2025 (3) TMI 915 - HC - Customs

Petition allowed after 35-year delay in criminal case violates right to speedy trial under Article 21

Dev Kumar Agarwal, & Prabha D. Agarwal Versus Assistant Director, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, and another.

Bombay HC allowed petition challenging inordinate delay in criminal proceedings. Case commenced investigation in 1983, complaint filed in 1996 after ... Infringement of Petitioner’s right to speedy trial guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India - inordinate delay in the prosecution of the criminal case pending since 1996 - HELD THAT:- As rightly submitted by the Petitioner, there were about ninety dates between 1996 upto 2018; but before that there was inordinate delay in filing of the complaint itself. The investigation had started in the year 1983 and the complaint was actually filed in the year 1996. It took thirteen long years for the authorities to even file the complaint. After that, cognizance was taken and evidence before charge started in the year 1999. It was closed in February, 2003 but the prosecution was permitted to lead further evidence by recalling a witness on 25.4.2003. The dates after that reflect sorry state of affairs. It can be seen that from 2003 upto 2018 continuously the prosecution witnesses were absent. The roznama also shows that the accused were also absent on almost all of these occasions but obviously the trial could not proceed in the absence of the prosecution witnesses. The evidence before charge was not formally closed in the year 2003. The order of the learned Magistrate passed on 13.11.2017, which is annexed at Exhibit-F to this Petition, mentions that till that date i.e. till 13.11.2017 the prosecution had examined only three witnesses - the Court directed that evidence before charge was closed and the matter was fixed for consideration of framing the charge. Thus, this order passed by the learned Magistrate shows that since November, 2003 till November, 2017 the prosecution did not take any steps to complete the step of evidence before charge and it had to be finally closed by the order of the learned Magistrate on 13.11.2017. In the case of Kadra Pahadiya, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Paragraph-2 has referred to this issue and held that as already held in the case of Hussainara Khatoon and others Vs. Home Secretary, State of Bihar, Patna [1979 (3) TMI 215 - SUPREME COURT], speedy trial was a fundamental right implicit in the guarantee of life and personal liberty enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution of India and any accused who is denied this right of speedy trial is entitled to raise this issue - The Hon’ble Supreme Court further observed that the Court could not lose sight of the fact that the trial had not made much headway even though no less than twenty years had gone by. Such protraction itself means considerable harassment to the accused not only monetarily but also by way of constant attention to the case and repeated appearances in Court, apart from anxiety. In the present case, the Petitioners – original accused had not challenged any order passed by the learned Magistrate before any higher forum. In that sense they had not caused any delay in conduct of the trial by approaching higher forums - the delay is not only at the stage of conduct of the trial but it starts right from the time when the investigation started as is observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the judgments referred. Conclusion - There is considerable force in the submissions of learned Senior Counsel Shri Jagtiani that the sword of prosecution was hanging on the Petitioner for almost half of her entire life which cannot be justified by any arguments which could be advanced in favour of saving the prosecution against the Petitioner Prabha. The delay in this case is so inordinate, so gross and so unjust, that this is a fit case where powers under Article 226 of the Constitution of India exercised to quash the proceedings. Petition allowed. ISSUES PRESENTED and CONSIDEREDThe core legal issue considered in this judgment was whether the Petitioner's right to a speedy trial, as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution of India, was infringed due to the inordinate delay in the prosecution of the criminal case pending since 1996. The court also considered whether this delay warranted the quashing of the criminal proceedings against the Petitioner.ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSISRelevant Legal Framework and PrecedentsThe legal framework revolves around Article 21 of the Constitution of India, which guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, including the right to a speedy trial. The court referred to several precedents, including the cases of Kadra Pahadiya, Uma Shankar Ketriwal, Vakil Prasad Singh, and Pankaj Kumar, which have established that a speedy trial is a fundamental right and any undue delay can be a ground for quashing proceedings.Court's Interpretation and ReasoningThe Court interpreted the right to a speedy trial as an integral part of Article 21, emphasizing that this right extends to all stages of criminal prosecution, including investigation, inquiry, trial, appeal, and retrial. The Court highlighted that the delay in the present case was not attributable to the Petitioner but was due to systemic inefficiencies and the prosecution's failure to proceed with the trial expeditiously.Key Evidence and FindingsThe Court noted the prolonged timeline of the case: the investigation began in 1983, the complaint was filed in 1996, and the charges were framed only in 2018. The prosecution failed to produce witnesses consistently, and the trial saw no significant progress between 2003 and 2018. The Court found that the delay was primarily due to the prosecution's inability to present witnesses and proceed with the trial.Application of Law to FactsApplying the principles of a speedy trial, the Court assessed that the delay in this case was inordinate and unjustified. The Court found that the prosecution's failure to act promptly and the systemic delays violated the Petitioner's right to a speedy trial. The Court also considered the Petitioner's advanced age and health condition, which compounded the prejudice caused by the delay.Treatment of Competing ArgumentsThe prosecution argued that the merits of the case should be considered and that the delay was partly due to the Petitioner's actions. However, the Court found these arguments unpersuasive, noting that the prosecution's failure to produce witnesses and proceed with the trial was the primary cause of the delay. The Court distinguished the present case from others where delays were attributed to the accused's actions.ConclusionsThe Court concluded that the Petitioner's right to a speedy trial was violated due to the gross and unexplained delay in the prosecution. It determined that the delay was so significant that it warranted the quashing of the criminal proceedings against the Petitioner.SIGNIFICANT HOLDINGSThe Court held that the right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. It emphasized that 'No procedure which does not ensure a reasonably quick trial can be regarded as 'reasonable, fair or just' and it would fall foul of Article 21.' The Court found that the delay in the present case was presumptive proof of prejudice against the Petitioner.Core Principles EstablishedThe judgment reinforced the principle that a speedy trial is an inalienable right under Article 21, applicable to all stages of criminal prosecution. It established that inordinate and unexplained delays by the prosecution can justify the quashing of proceedings, regardless of the seriousness of the allegations.Final Determinations on Each IssueThe Court determined that the Petitioner's right to a speedy trial was infringed due to the prosecution's inordinate delay. Consequently, it quashed the criminal proceedings against the Petitioner, emphasizing that the delay was unjustifiable and violated the Petitioner's constitutional rights.