Gift deed validity upheld where limitation, fraud, lease covenant breach, and later witness examination objections all failed.

A challenge to a gift deed failed where limitation was not established on the facts, as the plaintiff asserted later discovery of the deed and no conclusive evidence showed knowledge from execution. Allegations of fraud and misrepresentation also failed because the execution was supported by the donor's letter seeking permission, cross-examination admissions, and corroborating testimony of the attesting witness and scribe. The lease covenant requiring prior consent was treated as directory, not invalidating the transfer absent a voiding clause, and the lessor's later conduct amounted to ratification. The objection under Order XVIII Rule 3-A was rejected because later testimony was allowed with leave and recorded reasons.

---

---

Issues: (i) whether the suit challenging the gift deed was barred by limitation; (ii) whether the gift deed was void or otherwise invalid for alleged fraud or misrepresentation and for breach of the lease covenant requiring prior consent of the lessor; and (iii) whether the donor's examination as a witness after other plaintiff witnesses was vitiated by Order XVIII Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Issue (i): Whether the suit challenging the gift deed was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The plea of limitation was not dealt with by the trial court, but the appellate record showed that the original plaintiff asserted ignorance of the true character of the document and pleaded discovery of the alleged gift deed only later from subsequent correspondence. In that backdrop, and in the absence of contrary evidence conclusively showing knowledge from the date of execution, the claim could not be treated as time-barred on the facts proved.

Conclusion: The objection of limitation was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether the gift deed was void or otherwise invalid for alleged fraud or misrepresentation and for breach of the lease covenant requiring prior consent of the lessor.

Analysis: The allegation of fraud or misrepresentation was found to be unsupported by foundational evidence. The donor's own letter seeking permission to make the gift, her admissions in cross-examination, and the supporting testimony of the attesting witness and scribe together established valid execution and awareness of the nature of the instrument. The circumstance that the property was gifted to a relative and not to the donor's children was not, by itself, sufficient to create suspicious circumstances. As to the lease covenant, the prohibition on transfer without prior consent was held to be directory rather than mandatory, since the deed contained no penal clause invalidating the transfer and the most that could follow from breach was non-renewal. The lessor's subsequent conduct also amounted to substantial ratification. Accordingly, the trial court's reliance on breach of the covenant was held to be unsustainable.

Conclusion: The gift deed was held to be valid and binding, and the finding of invalidity was set aside.

Issue (iii): Whether the donor's examination as a witness after other plaintiff witnesses was vitiated by Order XVIII Rule 3-A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

Analysis: The court held that the rule does not impose an inflexible bar against a party giving evidence at a later stage if the court grants leave for recorded reasons. The post facto permission granted by the trial court was treated as legally permissible and sufficient to validate the evidence.

Conclusion: The objection based on Order XVIII Rule 3-A was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The appellate court found that the trial court had erred in law and on the evidence in declaring the gift deed void and granting injunction, and the suit was dismissed after the decree under challenge was set aside.

Ratio Decidendi: A transfer is not rendered invalid merely because prior consent under a lease covenant was not obtained, where the covenant is directory and unaccompanied by a clause of avoidance, and a party may be permitted under Order XVIII Rule 3-A to testify at a later stage by leave of the court for recorded reasons.

---