Statutory post-award interest under arbitration law applies by default when the award is silent, with only the rate being variable.

Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 makes post-award interest statutory unless the award directs a different rate; the phrase "unless the award otherwise directs" qualifies only the rate, not the entitlement. Section 31(7)(a) separately gives the tribunal discretion on pre-award interest. Where an award is silent on post-award interest for a payable sum, the statutory rate of 18% per annum applies, including in execution, because enforcing that interest does not amount to going behind the award. The tribunal may specify post-award interest on part of the sum, but if it does not, the statute supplies the default rate.

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Issues: Whether the expression "unless the award otherwise directs" in Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 qualifies the entitlement to post-award interest or only the rate of such interest, and whether the executing court could grant statutory post-award interest where the arbitral award was silent on that aspect for certain claims.

Analysis: Section 31(7)(a) governs pre-award interest and confers a broad discretion on the arbitral tribunal as to rate, sum, and period. Section 31(7)(b), by contrast, operates after the award and provides that the sum directed to be paid by the award shall carry interest at 18% per annum unless the award otherwise directs. The phrase "unless the award otherwise directs" is placed so as to qualify only the rate of post-award interest, not the entitlement to interest itself. The decision in Hyder Consulting, as later explained in Morgan Securities and affirmed in R.P. Garg, establishes that post-award interest is mandatory unless the tribunal specifies a different rate, and that the tribunal may award post-award interest on part of the sum, but if it does not do so the statutory rate applies. In execution, granting such statutory interest does not amount to going behind the award because the entitlement flows from the statute.

Conclusion: The phrase qualifies only the rate of post-award interest and not the entitlement to it. The executing court was justified in directing payment of post-award interest at the statutory rate, and there was no illegality or perversity in the impugned order.

Ratio Decidendi: Under Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, entitlement to post-award interest is statutory, and the arbitral tribunal's discretion extends only to fixing a different rate; if the award is silent, the statutory rate applies and may be enforced in execution.

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