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Issues: (i) whether non-conduct of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 vitiated the summoning order in a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881; (ii) whether the Court could quash the complaint by examining the petitioner's defence material and alleged compromise; and (iii) whether the complaint could be quashed on the ground that the cheque was issued without consideration or legally enforceable liability.
Issue (i): whether non-conduct of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 vitiated the summoning order in a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881.
Analysis: The applicable principle is that in complaints under Section 138, an inquiry under Section 202 is required where the accused resides outside the territorial jurisdiction of the Magistrate, but the Magistrate may satisfy himself on the basis of the complaint, affidavit evidence, cheque, notice, and supporting documents. The order issuing process need not contain elaborate reasons, and the Court found that the Magistrate had perused the relevant material before issuing summons.
Conclusion: The challenge based on Section 202 failed, and the summoning order was not vitiated.
Issue (ii): whether the Court could quash the complaint by examining the petitioner's defence material and alleged compromise.
Analysis: The governing quashing principles require the Court to consider only the complaint and the material placed before the Magistrate, and not to conduct a mini-trial or evaluate disputed defence evidence at the threshold. Materials produced for the first time in quashing proceedings, including documents relied on to show settlement or discharge, cannot be used to displace the complaint at this stage.
Conclusion: The defence material and alleged compromise did not justify quashing of the proceedings.
Issue (iii): whether the complaint could be quashed on the ground that the cheque was issued without consideration or legally enforceable liability.
Analysis: Under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, a presumption arises that the cheque was issued for consideration and in discharge of debt or liability once issuance is shown. That presumption is rebuttable, but only by proof meeting the standard of preponderance of probabilities, which is a matter for trial. At the summoning stage, the Court was not persuaded to accept the plea that no legally enforceable debt existed.
Conclusion: The presumption under the Negotiable Instruments Act remained undisturbed, and the complaint could not be quashed on this ground.
Final Conclusion: The petition seeking quashing of the complaint and summoning order was rejected, and the criminal proceedings were allowed to continue.
Ratio Decidendi: In a complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, the High Court should not quash proceedings by entering into disputed defence material or conducting a mini-trial, and the statutory presumption of consideration and liability must operate until rebutted in trial.