Review, limitation and specific performance turned on apparent errors, refusal notice, and lis pendens in an immovable property contract.

Review was justified because the earlier judgment rested on apparent factual and interpretative errors in construing the agreements, including the effect of Clause 21 and non-production of documents under Clause 3, and those errors materially affected limitation and specific performance. Limitation under Article 54 of the Limitation Act ran from notice of refusal only because no date for performance of the contract as a whole was fixed; the suit filed after the reply dated 14 April 2000 was therefore within time. Readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act was proved without the need for actual tender, and the petitioner remained entitled to specific performance since compensation was not shown to be adequate. A transfer made during pendency of the review was subject to lis pendens under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act.

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Issues: (i) whether the earlier judgment suffered from errors apparent on the face of the record warranting review; (ii) whether the suit for specific performance was within limitation; (iii) whether the petitioner had proved readiness and willingness and was entitled to specific performance; and (iv) whether the doctrine of lis pendens applied to a transfer made during pendency of the review proceedings.

Issue (i): Whether the earlier judgment suffered from errors apparent on the face of the record warranting review.

Analysis: Review lies only on the narrow grounds recognised by Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC. The earlier judgment contained clear factual and interpretative errors on the construction of the agreements, especially in treating Clause 21 as referring to an agreement with the petitioner in 1994, and in overlooking the consequence of non-production of documents under Clause 3. Those errors went to the root of the reasoning on limitation and specific performance and were not mere matters of debatable merits.

Conclusion: The review jurisdiction was rightly invoked in favour of the petitioner.

Issue (ii): Whether the suit for specific performance was within limitation.

Analysis: Article 54 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies either from the date fixed for performance or, where no such date is fixed, from the date when refusal is noticed. On a correct reading of the agreements, the three-month stipulation did not fix a date for performance of the contract as a whole. The petitioner had notice of refusal only upon the reply dated 14 April 2000. The suit filed thereafter was within three years.

Conclusion: The suit was within limitation and not time-barred.

Issue (iii): Whether the petitioner had proved readiness and willingness and was entitled to specific performance.

Analysis: Under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, readiness and willingness must be proved, but actual tender of money is not indispensable where payment is involved unless directed by court. The petitioner had paid a substantial part of the consideration, and the earlier finding that the vendors had complied with their documentary obligations was unsustainable. The presumption under Section 10 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 that compensation is not an adequate remedy for breach of a contract to transfer immovable property remained unrebutted. The petitioner therefore satisfied the equitable requirements for specific performance.

Conclusion: The petitioner was ready and willing to perform and was entitled to specific performance.

Issue (iv): Whether the doctrine of lis pendens applied to a transfer made during pendency of the review proceedings.

Analysis: Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 applies from institution of proceedings until final disposal. Pendency begins on institution, not on issuance of notice, and a transfer made after the review was instituted could not defeat the rights under the final outcome of the litigation.

Conclusion: The transfer was subject to lis pendens.

Final Conclusion: The earlier judgment was recalled, the High Court judgment was restored, and the petitioner ultimately succeeded in review.

Ratio Decidendi: Review may be granted where the prior decision rests on an apparent factual or interpretative mistake that materially affects the outcome, and in a contract for transfer of immovable property, limitation under Article 54 runs from refusal only when no date for performance of the contract is fixed as a whole.

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