Issues: (i) Whether the Company Court had jurisdiction in the winding-up to adjudicate title to seized paintings claimed by the liquidation estate; (ii) Whether five identified paintings formed part of the liquidation estate notwithstanding a rival claimant's asserted entitlement under family consent terms; and (iii) Whether sale of the five identified paintings should proceed through an expert-assisted art-auction process.

Issue (i): Whether the Company Court had jurisdiction in the winding-up to adjudicate title to seized paintings claimed by the liquidation estate.

Analysis: Sections 446(2)(b) and 446(2)(d), read with Section 456 of the Companies Act, 1956, empower the Company Court to take custody of property to which the company appears entitled and to determine the consequential question of title. The earlier determination of jurisdiction had attained finality and had not been disturbed in appeal.

Conclusion: The Company Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate title to the paintings for purposes of the winding-up.

Issue (ii): Whether five identified paintings formed part of the liquidation estate notwithstanding a rival claimant's asserted entitlement under family consent terms.

Analysis: The asset register, purchase vouchers, seizure record, police affidavits and gallery confirmation furnished a coherent and corroborated basis to identify the five paintings as company assets. The applicable standard was preponderance of probabilities. The rival claimant, despite repeated opportunities, adduced no evidence of title and declined to enter the witness box, warranting an adverse inference. The family consent terms concerned possession and enjoyment among family members, covered only the art then in dispute, and neither bound the company nor established title against it.

Conclusion: The five identified paintings form part of the liquidation estate, and the rival claim to them fails. No determination of title is made in respect of the remaining paintings.

Issue (iii): Whether sale of the five identified paintings should proceed through an expert-assisted art-auction process.

Analysis: Works of art require a specialised sale mechanism rather than a routine asset-auction platform. Engagement of an art expert and an appropriate art auction house would promote value maximisation and price discovery for the liquidation estate.

Conclusion: The five identified paintings may be sold through an expert-assisted art-auction process formulated by the Official Liquidator and the appointed expert.

Final Conclusion: The liquidation estate is entitled to realise the five identified assets for satisfaction of stakeholder claims, while competing claims concerning the remaining paintings are preserved for separate adjudication.

Ratio Decidendi: In winding-up, the Company Court may determine title to property appearing to belong to the company on a preponderance of probabilities based on reliable corporate records and corroborative material, particularly where a rival claimant fails to substantiate title.

Issues: Whether the impugned properties could be retained under attachment as proceeds of crime under the Prevention of Money-Laundering Act, 2002.

Analysis: Sections 2(u), 2(1)(y), and 3 require property alleged to be proceeds of crime to have a demonstrable nexus with criminal activity relating to a scheduled offence. The payments received under the debenture subscription agreements, consultancy arrangements, and dairy-business sale arrangement were independent commercial transactions. Significant payments preceded the relevant bank disbursement, and no material established a link between the later payments and any alleged criminal proceeds. Official banking investments and loans, without material showing illegality or diversion, could not by themselves be treated as proceeds of crime.

Conclusion: The amounts and the attached properties were not shown to constitute proceeds of crime; continuation of the attachment was unwarranted.

Issues: (i) Whether the relevant date of import for applying an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy is the date of shipment or dispatch or the date of filing of the Bill of Entry or clearance for home consumption; (ii) Whether Notification No. 02/2026-27 applies to goods dispatched and arrived in India before its electronic Gazette publication merely because the Bills of Entry were filed thereafter.

Issue (i): Whether the relevant date of import for applying an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy is the date of shipment or dispatch or the date of filing of the Bill of Entry or clearance for home consumption.

Analysis: Paragraph 1.05(b) of the Foreign Trade Policy, read with paragraphs 2.17(a) and 11.11 of the Handbook of Procedures, 2023, defines the date of import by reference to shipment or dispatch from the supplying country. For air imports, the relevant Airway Bill evidencing departure from the last airport in the exporting country is determinative. The Bill of Entry or out-of-charge date is relevant under Section 15 of the Customs Act, 1962 for determining the rate of customs duty, but does not govern the applicability of an import-policy restriction under the Foreign Trade Policy.

Conclusion: The relevant date of import for the import-policy restriction is the shipment or dispatch date determined under the Foreign Trade Policy and Handbook of Procedures, not the post-notification Bill of Entry or clearance date. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Notification No. 02/2026-27 applies to goods dispatched and arrived in India before its electronic Gazette publication merely because the Bills of Entry were filed thereafter.

