Plausible contractual interpretation in arbitration cannot be replaced by court review, and a dissenting opinion is not the award.

Under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, a court under Sections 34 and 37 cannot substitute its own reading of a contract where technical arbitrators have adopted a plausible interpretation of embankment measurement; interference is warranted only for perversity, patent illegality, or an unreasonable construction. The Court also clarified that a dissenting opinion in a multi-member arbitral tribunal is not part of the binding award and cannot displace the majority decision. On that basis, the arbitral awards were restored, the High Court's judgments were set aside, and relief was maintained subject only to modification on interest.

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Issues: (i) Whether the High Court could interfere with the arbitral award under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the ground that the tribunal's interpretation of the contract on measurement of embankment work was implausible; (ii) Whether a dissenting opinion in a multi-member arbitral tribunal could be treated as an award or used to displace the majority award.

Issue (i): Whether the High Court could interfere with the arbitral award under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 on the ground that the tribunal's interpretation of the contract on measurement of embankment work was implausible.

Analysis: The contractual clauses were construed by the majority of technical arbitrators as requiring composite measurement of the completed embankment, and that view was consistent with the contract documents read as a whole. The Court reiterated that an arbitrator's interpretation of contract terms, especially in technically specialised works, is entitled to deference if it is a plausible view. Under Sections 34 and 37, the court does not undertake appellate reappreciation of contractual interpretation and may interfere only where the award is perverse, patently illegal, or based on a construction that no fair-minded or reasonable person could adopt.

Conclusion: The High Court ought not to have substituted its own interpretation for the plausible view taken in the award; interference was unwarranted and the award was protected.

Issue (ii): Whether a dissenting opinion in a multi-member arbitral tribunal could be treated as an award or used to displace the majority award.

Analysis: A dissenting opinion is not part of the award and does not acquire independent status merely because the majority award is under challenge. It may be relevant as a record of disagreement or, in an appropriate case, as a procedural indicator, but it cannot be elevated into the tribunal's operative determination in place of the majority view. The scrutiny before the court remains directed to the impugned award, not to a dissenting opinion that was never the binding decision of the tribunal.

Conclusion: The dissenting opinion could not be treated as an award or as a substitute for the majority award.

Final Conclusion: The arbitral awards were restored, the High Court's judgments were set aside, and the contractors succeeded with modification only on the interest component.

Ratio Decidendi: A court exercising jurisdiction under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 cannot supplant a plausible contractual interpretation adopted by technical arbitrators, and a dissenting opinion in a multi-member tribunal does not form part of the binding award.

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