Section 7 default date amendment upheld where pre-existing default predates Section 10A and restructuring did not cure the account.

In a Section 7 insolvency proceeding, the date of default may be amended before final disposal where clarification or correction is required, because such an application is not treated like a civil plaint. The Tribunal upheld the amended default date on the basis that the restructuring sanctioned in March 2020 did not cure the existing default, as the restructuring conditions were not met. It further held that the account had been treated as NPA from 01.11.2019 and the default date of 02.08.2019 fell outside the Section 10A protected period, so the pandemic-related bar did not apply. The admission order was therefore found to be sustainable.

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Issues: (i) Whether the date of default could be changed after filing the Section 7 application. (ii) Whether the amended date of default was correctly identified so as to keep the case outside Section 10A of the Code.

Issue (i): Whether the date of default could be changed after filing the Section 7 application.

Analysis: An application under Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code is not treated like a civil plaint, and additional pleadings or documents may be allowed before the final order if the facts of the case require clarification or correction. The permitted amendment was carried out during the proceedings and was considered by the Adjudicating Authority in accordance with the governing insolvency framework.

Conclusion: The amendment of the date of default was validly allowed.

Issue (ii): Whether the amended date of default was correctly identified so as to keep the case outside Section 10A of the Code.

Analysis: The evidence relied upon showed that the restructuring sanctioned in March 2020 did not cure the pre-existing default because the conditions of restructuring were not met. On the record, the account was treated as an NPA with effect from 01.11.2019 and the corresponding default was taken as 02.08.2019. Since that date preceded the Section 10A period, the statutory bar for pandemic-period defaults did not apply. The Tribunal also found no basis to hold that the later restructuring created a fresh default timeline displacing the earlier default.

Conclusion: The amended date of default was correctly identified and Section 10A did not bar initiation of CIRP.

Final Conclusion: The impugned admission order was found to be free from infirmity, and the insolvency proceedings were allowed to stand.

Ratio Decidendi: In a Section 7 proceeding, the adjudicating authority may permit amendment of the pleaded date of default before final disposal, and Section 10A protection is unavailable where the proved default predates the protected period notwithstanding a subsequent restructuring attempt.

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