Issues: (i) Whether the Limitation Act applies to an application by a personal guarantor under Section 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; (ii) Whether rejection of a Section 94 application at the maintainability stage requires prior appointment of a Resolution Professional and a report; (iii) Whether the Section 94 application, filed after conclusion of auction proceedings, was liable to be rejected as an abuse of process.

Issue (i): Whether the Limitation Act applies to an application by a personal guarantor under Section 94 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Analysis: Section 238A applies the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings under the Code. The applicable precedent treating limitation as applicable to Section 94 proceedings had not been stayed. The guarantee was invoked in September 2016, whereas the fresh application was instituted in January 2025, long after expiry of the prescribed period.

Conclusion: The Limitation Act applies to Section 94 applications, and the application was barred by limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether rejection of a Section 94 application at the maintainability stage requires prior appointment of a Resolution Professional and a report.

Analysis: The requirement relating to appointment of a Resolution Professional and report under Sections 97 and 99 was not treated as mandatory where a debtor-filed Section 94 application is ex facie not maintainable. The authorities relied upon concerning creditor-initiated proceedings under Section 95 were held inapplicable to this factual setting.

Conclusion: Prior appointment of a Resolution Professional was not necessary before rejecting the time-barred and non-maintainable Section 94 application.

Issue (iii): Whether the Section 94 application, filed after conclusion of auction proceedings, was liable to be rejected as an abuse of process.

Analysis: The personal guarantor had knowledge of recovery proceedings since 2016, had earlier obtained liberty to file a fresh application, and filed the present application only after the secured-assets auction had concluded and the successful bidder had deposited the earnest money and part sale consideration. This timing showed that the insolvency mechanism was invoked to impede matured recovery proceedings rather than for genuine insolvency resolution.

Conclusion: The application was not bona fide and amounted to an abuse of process; its rejection was justified.

Final Conclusion: A personal guarantor cannot invoke the insolvency process through a stale and non-bona-fide application to obstruct substantially completed secured-creditor recovery and auction proceedings.

Ratio Decidendi: An Adjudicating Authority may reject a debtor-filed Section 94 application at the threshold without appointing a Resolution Professional where admitted facts establish that it is barred by limitation or otherwise not maintainable.

Issues: Whether the refund claim could be denied for non-quarterly filing, lack of nexus between input services and exported output services, limitation, and grounds allegedly beyond the show cause notice; and whether the matter should be remanded or the refund sanctioned.

Analysis: It was found that Notification No. 5/2006-C.E. (N.T.) dated 14.03.2006 does not bar refund of accumulated credit of an earlier period in a subsequent quarter, subject to limitation. The relevant date for credit arising from service tax paid under reverse charge was treated as the actual tax-payment date, rendering the claim within time. One Member considered that the refund rejection travelled beyond the show cause notice, that eligibility of already-availed credit could not be re-examined at the refund stage, and that refund with interest should be sanctioned. The other Member considered that factual issues concerning credit, reverse-charge payment, premises and statutory compliance required fresh examination by the original authority and favoured limited remand.

Outcome: Owing to the difference of opinion on remand versus sanction of refund with interest, the matter and records were directed to be placed before the President for determination by a Third Member.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation for recovery of inadmissible CENVAT credit was validly invoked.

Analysis: Credit was taken on input-service invoices relating to the period during which the manufactured goods enjoyed area-based exemption. Although the Department had been informed that CENVAT credit would be availed after expiry of the exemption, the disclosure did not identify credit relating to services received during the exempted period. The credit was also spread across ER-1 returns instead of being disclosed in full in the return for November 2016 despite the invoices being available. These circumstances established deliberate concealment of the material fact affecting eligibility, rather than a bona fide error. The earlier single-member decision was inapplicable because it did not address these material circumstances concerning pre-cut-off input-service invoices and their non-disclosure.

Conclusion: The statutory conditions for invocation of the extended period were satisfied; recovery of the inadmissible credit was not time-barred.

Issues: Whether rejection of the statutory appeal for failure to respond to notice concerning delay was sustainable when the appeal was filed within the condonable period and the petitioner asserted medical circumstances as sufficient cause.

Analysis: The appeal was filed beyond the ordinary limitation period but within the period in which delay may be condoned under Section 107 of the Odisha Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017. The rejection followed non-response to the notice seeking an explanation for delay. The asserted medical circumstances were not refuted by material from the department, and sufficient cause existed for allowing the petitioner an opportunity to explain the delay and be heard.

Conclusion: The rejection of the appeal was set aside in favour of the assessee, who was entitled to submit an explanation for delay before the appellate authority and receive an opportunity of hearing.

