Lis pendens and finality of unchallenged findings bar a later transferee from defeating specific performance.

An appellate court cannot reopen and record an adverse finding on fraud or collusion against a party when that party has not filed a cross-appeal or cross-objections, because the unchallenged part of the decree attains finality. A respondent may support the decree, but cannot seek reversal of findings that underpin it without following the prescribed procedure. A transfer of property made after institution of a suit for specific performance remains subject to lis pendens, so the later transferee cannot defeat enforcement by asserting bona fide purchase or lack of notice. The later sale therefore does not displace the plaintiff's right to specific performance.

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Issues: (i) whether, in the absence of any cross-appeal or cross-objections by the defendants, the first appellate court could reopen and record an adverse finding that the agreement to sell was collusive or fraudulent; (ii) whether the subsequent transferee could resist specific performance on the plea of bona fide purchase, or whether the transfer pendente lite was governed by the doctrine of lis pendens.

Issue (i): whether, in the absence of any cross-appeal or cross-objections by the defendants, the first appellate court could reopen and record an adverse finding that the agreement to sell was collusive or fraudulent.

Analysis: The suit had been partly decreed in favour of the plaintiff for refund of earnest money, and the finding on fraud and collusion had gone against the defendants. Since the defendants did not challenge that part of the decree or the adverse finding by appeal or cross-objections, the decree to that extent attained finality. A respondent may support a decree without filing cross-objections, but cannot seek reversal of an adverse finding affecting the decree in its favour without taking the prescribed procedural step. The first appellate court therefore exceeded its jurisdiction in treating the agreement as collusive.

Conclusion: The adverse finding of collusion could not be recorded by the first appellate court and the finding in favour of the plaintiff remained undisturbed.

Issue (ii): whether the subsequent transferee could resist specific performance on the plea of bona fide purchase, or whether the transfer pendente lite was governed by the doctrine of lis pendens.

Analysis: The sale deed in favour of the appellant was executed after the suit for specific performance had already been instituted. A transfer made during the pendency of litigation is subject to the rule of lis pendens and binds the transferee irrespective of notice or claimed good faith. Once the agreement to sell stood proved and the later alienation took place during pendency of the suit, the later purchaser could not claim protection as a bona fide purchaser to defeat the plaintiff's right to specific performance. The plea of lack of notice was therefore immaterial.

Conclusion: The subsequent sale was hit by lis pendens and the appellant could not defeat the decree for specific performance.

Final Conclusion: The High Court's decree for specific performance was sustained and the challenge to it failed, leaving the plaintiff's entitlement under the agreement enforceable against the later transferee.

Ratio Decidendi: A transfer of the suit property made during the pendency of a suit for specific performance is subject to lis pendens and cannot defeat the decree, and an adverse finding that has attained finality cannot be reopened by the appellate court in the absence of a cross-appeal or cross-objections.

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