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<h1>Supreme Court converts imprisonment to fine for sugar confectionary misbranding under Rule 32 due to inadequate labeling</h1> SC upheld conviction for misbranding of sugar confectionaries due to inadequate labeling under Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. Packets lacked ... Food Safety and Standards - Inadequate labeling - Misbranding - Adulteration of foods or not - sugar boiled confectionaries - packets did not show the prescribed particulars such as complete address of the manufacturer and the date of manufacturing - violation of Rule 32(c) and (f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955. Appellants would argue that the entire case of the prosecution is liable to be dismissed for the simple reason that the Appellants were charged Under Rule 32(c) and (f) of the Rules but these provisions were not related to misbranding and were regarding something else. HELD THAT:- The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 was repealed by the introduction of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 where Section 52 provides a maximum penalty of Rs. 3,00,000/- for misbranded food. There is no provision for imprisonment. Whether the Appellant can be granted the benefit of the new legislation and be awarded a lesser punishment as is presently prescribed under the new law? This Court in T. Barai v. Henry Ah Hoe [1982 (12) TMI 186 - SUPREME COURT], had held that when an amendment is beneficial to the Accused it can be applied even to cases pending in Courts where such a provision did not exist at the time of the commission of offence. The present Appellant No. 2, at this stage, is about 60 years of age and the crime itself is of the year 2000, and twenty- four years have elapsed since the commission of the crime. Vide Order dated 06.08.2018, this Court had granted exemption from surrendering to Appellant No. 2. Considering all aspects, more particularly the nature of offence, though the findings of the Courts below regarding the offence is upheld, but the sentence of Appellant No. 2 from three months of simple imprisonment along with fine of Rs. 1,000/- is convertred to a fine of Rs. 50,000/-. The sentence of Appellant No. 1 which is for a fine of Rs. 2000/- is upheld. The appeal is partly allowed. ISSUES PRESENTED AND CONSIDERED 1. Whether the offence established by the prosecution was misbranding under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954, having regard to non-compliance with Rule 32(c) and (f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955, and Section 2(ix)(k) defining 'misbranded'. 2. Whether the appellants could escape conviction on the ground that they were not the manufacturers of the impugned food articles, where no convincing proof of third-party manufacture was produced. 3. Whether Article 20(1) of the Constitution prohibits application of a subsequently enacted penal regime that prescribes a lesser punishment (i.e., the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, s. 52) to offences committed under the repealed Act. 4. Whether, in the facts of the case, the sentence of imprisonment can be converted to a monetary penalty in exercise of the Court's power to award a lesser punishment under present law and judicial precedent. ISSUE-WISE DETAILED ANALYSIS Issue 1 - Misbranding under the Act and Rules (Rule 32(c) & (f); Section 2(ix)(k)) Legal framework: The Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 and the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (as amended by G.S.R. 422(E) dated 29.04.1987) required packages to carry prescribed particulars, including the name and complete address of the manufacturer/vendor/packer (Rule 32(c)) and the month and year of manufacture (Rule 32(f)). Misbranding is defined in Section 2(ix)(k) where labelling is not in accordance with statutory requirements. Precedent treatment: The Court relied upon the statutory definition and contemporaneous operation of the Rules as at the date of sampling (06.12.2000); no contrary authority was required to negate the appellants' contention. Interpretation and reasoning: The lab report found absence of prescribed particulars on the packets; therefore the food articles were misbranded as per Section 2(ix)(k). The Court treated the amended Rule 32(c) and (f) as applicable on the date of occurrence and rejected the submission that those provisions were unrelated to misbranding. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - non-labeling of required particulars under Rule 32(c)/(f) constitutes misbranding under the Act; concurrent findings of lower courts on this factual matrix are reliable and upheld. Conclusion: Conviction for misbranding under Section 16(1)(a)(i) read with Section 7 of the Act is sustainable on the ground of statutory non-compliance with Rule 32(c) and (f). Issue 2 - Liability where accused contend non-manufacture (third-party manufacturer defence) Legal framework: Offence under Section 16(1)(a)(i) and attendant provisions impose liability for manufacture/packing/possession for sale of misbranded food; proof of actual manufacturer may negate liability if established. Precedent treatment: Courts below assessed the factual claim that another entity manufactured the goods; absence of corroborative proof is critical. Interpretation and reasoning: Appellants failed to produce valid proof that the items were manufactured by a third party (Bose Confectionary). Concurrent courts found absence of such proof and thus maintained culpability. The Court refrained from overturning those concurrent factual findings given their consistency and evidentiary basis. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - unsupported assertion of third-party manufacture does not absolve the accused; proof is required to shift statutory liability. Conclusion: The defence of non-manufacture was rightly rejected; conviction remains justified on the recorded evidence. Issue 3 - Application of Article 20(1) to permit benefit of subsequent lesser penalty (FSS Act, 2006, s. 52) Legal framework: Article 20(1) bars conviction or penalty greater than that permitted by law in force at time of commission; principle distinguishes prohibition of retrospective creation/enhancement of punishment from allowance of subsequent ameliorative punishment. Precedent treatment: The Court relied on established authority that where a later statute reduces punishment, the benefit may be applied to accuseds whose cases are pending (principle in T. Barai and followed in subsequent decisions such as Nemi Chand and Trilok Chand). These precedents permit application of ameliorative penal amendments to pending cases. Interpretation and reasoning: The Court held that Article 20(1) prohibits imposition of greater punishment than was then applicable but does not forbid imposition of a lesser punishment under a subsequent statute. The Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006 prescribes only a monetary penalty (s. 52) for misbranded food and does not provide imprisonment; therefore, the later, less onerous regime is beneficial and applicable. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - ameliorative penal provisions may be applied to cases pending after such change where they reduce the punishment; Article 20(1) does not impede granting of lesser punishment retrospectively. Conclusion: The appellants are entitled to the benefit of the newer penal regime to the extent that it permits imposition of a lesser sentence than was available under the repealed Act. Issue 4 - Conversion of sentence of imprisonment to fine in exercise of Court's power Legal framework: Courts possess the power to modify sentence on appeal/ revision and to apply beneficial legislative changes; sentencing must consider nature of offence, time elapsed, age of convict, and precedential guidance where imprisonment has been commuted to fine. Precedent treatment: Decisions (T. Barai, Nemi Chand, Trilok Chand) have modified sentences of imprisonment for misbranding under the repealed Act into fines under the newer, less punitive standard. These authorities were applied to guide appropriate quantum. Interpretation and reasoning: Considering concurrent findings of guilt but recognizing the ameliorative effect of the 2006 Act, the Court evaluated mitigating factors - age of the convicted person (about 60), passage of 24 years, prior judicial orders (exemption from surrender) - and concluded that imprisonment was no longer appropriate. The Court converted the sentence of imprisonment to a specific fine (Rs. 50,000) for the partner who had been sentenced to imprisonment; the fine previously imposed on the corporate appellant was upheld. Ratio vs. Obiter: Ratio - where a later statute prescribes a non-custodial maximum penalty for the same substantive offence, appellate Courts may commute imprisonment to a monetary penalty in appropriate cases, applying precedents and considering individual circumstances. Conclusion: The sentence of imprisonment was converted to a fine for the individual appellant in the exercise of the Court's power to impose the lesser, currently applicable punishment; monetary penalties were ordered to be deposited within a specified period. Convictions were otherwise maintained.