Statutory presumptions under the Negotiable Instruments Act prevailed where the cheque defence, notice challenge, and revision plea failed.

Statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act apply where the cheque and signature are admitted, and the drawer must rebut them on a preponderance of probabilities. A bare plea that the cheque was lost and payment was stopped was rejected because no police complaint or reliable supporting material was produced, while bank evidence and the dishonour memo supported insufficiency of funds. Service of notice was treated as proved because it was sent to the correct address and the drawer effectively admitted receipt in the Section 313 statement. The request under Section 311 CrPC was found unwarranted, and no illegality or perversity was shown in the concurrent findings.

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Issues: Whether the conviction under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and the concurrent findings of the courts below warranted interference in revision, including on the questions of statutory presumption, service of notice, and the plea that the cheque had been lost and payment was stopped.

Analysis: The cheque and the drawer's signature were not disputed, attracting the presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The presumption is rebuttable, but the accused must raise a probable defence on a preponderance of probabilities. The plea that the cheque had been lost and payment was stopped remained unsubstantiated, as no police complaint or supporting material was produced and the bank witness did not establish a reliable stop-payment defence. The dishonour memo and bank evidence supported insufficiency of funds. On notice, the cheque notice was sent to the correct address and the drawer had not effectively rebutted the presumption of service; the evidence also showed an admission of receipt in the Section 313 statement. The request to invoke Section 311 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 was found unwarranted because the burden to rebut the statutory presumption lay on the accused and no strong reason was shown for court-initiated examination of additional witnesses.

Conclusion: The statutory presumptions were not rebutted and no illegality or perversity was shown in the concurrent findings; interference in revision was not called for, and the challenge to the conviction failed.

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