Transfer of Section 138 complaints requires exceptional grounds; territorial-jurisdiction objections alone do not justify Section 406 intervention.

Section 406 CrPC confers an extraordinary and discretionary transfer power, to be exercised sparingly only where transfer is genuinely expedient for the ends of justice. In a Section 138 Negotiable Instruments Act prosecution, a bare objection that the trial court lacks territorial jurisdiction does not by itself justify transfer, particularly where the complaint has been filed before a court competent under Section 142(2). A territorial-jurisdiction dispute is ordinarily for the trial court to examine on the basis of evidence and jurisdictional rules, and transfer requires exceptional circumstances such as a substantiated apprehension of unfairness or denial of justice. Mere inconvenience or preference for another forum is insufficient.

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Issues: (i) Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be transferred under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the ground that the trial court lacks territorial jurisdiction; (ii) whether, assuming a territorial-jurisdiction objection exists, the Supreme Court can transfer the complaint to the court having territorial jurisdiction under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; (iii) whether the expression "expedient for the ends of justice" in Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 includes a plea based on lack of territorial jurisdiction in a Section 138 prosecution.

Issue (i): Whether a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be transferred under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 on the ground that the trial court lacks territorial jurisdiction.

Analysis: The power under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is an extraordinary and discretionary power, to be used sparingly and only when transfer is expedient for the ends of justice. Territorial jurisdiction in a criminal case is ordinarily to be tested by the statutory rules governing inquiry and trial, and a bare plea that another court may also have jurisdiction does not by itself justify transfer. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 filed before a court having jurisdiction under Section 142(2) cannot be transferred merely because the accused asserts lack of territorial jurisdiction.

Conclusion: No. A complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 is not transferable under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 merely on a territorial-jurisdiction objection.

Issue (ii): Whether, assuming a territorial-jurisdiction objection exists, the Supreme Court can transfer the complaint to the court having territorial jurisdiction under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Analysis: The Court held that the existence of a territorial-jurisdiction dispute does not automatically require transfer. Such objections are to be examined by the trial court on the basis of evidence and the relevant jurisdictional rules. The mere fact that another court may also be competent does not compel transfer, and the accused must show circumstances creating a reasonable apprehension of denial of justice or other exceptional factors justifying transfer. Convenience alone is insufficient.

Conclusion: No. Even where territorial jurisdiction is disputed, transfer is not warranted as a matter of course under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

Issue (iii): Whether the expression "expedient for the ends of justice" in Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 includes a plea based on lack of territorial jurisdiction in a Section 138 prosecution.

Analysis: The phrase "expedient for the ends of justice" requires a real and substantiated basis showing that justice would be imperilled if the matter remains before the existing forum. The Court reiterated that the complainant's statutory forum under Section 142(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 cannot be displaced merely because the accused prefers another venue or finds the forum inconvenient. The factors justifying transfer are exceptional, including reasonable apprehension of unfairness, hostility, or other material showing that a fair trial is at risk.

Conclusion: No. The phrase does not extend to a mere plea of lack of territorial jurisdiction or inconvenience in the absence of exceptional circumstances.

Final Conclusion: The transfer petitions did not disclose any ground warranting intervention under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, and the proceedings were allowed to continue before the court where the complaint had been filed.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a transfer under Section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 can be ordered only on a substantiated showing that transfer is expedient for the ends of justice; a mere plea of territorial-jurisdiction objection or convenience does not suffice, especially where the complaint is filed before a court competent under Section 142(2) of the Act.

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