Pre-trial quashing of cheque dishonour complaints declined where authorised representative's knowledge and authority were prima facie shown.

At the pre-trial stage, complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act were not quashed because the authorised representative's personal knowledge and authority were prima facie asserted in the complaint and pre-summoning affidavit. The challenge to the power of attorney and the alleged compromise deed raised disputed questions of fact and law that could not be conclusively decided in proceedings under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The earlier quashing of proceedings concerning a different cheque did not control the present complaints, as the authorisation here was stated to be duly attested and the earlier defect was matter-specific. The complaints and the notice under Section 251 were therefore left to proceed to trial.

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Issues: Whether the complaints under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the order framing notice under Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were liable to be quashed on the grounds that the authorised representative lacked personal knowledge of the transaction, the power of attorney was invalid or insufficient, and the alleged compromise deed barred the proceedings.

Analysis: The exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 at the pre-trial stage is confined to cases where unimpeachable material conclusively displaces the allegations. The complaint and pre-summoning affidavit contained an assertion that the authorised representative had personal knowledge and was competent to institute and support the complaint, which satisfied the prima facie requirement at the summoning stage. The extent or sufficiency of such knowledge, and the challenge to the compromise deed, involved disputed questions of fact and law that could not be finally adjudicated in quashing proceedings. The Court also held that the earlier quashing of proceedings relating to a different cheque did not compel quashing in the present complaints, since the present authorisation was stated to be duly attested and the earlier defect was specific to the prior matter.

Conclusion: The challenge to the complaints and the notice under Section 251 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was not sustainable at this stage, and the issues raised were left to be decided in trial.

Final Conclusion: The proceedings were allowed to continue, as the petitioners failed to show grounds warranting interference under the Court's inherent jurisdiction.

Ratio Decidendi: At the pre-trial stage, a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 will not be quashed merely because the authorised representative's personal knowledge is questioned; if the complaint contains a prima facie assertion of authority and knowledge, the dispute is ordinarily a matter for trial.

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