PRAKASAN & ORS.

The SC dismissed an appeal where appellant sought deletion of his name from the array of parties after being impleaded as a legal heir under Order XXII ... Application under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) - impleadment as a legal heir - seeking the deletion of his name from the array of parties - doctrine of res judicata - failure of the original defendant to execute the sale deed after accepting the balance consideration - entitlement to the benefit of Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 - transfer of possession of the suit property - failed to establish his tenancy or possession over the suit property - HELD THAT:- The position of law is well settled that the power to strike out or add a party to the proceedings under Order I Rule 10 can be exercised by the court at any stage of the proceeding. However, the same cannot be construed to mean that when a particular party has been impleaded as a legal heir under Order XXII Rule 4 after due inquiry by the court and without any objections, the party can approach the court anytime later and seek his deletion from the array of parties by filing an application under Order I Rule 10. If at all the appellant was aggrieved by his impleadment as a legal heir, the suitable course of action was to first object to his impleadment under Sub-rule (2) of Order XXII Rule 4. Even then if the Trial Court would have decided against the appellant, it would have been open to him to approach the High Court by filing a revision application against the order of impleadment. However, the appellant chose to sit tight in the impleadment proceedings despite entering appearance. He was also a respondent in the application preferred by some of the legal heirs under Section 28 of the SRA seeking rescission of the contract, both before the Trial Court and later before the High Court in the revision preferred against the rejection of the said application. However, he chose not to raise any objection in either of these proceedings as well. In the present case, the order for impleadment of the appellant as a legal heir was made by the Trial Court after due inquiry under Order XXII, as also observed by the Trial Court in its order rejecting the application under Order I Rule 10. Evidently, neither any objection was raised by the appellant before the Trial Court nor any revision was preferred subsequently against the said order. Thus, it could be said that the issue as regards the impleadment of the appellant as a legal heir of the original defendant had attained finality between the parties and thus the subsequent application under Order I Rule 10 seeking to get his name deleted from the array of parties could be said to be barred by res judicata. Undoubtedly, the expression “at any stage of the proceedings” used in Order I Rule 10 allows the court to exercise its power at any stage, however the same cannot be construed to mean that the defendant can keep reagitating the same objection at different stages of the same proceeding, when the issue has been determined conclusively at a previous stage. Allowing the same would run contrary to the considerations of fair play and justice and would amount to keeping the parties in a state of limbo as regards the adjudication of the disputes. We are aware of the decision of this Court in Pankajbhai Rameshbhai Zalavadiya v. Jethabhai Kalabhai Zalavadiya [2017 (10) TMI 1397 - SUPREME COURT] wherein it was held that an application under Order I Rule 10 would not be liable to be rejected solely on the ground that an application under Order XXII Rule 4 had been found to not be maintainable. However, the facts before us are quite different from the facts before the Court in Jethabhai (supra). Therein, the subsequent application under Order I Rule 10 was allowed on the ground that the initial application under Order XXII Rule 4 was filed under a mistake of law and fact as the defendant had passed away prior to the institution of the suit, whereas order XXII Rule 4 only contemplates a situation wherein the defendant passes away during the pendency of the proceedings. Thus, in such a scenario, it was observed that the appropriate application would be under Order I Rule 10. However, in the present case, the appropriate remedy for the appellant lay in raising an objection under Sub-rule (2) of Rule (4) of Order XXII at the time of the impleadment and not under Order I Rule 10 four years after the impleadment came to be allowed. Thus, had the appellant taken up the objection at the right stage of the proceedings, it would have been open to the court to look into the said objection under Order XXII Rule 5 and disallow his impleadment as a legal heir of the original defendant. However, having failed to act at the appropriate stage, it was not open to the appellant to subsequently approach the court with an application under Order I Rule 10. Further, as we shall shortly discuss, the appellant having failed to raise the plea of his tenancy and possession over the suit property, the rejection of his application under Order I Rule 10 has no material effect on the ultimate outcome of the lis. Thus, as in the present case, both the courts below have arrived at the conclusion that the exclusive possession of the suit property could be said to be with the original defendant when the suit was