Issues: Whether a person whose GST registration was cancelled for continuous non-filing of returns may seek restoration by furnishing pending returns and clearing tax dues, interest and late fee under the proviso to Rule 22(4).

Analysis: Section 29(2)(c) permits cancellation for continuous non-furnishing of returns. Under the proviso to Rule 22(4), where the registered person furnishes all pending returns and makes full payment of tax dues with applicable interest and late fee, the empowered officer may drop the cancellation proceedings by passing the prescribed order. In view of the serious civil consequences of cancellation, the statutory mechanism remained available for consideration upon the taxpayer's compliance.

Conclusion: The empowered authority has jurisdiction to consider restoration of the registration upon the taxpayer furnishing pending returns and clearing the requisite tax dues, interest and late fee.

Issues: Whether a public interest petition is maintainable for directions to investigate and monitor alleged GST and income-tax evasion by identified private entities.

Analysis: The alleged tax liability, evasion, quantum and consequential recovery require scrutiny of commercial records and are matters committed to the competent statutory authorities. Enquiries had already been initiated, and the petitioner established neither a complete failure of statutory duty nor mala fides. Non-disclosure of investigation progress did not create a right to seek judicial supervision, particularly where tax investigations are confidential. The earlier dismissal of a substantially similar petition for want of locus standi could not be overcome merely by styling the fresh petition as a public interest litigation. The petition did not disclose a genuine public injury warranting PIL jurisdiction.

Conclusion: A PIL seeking court-monitored investigation and recovery of alleged tax dues from private entities is not maintainable where statutory authorities are competent to investigate and no demonstrable failure of duty or mala fides is shown.

Issues: Whether disciplinary proceedings against a customs broker for alleged breach of its advisory and due-diligence obligations could be sustained on show cause notices that did not specify the allegations or the manner of contravention.

Analysis: The notices merely reproduced material from proceedings concerning import misclassification and undervaluation, without identifying how that material established any breach by the customs broker. The adjudication orders supplied particulars not contained in the notices. The notices were materially identical to notices previously invalidated in the appellant's own case, whose invalidation had been affirmed by the High Court. A vague notice deprives the noticee of a meaningful opportunity to meet the case and an adjudication cannot travel beyond its foundation notice.

Conclusion: The show cause notices were vague and unsustainable; the consequential revocation of licence, forfeiture of security deposit and penalty orders were set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation was validly invoked for recovery of customs duty arising from misclassification of imported optical network equipment and wrongful availment of exemption notifications.

Analysis: The appellant adopted inconsistent tariff classifications for technically similar equipment across imports and ports, while claiming nil or concessional duty as subscriber-end equipment. It continued the disputed classification and exemption claim despite provisional reassessment of a bill of entry under the applicable tariff heading. The product-approval documentation described the goods as GPON ONT and did not support their description as subscriber-end equipment. The appellant neither exercised due diligence in self-assessment nor sought provisional assessment in case of ambiguity. These circumstances established deliberate misclassification and ineligible availment of exemption benefits with intent to evade customs duty.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was rightly invoked; the demand and related findings are sustained against the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the declared transaction value of the imported Maserati GranTurismo was rightly rejected and the assessable value enhanced under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 read with the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007, and whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Serial No. 344(2) of Notification No. 21/2002-Cus., dated 01.03.2002? (ii) Whether the confiscation of the imported vehicle and the consequential redemption fine and penalties imposed under the Customs Act, 1962 are sustainable?

Issue (i): Whether the declared transaction value of the imported Maserati GranTurismo was rightly rejected and the assessable value enhanced under Section 14 of the Customs Act, 1962 read with the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007, and whether the appellant is entitled to the benefit of Serial No. 344(2) of Notification No. 21/2002-Cus., dated 01.03.2002?

Analysis: Transaction value has statutory primacy, but Rule 12 permits its rejection where cogent and reliable material creates reasonable doubt about its truth or accuracy. Contemporaneous invoices for the same vehicle, bearing the same date and currency but recording materially different values, together with official overseas verification, electronic correspondence and commercial records, established deliberate undervaluation. However, refundable VAT in the exporting country did not form part of the price actually paid or payable for export to India and was not includible in assessable value.

Analysis: Eligibility for exemption is independent of valuation. Under the applicable circular, registration abroad merely as a statutory or transportation formality does not establish that a vehicle was used. In the absence of evidence of actual prior use, temporary registration in the United Kingdom did not render the vehicle a used motor vehicle. The appellant satisfied the conditions for the exemption.

