Cheque signature admission triggers statutory presumptions; bare Section 313 denial cannot rebut them without defence evidence.

Once the accused admitted the cheque signature in a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 arose that the cheque was issued for consideration and towards a debt or liability, shifting the evidential burden to the accused. A bare statement under Section 313 CrPC, without cogent defence evidence or material creating a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities, was insufficient to rebut those presumptions. The court held that the trial court had erred in assessing alleged defects in the complainant's case before first examining rebuttal, and the acquittal was therefore set aside.

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Issues: (i) Whether admission of signature on the cheque attracted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and shifted the burden to the accused. (ii) Whether the accused rebutted the presumptions merely through a statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 without leading defence evidence, and whether the acquittal was therefore unsustainable.

Issue (i): Whether admission of signature on the cheque attracted the statutory presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and shifted the burden to the accused.

Analysis: Once execution of the cheque was admitted, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 came into operation. The presumption is that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of a debt or liability. The correct approach is to proceed on that basis unless the accused raises a probable defence sufficient to rebut the presumption on a preponderance of probabilities.

Conclusion: The statutory presumptions applied and the evidential burden shifted to the accused.

Issue (ii): Whether the accused rebutted the presumptions merely through a statement under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 without leading defence evidence, and whether the acquittal was therefore unsustainable.

Analysis: A statement under Section 313 CrPC is not substantive evidence of defence. Mere denial, without cogent defence evidence or material creating a probable defence, does not rebut the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139. The trial court erred in focusing on alleged deficiencies in the complainant's case before first determining whether the accused had discharged the initial burden of rebuttal.

Conclusion: The accused did not rebut the presumptions and the acquittal could not stand.

Final Conclusion: The appellate court corrected the burden-of-proof approach in a cheque dishonour prosecution and restored the complainant's case by setting aside the acquittal.

Ratio Decidendi: In a prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, once the accused admits the cheque signature, the presumptions under Sections 118(a) and 139 arise and can be displaced only by a probable defence proved on a preponderance of probabilities; a bare statement under Section 313 CrPC, without substantive rebuttal material, is insufficient.

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