decreed, the relief of transfer of possession is implicit in the decree for specific performance directing the original defendant to execute a sale deed in the favour of the original plaintiff. Thus, we are of the view that the High Court, as well as the Trial Court, committed no error, much less any error of law, in arriving at their respective decisions. As a result, the appeal fails and is, hereby, dismissed with costs of Rs 25,000/- to be paid by the appellant and deposited with the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee within a period of two weeks from today. The sale deed having already been executed in favour of the respondent no. 1, the Executing Court shall now proceed to ensure that vacant and peaceful possession of the suit property is handed over to the respondent no.1 in his capacity as the decree holder as well as the title holder of the suit property and, if necessary, with the aid of police. This exercise shall be completed within a period of two months from today without fail. Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed of. 1. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDEREDa. Whether the High Court erred in rejecting the appellant's petition on the ground that the application under Order I Rule 10(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) seeking deletion of his name from the array of parties was barred by the doctrine of res judicata.b. Whether the appellant is entitled to the protection under Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, on the basis of tenancy rights inherited from his deceased father.c. Whether, in the facts of this case, the transfer of possession of the suit property was implicit in the decree of specific performance granted by the Trial Court.2. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSISa. Applicability of Res Judicata to the Application under Order I Rule 10(2) CPCRelevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Order I Rule 10(2) CPC empowers courts to add or strike out parties at any stage of proceedings to ensure effective adjudication of all questions involved in the suit. The power is broad and discretionary but must be exercised judiciously. The principle of res judicata, embodied in Section 11 CPC, bars re-litigation of issues that have been finally decided between the same parties. It applies not only between separate suits but also at different stages of the same proceeding. This Court has emphasized that once a matter is finally decided by a court of competent jurisdiction, it cannot be re-agitated in subsequent stages of the same proceeding (Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar; Satyadhyan Ghosal v. Deorajin Debi; S. Ramachandra Rao v. S. Nagabhushana Rao).Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The appellant was impleaded as a legal heir of the deceased original defendant under Order XXII Rule 4 CPC after due inquiry and without objection at the time. The appellant participated in subsequent proceedings without challenging his status. The Trial Court and High Court found that the appellant's belated application under Order I Rule 10(2) seeking deletion from the party array was an attempt to circumvent the finality of the earlier order and delay execution proceedings.The Court held that although Order I Rule 10(2) allows deletion of parties at any stage, it does not permit repetitive challenges to a settled issue. The appellant's failure to object at the appropriate stage and his participation in related proceedings estopped him from reopening the question. The High Court's rejection of the application on the ground of res judicata was upheld as legally sound.Key Evidence and Findings: The appellant was served notice and appeared when impleaded; no objection was raised for over four years. The appellant was also a respondent in the application for rescission of contract but did not object then. The timing of the application for deletion, filed immediately after dismissal of a related revision petition, indicated a strategy to delay execution.Application of Law to Facts: The legal framework mandates finality in litigation to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. The appellant's conduct and delay negated his entitlement to challenge impleadment at a belated stage. The doctrine of res judicata applied to bar the application under Order I Rule 10(2).Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant argued that impleadment under Order I Rule 10(2) is a summary procedure and cannot operate as res judicata, citing precedents allowing deletion of parties at any stage. The Court distinguished these by emphasizing the settled nature of the issue and the appellant's failure to raise objections earlier.Conclusion: The Court concluded that the High Court correctly dismissed the application as barred by res judicata and that the appellant's attempt to delete his name was an abuse of process.b. Entitlement of the Appellant to Protection under Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965Relevant Legal Framework and Precedents: Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, contains a non obstante clause protecting tenants from eviction except in accordance with the Act. The tenancy rights of a protected tenant continue until validly terminated (B. Bal Reddy v. Teegala Narayana Reddy). The appellant claimed tenancy rights inherited from his deceased father, who was acknowledged as tenant in the 1976 assignment deed and held municipal licenses.Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that while the appellant's father was a tenant prior to his death in 1992, the appellant failed to establish tenancy or possession post-1996 agreement to sell. The 1996 agreement, to which the appellant was a witness, did not mention tenancy rights, unlike the 1976 deed. The appellant did not raise tenancy objections during earlier proceedings and failed to produce documentary evidence of tenancy or possession from the time of the agreement to sell until execution proceedings.Key Evidence and Findings: The appellant's reliance on municipal licenses issued in 1992 and 2011 was insufficient to prove tenancy or possession, especially since the 2011 license was issued during pendency of execution proceedings. Both Trial Court and High Court rejected the tenancy claim based on the absence of evidence and inconsistent conduct.Application of Law to Facts: The tenancy protection under the Act does not extend to the appellant without proof of valid tenancy rights and possession. The omission of tenancy clauses in the 1996 agreement and failure to raise tenancy claims earlier undermined the appellant's case.Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant argued that tenancy rights inherited from his father entitled him to protection against eviction. The Court rejected this, noting the absence of tenancy transfer in the sale agreement and the appellant's failure to assert such rights timely.Conclusion: The appellant was not entitled to protection under Section 11 of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, as tenancy rights were not established or continued in his favor.c. Whether Transfer of Possession was Implicit in the Decree for Specific PerformanceRelevant Legal Framework and Precedents: The decree for specific performance under the Specific Relief Act, 1963, may or may not include possession depending on pleadings and facts. This Court in Babu Lal v. Hazari Lal Kishori Lal and recently in Rohit Kochhar v. Vipul Infrastructure Developers Ltd. held that where exclusive possession is with the contracting party, transfer of possession may be implicit in the decree for specific performance. Conversely, possession relief must be specifically sought if the property is in possession of a third party (Birma Devi v. Subhash).Court's Interpretation and Reasoning: The Court found that exclusive possession of the suit property was with the original defendant when the suit was decreed. The decree directing execution of the sale deed implicitly included transfer of possession. The appellant's contention that possession relief was not granted and thus the decree was satisfied by execution of sale deed alone was rejected.Key Evidence and Findings: The decree dated 17.03.2003 directed the original defendant to execute the sale deed upon payment of balance consideration. The appellant's tenancy claim was rejected. The courts below held possession was implicit in the decree given the circumstances.Application of Law to Facts: The Court applied settled principles that possession transfer can be implicit in specific performance decrees where the defendant held exclusive possession. The appellant's failure to raise tenancy or possession claims earlier supported this conclusion.Treatment of Competing Arguments: The appellant relied on precedents requiring specific pleadings for possession relief. The Court distinguished those by emphasizing the factual possession status and the nature of the decree in this case.Conclusion: The decree for specific performance implicitly included transfer of possession, entitling the decree-holder to possession of the suit property.3. SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGS'The power to strike out or add a party under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC is a broad discretion exercisable at any stage of the proceedings; however, this power cannot be used to re-agitate an issue already finally decided between the parties, as such would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata.''The doctrine of res judicata applies not only to separate proceedings but also to different stages of the same proceeding, ensuring finality and preventing vexatious litigation.''Tenancy rights under the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965, require proof of valid tenancy and possession; mere inheritance of tenancy rights without evidence of continuation or transfer is insufficient to claim protection.''Where exclusive possession of the suit property is with the contracting party at the time of decree for specific performance, the transfer of possession is implicit in the decree even if not expressly granted.''An application under Order I Rule 10(2) CPC seeking deletion of a party is not maintainable if the party was validly impleaded earlier after due inquiry and without objection, and the issue has attained finality.''The Court observed that the appellant's application was a 'ruse' to delay execution and was barred by constructive res judicata and devoid of bonafides.''The Executing Court is directed to ensure vacant and peaceful possession is handed over to the decree-holder within two months, if necessary with police aid.'