Conclusion: The rejection of declared value and enhancement of assessable value were upheld, excluding refundable VAT; the appellant was entitled to the benefit of Serial No. 344(2) of Notification No. 21/2002-Cus., dated 01.03.2002. The issue was decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the confiscation of the imported vehicle and the consequential redemption fine and penalties imposed under the Customs Act, 1962 are sustainable?

Analysis: Deliberate misdeclaration of value rendered the vehicle liable to confiscation under Section 111(m), independently of eligibility for the exemption. Redemption fine could not be imposed because the vehicle had already been cleared and was unavailable for confiscation. Since duty required recalculation after allowing the exemption and excluding VAT, the penalty linked to duty required corresponding modification; the separate intermediary penalty was sustained.

Conclusion: Confiscation and the penalty under Section 112(a) were sustained; redemption fine was set aside; and the penalty under Section 114A was to be confined to the recalculated differential duty. The issue was decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The assessable value, duty liability, interest and duty-linked penalty require limited recalculation after exclusion of refundable VAT and application of the available vehicle exemption, while the findings of undervaluation and confiscability remain operative.

Ratio Decidendi: A declared customs value may be rejected on independently corroborated contemporaneous evidence of undervaluation; temporary foreign registration without proof of actual use does not defeat an exemption available to a new motor vehicle, and redemption fine is impermissible where cleared goods are unavailable for confiscation.

Issues: Whether the appeal concerning a gold ornament found worn on an arriving passenger's wrist was barred from the Tribunal's jurisdiction as relating to goods imported as baggage under the first proviso to Section 129A(1) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: The statutory exclusion applies only where the impugned order in fact relates to goods imported or exported as baggage. The passenger's arrival from abroad or interception at an international airport does not, by itself, establish that an article worn on the body is baggage. Since the gold kada was recovered from the appellant's wrist rather than from checked-in or hand baggage, and its character as a personal ornament, its declarability and the allegation of concealment remained disputed, the jurisdictional fact necessary to invoke the exclusion was not conclusively established. Precedents involving goods admittedly recovered from passenger baggage or luggage were factually distinguishable.

Conclusion: The preliminary objection was rejected; the appeal was held maintainable before the Tribunal.

Issues: Whether imported flavour compound classified under CTH 3302.10 was excluded from exemption under Sl. No. 119 of Notification No. 21/2002-Cus as a compound alcoholic preparation of a kind used for manufacture of beverages.

Analysis: The exclusion applies only where the imported goods are established to be compound alcoholic preparations of the prescribed alcoholic strength and of a kind used in the manufacture of beverages. The earlier ruling concerning beverage flavours did not permit denial of exemption for flavours not sold to beverage manufacturers without a categorical finding that they were of a kind used for beverage manufacture. The goods were supplied pursuant to an order from a tobacco-products manufacturer, while Revenue produced no conclusive material establishing their use or suitability for beverage manufacture. Further, the denial rested on a previous test report, with no test report shown to have been drawn for the consignment under import.

Conclusion: The imported goods were not proved to fall within the excluded category under Sl. No. 119 of Notification No. 21/2002-Cus; the assessee was entitled to the exemption.

Issues: Whether penalties for abetment of smuggling and confiscation of the vehicle could be sustained without evidence that the driver or hotel operators knew of, or participated in, the passengers' gold-smuggling activity.

Analysis: Gold was recovered from the passengers and not from the appellants. The driver's act of transporting passengers, without corroborative evidence connecting him with the smuggling activity, did not establish involvement or knowledge. Likewise, no evidence established that the hotel operators had knowledge of, or any connection with, the activity of the persons from whom the gold was recovered.

Conclusion: The penalties and vehicle confiscation were unsustainable; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether CENVAT credit could be denied solely because the recipient's address in input-service invoices did not match the address in its ST-2 registration certificate.

Analysis: The impugned demand proceeded exclusively on the invoice-address discrepancy without determining the substantive eligibility of the credit. The invoices otherwise contained the particulars required under Rule 4A of the Service Tax Rules, 1994. The differing address originated from an address retained in the service provider's accounting system, and the adjudicating authority did not address the assessee's explanation or objections. Denial of credit on that technical basis, without examination of entitlement on merits, was unsustainable.

Conclusion: The denial of CENVAT credit and the consequential demand, interest and penalty based solely on the address discrepancy were set aside in favour of the assessee, with the matter requiring fresh adjudication after notice and hearing.

Issues: Whether recovery of letter-of-credit charges by a trader from high-seas-sale buyers constitutes consideration for taxable banking and other financial services before 1 July 2012 and taxable service thereafter.