Analysis: A notification acquires legal force only upon its electronic Gazette publication and cannot operate retrospectively without statutory authority. The restrictive notification could therefore operate only prospectively and could not affect goods already dispatched and arrived before publication. Its clauses excluding transitional arrangements did not alter this position. A subsequent executive memorandum lacked statutory force and could neither override the policy-defined date of import nor retrospectively expand the notification's application; conditional import authorisations did not redress that entitlement.

Conclusion: No. The restrictive notification is inapplicable to goods dispatched and arrived before its electronic Gazette publication, notwithstanding subsequent filing of Bills of Entry. This issue is decided in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: Goods whose shipment or dispatch predates the effective publication of a restrictive import-policy amendment remain governed by the pre-existing import policy, and that position cannot be altered through a subsequent executive clarification.

Ratio Decidendi: For import restrictions under the Foreign Trade Policy, the policy-defined shipment or dispatch date governs the date of import; the customs clearance date applicable to duty assessment and an executive clarification cannot retrospectively vary that policy framework.

Issues: Whether cognizance for an alleged contravention of Section 217(4) of the Companies Act, 2013 was liable to be quashed.

Analysis: At the cognizance stage, scrutiny is confined to the complaint and supporting material for determining whether a prima facie case exists; defence material and explanations cannot be evaluated through a mini-trial. The complaint and supporting documents disclosed allegations of non-cooperation with the investigation, and the cognizance order reflected application of mind to that material.

Conclusion: The cognizance and issuance of process for the alleged offence under Section 217(4), punishable under Section 217(6), of the Companies Act, 2013 were not liable to be quashed.

Issues: Whether an ex parte assessment order could be sustained where it was not passed on the scheduled hearing date and no notice of the subsequent hearing date was served.

Analysis: In exercise of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the validity of an assessment order issued under Section 73 of the GST Act was tested against the principles of natural justice. Where the authority neither decides the matter on the fixed date nor communicates the next date of hearing, an ex parte order results from denial of a fair opportunity of personal hearing.

Conclusion: The ex parte assessment order was invalid for breach of the principles of natural justice and was set aside, with a direction for fresh hearing and a reasoned order in accordance with law.

Issues: Validity of the general penalty imposed under Section 125 of the Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 and the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017, after the return was filed, tax liability discharged and late fee paid.

Analysis: The return had already been furnished, the applicable late fee had been paid, and the aggregate penalty of Rs. 50,000 exceeded the maximum limit prescribed under the Uttar Pradesh Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017.

Conclusion: The penalty was unsustainable for exceeding the statutory maximum, and the impugned show-cause notice and penalty order were set aside.

Issues: Whether the generation of three digitally signed personal-hearing notices on the same date, bearing different numbers and fixing different hearing dates and times, required scrutiny of the State Tax portal and notice-generation process.

Analysis: The three notices were issued and digitally signed within minutes of each other while specifying separate dates and times for personal hearing. This was treated as a serious system lacuna capable of permitting manipulation. A report on the portal functioning and the process enabling such notices was directed from the Chief Commissioner of State Tax, and a fresh appellate order was directed.

Outcome: Report and fresh appellate order directed; matter listed for further hearing.

Issues: Whether the reassessment notice for Assessment Year 2018-19, issued after expiry of three years from the end of the relevant assessment year with approval of the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax, was valid under the applicable reassessment regime.

Analysis: Under Sections 148, 148A and 151 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, where more than three years have elapsed from the end of the relevant assessment year, prior approval for issuing a reassessment notice is required from the authority specified in Section 151(ii), namely the Principal Chief Commissioner, Principal Director General, Chief Commissioner or Director General. The notice dated 02.04.2022 was issued after the three-year period for Assessment Year 2018-19 had expired, but approval was obtained only from the Principal Commissioner of Income-tax. No extension of time for replying to the Section 148A(b) notice had been sought, and therefore exclusion of such time for limitation purposes was inapplicable. A non-speaking dismissal of a Special Leave Petition does not attract the doctrine of merger or affirm the reasoning of the High Court.

