Arbitral interim restraint on share alienation upheld where appellate interference is limited to perversity or illegality.

Appellate interference with an arbitral interim measure is limited to cases of arbitrariness, perversity, caprice, or disregard of settled principles, and a reasonable order preserving the subject matter will not be disturbed merely because another view is possible. The interim restraint on alienating the company's sole asset was upheld because it protected the arbitration's subject matter and reflected a proper exercise of discretion. Objections that the underlying contract was determinable or contingent, and therefore not specifically enforceable, were treated as matters for final determination and did not invalidate interim protection. The respondent's part-performance and continuing readiness and willingness also supported the injunction, which was not treated as a final decree of specific performance.

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Issues: Whether the arbitral tribunal's interim order restraining alienation of the shareholding, passed under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, warranted interference in appeal; and whether the appellant's objections based on the contract being determinable or contingent and therefore not specifically enforceable justified setting aside the injunction.

Analysis: The appeal arose from an interlocutory order under the arbitral interim-measures jurisdiction, where appellate interference is confined to cases of arbitrariness, perversity, caprice, or disregard of settled principles. The Court reiterated that judicial interference in arbitral proceedings must remain minimal and that an appellate court should not substitute its own view merely because another view is possible. On the merits, the agreement was treated as a transaction structured to transfer control over the sole asset of the company, and the tribunal's protection of the subject matter was found to be a reasonable interim measure. The objections that the contract was determinable or contingent, and therefore incapable of interim protection, were held to be matters for final adjudication by the tribunal and did not make the interim restraint legally infirm. The Court also accepted that the respondent had shown part-performance and continuing readiness and willingness to complete the bargain, so the injunction could not be equated with a final decree of specific performance.

Conclusion: The arbitral tribunal's exercise of discretion was neither arbitrary nor perverse, and the interim restraint on alienation was upheld.

Final Conclusion: The appeal failed, and the interim protection granted by the arbitral tribunal remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: In an appeal against an arbitral interim order, interference is warranted only where the tribunal's discretion is shown to be perverse, arbitrary, or contrary to law; a reasonable interim measure preserving the subject matter of the arbitration will not be set aside merely because the appellant advances competing contractual objections.

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