Analysis: The high-seas-sale agreement was predominantly a sale-of-goods arrangement on a principal-to-principal basis. Its consideration clause made the letter-of-credit charges and all seller costs part of the amount payable for the imported goods. The letter of credit, including its payment guarantee, was issued by the bank and not by the appellant; consequently, the parties did not have a service-provider and service-recipient relationship in respect of issuance of the letter of credit.

Analysis: Banking and other financial services concerning issuance of letters of credit cover activities normally rendered by banks, financial institutions, or similar providers. A trading organisation merely arranging a bank-issued letter of credit for its own import transaction does not provide that financial service. Mere flow or reimbursement of money does not establish consideration for a service. After the negative-list regime commenced, the high-seas sale remained excluded from service because it constituted transfer of title in goods. The letter-of-credit charges were an inseverable pre-import cost within the composite sale transaction and could not be vivisected for a separate service-tax levy.

Conclusion: The recovered letter-of-credit charges were not consideration for taxable banking and other financial services or any other taxable service; no service tax was payable on them.

Issues: Whether the acquittal for cheque dishonour under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 was sustainable when the accused admitted the borrowing and issuance of the signed cheque but asserted repayment.

Analysis: Admission of the signature and issuance of the cheque entitled the complainant to the presumptions of consideration and legally enforceable liability. The accused established repayment of Rs.35,000 through bank material, but produced no cogent evidence proving repayment of the remaining admitted liability of Rs.2,00,000. The assertion that the complainant kept the loan amount at home, and the use of different inks for the signature and other cheque entries, did not by themselves establish improbability or rebut the statutory presumptions on a preponderance of probabilities. A challenge to the complainant's financial capacity required supporting contra material, which was absent.

Conclusion: The acquittal was unsustainable; the accused was guilty of the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.

Issues: Whether the acquittal for dishonour of cheque was justified where the complainant failed to establish a legally enforceable personal liability of the accused and the statutory presumptions stood rebutted.

Analysis: The documentary record showed that administration of the trust and responsibility for its liabilities had been transferred to newly inducted trustees from 01.02.2005. Rent receipts acknowledged payment by the trust's management, while the alleged advances included sums said to have been paid by the complainant's wife, who was neither examined nor shown to have authorised recovery through the complainant. The evidence did not establish that the trust-related liabilities were personally assumed by the accused or that the consolidated cheque amount represented an enforceable debt payable by her. These circumstances constituted a probable defence sufficient to rebut the presumptions of consideration and liability; the burden consequently shifted to the complainant, who did not prove the liability beyond reasonable doubt. The appellate acquittal was based on an appraisal of evidence and disclosed no perversity or manifest illegality warranting interference.

Conclusion: The acquittal was justified because no legally enforceable personal debt or liability of the accused was proved; the finding is against the complainant.

Issues: Whether cancellation of the NBFI registration for failure to maintain the prescribed minimum Net Owned Fund was lawful despite the pending amalgamation proposal; and whether the cancellation orders warranted interference because of the alleged future stigma.

Issue (i): Whether cancellation of the NBFI registration for failure to maintain the prescribed minimum Net Owned Fund was lawful despite the pending amalgamation proposal.

Analysis: The petitioner admittedly did not satisfy the Rs. 2 crore Net Owned Fund threshold when the second show-cause notice was issued and throughout the relevant period. A pending amalgamation proposal did not establish compliance, since the proposal required approval and subsequent completion of amalgamation before any increase in Net Owned Fund could materialise. The amalgamation application was ultimately rejected after an opportunity of hearing. The cancellation was therefore founded on a valid ground disclosed in the show-cause notice, and no breach of natural justice, jurisdictional error, or procedural illegality was established. Re-assessment of the regulatory material on the earlier Net Owned Fund requirement was not warranted in writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The cancellation of registration was lawful and the issue is decided against the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the cancellation orders warranted interference because of the alleged future stigma.

Analysis: The petitioner could not meet the subsequently applicable Net Owned Fund requirement of Rs. 1000 crore even if cancellation were set aside. Non-fulfilment of the Net Owned Fund criterion was not, by itself, a stigma preventing a future registration application if the prevailing requirements and regulatory conditions were later met.

Conclusion: No relief was warranted on the basis of the alleged stigma, and the issue is decided against the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: The regulatory cancellation remains legally sustainable, and the challenge to it yields no effective relief in light of the petitioner's inability to meet the prevailing capital requirement.

Ratio Decidendi: A pending and unconsummated amalgamation proposal cannot cure an NBFC's existing failure to meet the mandatory Net Owned Fund threshold or invalidate cancellation of its registration on that ground.