Conclusion: The notice issued without sanction from the authority prescribed by Section 151(ii) was invalid; consequently, the reassessment lacked valid jurisdiction and was quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether the final assessment order passed after DRP directions was barred by limitation; (ii) Whether the MLI or its underlying spirit could be invoked to determine PE for assessment year 2020-21; and (iii) Whether the alleged PE and the 30% profit attribution could be sustained on the existing record.

Issue (i): Whether the final assessment order passed after DRP directions was barred by limitation.

Analysis: The retrospective amendment clarified that the limitation under Section 153 governs the passing of the draft assessment order, whereas the final assessment order following DRP directions is governed by Section 144C.

Conclusion: The final assessment order was not time-barred. Against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the MLI or its underlying spirit could be invoked to determine PE for assessment year 2020-21.

Analysis: The relevant MLI provisions were admittedly inapplicable to the assessment year. The existence of a PE must therefore be determined strictly under Article 5 of the India-United Kingdom Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement applicable for that year.

Conclusion: Neither the MLI nor its underlying spirit can be invoked to determine PE for the relevant year. In favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether the alleged PE and the 30% profit attribution could be sustained on the existing record.

Analysis: Determination of a dependent-agent PE requires examination of the actual contractual arrangements and conduct, including control over pricing, credit risk, contractual obligations, performance responsibility, and the Indian entity's role in soliciting, negotiating, securing and processing orders. Fixed-place and service PE require separate satisfaction of their respective treaty conditions; the Revenue bears the burden of establishing a PE. Acceptance of an earlier assessment concerning another group entity does not create an estoppel for the relevant year. If a PE is found, profit attribution must follow a functions, assets and risks analysis. Arm's-length remuneration does not determine PE existence, but may eliminate further attribution where it fully captures the relevant functions and risks; ad hoc attribution is impermissible.

Conclusion: The PE issue and related profit attribution were remitted for fresh treaty-compliant determination; no final finding on PE or attributable profits was made. In favour of the assessee to the extent of remand.

Final Conclusion: The limitation challenge fails, while the PE inquiry and any profit attribution must be redetermined independently under the applicable treaty, without reliance on the MLI or an ad hoc percentage of receipts.

Ratio Decidendi: PE existence and resultant profit attribution must be determined independently for each year under the applicable treaty on the actual functions, assets, risks and conduct of the parties, and cannot rest on inapplicable MLI principles, prior group assessments or ad hoc attribution.

Issues: (i) Whether donations forming part of mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure are eligible for deduction under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite their non-deductibility under Section 37(1) of that Act. (ii) Whether the assessment order allowing that deduction was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue so as to permit revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Issue (i): Whether donations forming part of mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure are eligible for deduction under Section 80G of the Income-tax Act, 1961 despite their non-deductibility under Section 37(1) of that Act.

Analysis: Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) excludes mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure under Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013 from business-expense deduction. That exclusion operates only in computing business income and does not bar an independent statutory deduction under Chapter VI-A where the payment otherwise qualifies as a donation under Section 80G.

Conclusion: Donations forming part of mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure were eligible for deduction under Section 80G, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the assessment order allowing that deduction was erroneous and prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue so as to permit revision under Section 263 of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Revisionary jurisdiction requires both an erroneous assessment order and prejudice to the interests of the Revenue. The assessment record showed that the Assessing Officer sought particulars and supporting documents for Chapter VI-A deductions under Section 142(1), and the assessee furnished donation details and receipts. The claim was thus examined with application of mind. A different view on the deduction did not render the assessment erroneous.

Conclusion: The assessment order was neither erroneous nor prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue; revision under Section 263 was invalid, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The revisionary order was quashed and the assessment allowing the Section 80G deduction for the qualifying corporate social responsibility donations remained undisturbed.

Ratio Decidendi: Revisionary jurisdiction cannot be invoked where an assessment, after inquiry and application of mind, adopts the legally sustainable view that disallowance of mandatory corporate social responsibility expenditure under Section 37(1) does not bar a qualifying Section 80G deduction.

Issues: Whether penalty for under-reporting of income under Section 270A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 could be sustained where the income declared in the original return and processed under Section 143(1) remained unchanged in reassessment without any addition or disallowance.

Analysis: Section 270A(2)(a) requires a comparison between the assessed income and the income determined on processing of the return to establish under-reporting. The original return disclosed income of Rs. 45,83,888, which was accepted on processing under Section 143(1). The same income was returned in response to reassessment proceedings and was ultimately accepted without any variation. The statutory conditions for treating the entire returned income as under-reported were therefore not established.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 270A was unsustainable and was directed to be deleted.

