Statutory disqualification for authorised representatives applies after qualifying service as Income-tax Officer, and the constitutional challenge fails.

Section 288(3) of the Income-tax Act applies where a person has served as an Income-tax Officer, or in an income-tax authority not below that rank, for the required three-year period; it is not necessary that he must have been posted as an Income-tax Officer immediately before resignation. On the stated facts, the former officer remained within the statutory disqualification because he had served long enough in the qualifying post, even though he resigned while working in another revenue position. The note also states that the two-year bar on acting as an authorised representative is a statutory regulation, not an infringement of a fundamental right, and that the article 14 challenge failed for want of concrete discrimination.

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Issues: (i) Whether section 288(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to a person who had been appointed as an Income-tax Officer and had served in that capacity for the requisite period, but who was serving as Assistant Controller of Estate Duty when he resigned. (ii) Whether section 288(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was unconstitutional as violative of article 19(1)(g) and article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Issue (i): Whether section 288(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 applied to a person who had been appointed as an Income-tax Officer and had served in that capacity for the requisite period, but who was serving as Assistant Controller of Estate Duty when he resigned.

Analysis: The disqualification under section 288(3) attached where the person had formerly been employed as an income-tax authority not below the rank of Income-tax Officer and had served for not less than three years from the date of first employment in such capacity. The provision did not require that the person must have been functioning as an Income-tax Officer immediately before retirement or resignation. The material question was whether the person had, during service, held the qualifying income-tax office for the required period. On the facts found, the petitioner had been an Income-tax Officer for more than three years and therefore answered the statutory description, notwithstanding that he was working as Assistant Controller of Estate Duty when he resigned.

Conclusion: Section 288(3) applied to the petitioner, and he was subject to the two-year prohibition on acting as an authorised representative.

Issue (ii): Whether section 288(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was unconstitutional as violative of article 19(1)(g) and article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Analysis: The right to act as an authorised representative under section 288 was a statutory facility, not an independent fundamental right. The assessee's representation could be regulated by the legislature, and the impugned restriction operated only for a limited period after resignation or retirement. The petition also failed to make out a proper article 14 challenge, as no sufficient factual material was placed to show impermissible discrimination or absence of rational classification.

Conclusion: Section 288(3) was not ultra vires article 19(1)(g) or article 14 of the Constitution of India.

Final Conclusion: The writ petition failed because the statutory bar was held applicable to the petitioner and the constitutional challenge was rejected.

Ratio Decidendi: A former income-tax authority who has served for the statutory minimum period is disqualified for the prescribed cooling-off period even if he was posted in another revenue post at the time of resignation, and a statutory privilege to represent assessees may be validly restricted without infringing articles 19 or 14 where no independent fundamental right or concrete discrimination is established.

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