Issues: Whether interest earned by a co-operative society from investments with a co-operative bank qualifies for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Section 80P(2)(d) permits deduction of interest or dividend income received from investments with another co-operative society. A co-operative bank remains a species of co-operative society for this purpose. Section 80P(4), which excludes a co-operative bank itself from claiming the deduction, does not disentitle a co-operative society from claiming deduction on interest received from a co-operative bank.

Conclusion: Interest received by the agricultural co-operative society from a co-operative bank is eligible for deduction under Section 80P(2)(d) of the Income-tax Act, 1961, and the addition is deleted.

Issues: Whether the entire Rs. 12,03,500 cash-deposit addition under section 69A, taxable under section 115BBE, should be sustained where the supporting cash records were self-prepared and unaudited.

Analysis: Section 69A governs unexplained money, while the charge under the Income-tax Act is on income and not on gross receipts. The cash records, bank material and related documents produced did not justify complete acceptance because the books were self-prepared and not subject to audit. At the same time, the material did not warrant taxing the entire cash deposit as income. An estimated profit component was considered appropriate to account for the inconsistencies while protecting revenue.

Conclusion: The addition is restricted to Rs. 1,20,350, being 10% of Rs. 12,03,500, taxable at normal rates and not under section 115BBE; the issue is decided partly in favour of the assessee.

Issues: Whether estimated additions for alleged on-money receipts from sale of flats could be sustained under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 without corroborative evidence of the assessee's receipt.

Analysis: The seized material evidenced on-money receipts of a specified amount which had been accepted as income and offered to tax by the person managing the project. The further additions were derived by applying an average sale rate to other flat sales, without material evidencing that the assessee had received additional on-money. An addition under Section 69A cannot rest solely on such uncorroborated estimation.

Conclusion: The estimated additions for alleged on-money receipts under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 cannot be sustained and are deleted.

Issues: (i) Whether a 20% ad hoc disallowance of claimed business expenditure was sustainable without rejection of audited books or identification of bogus or unsupported expenditure; (ii) Whether the disallowance for cash payments under section 40A(3) required fresh verification of the payment recipients, business expediency, and the exceptions under Rule 6DD(e).

Issue (i): Whether a 20% ad hoc disallowance of claimed business expenditure was sustainable without rejection of audited books or identification of bogus or unsupported expenditure.

Analysis: The expense entries and apparent discrepancies in nomenclature were explained through ledger extracts, cash-book details, and supporting vouchers. The audited books were not rejected, no particular expenditure was found bogus or unsupported, and no defect was identified in the revised clarification. A blanket 20% disallowance founded merely on doubts arising from differently described entries was therefore conjectural.

Conclusion: The ad hoc disallowance of business expenditure is deleted in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the disallowance for cash payments under section 40A(3) required fresh verification of the payment recipients, business expediency, and the exceptions under Rule 6DD(e).

Analysis: Section 40A(3) restricts deductions for specified cash payments, while Rule 6DD(e) provides an exception for payments for specified animal-husbandry produce, including hides and skins. The record required verification of whether payments exceeding the threshold were made to different persons, whether business expediency justified the payments, and whether the statutory exception applied. These matters had not been adequately examined.

Conclusion: The cash-payment disallowance is set aside and remitted to the Assessing Officer for fresh verification and recomputation.

Final Conclusion: The unsupported ad hoc expense disallowance is removed, while the cash-payment question requires fresh statutory verification.

Ratio Decidendi: An ad hoc disallowance of expenditure cannot rest on conjecture where audited books are not rejected and no expenditure is found bogus or unsupported.

Issues: Whether rejection of the rectification application was valid where no mistake apparent from the record was established.

Analysis: Section 154 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 permits correction only of a mistake apparent from the record and cannot be invoked to review or reopen an issue requiring reconsideration beyond that limited jurisdiction. The original appeal had not been admitted under Section 249(3) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 because the delay in filing it was not condoned. The rectification application did not demonstrate any apparent mistake in that order. The grounds concerning the merits of the deduction claim and consequential interest were not adjudicated because the appeal was confined to rejection of rectification.

Conclusion: Rejection of the rectification application was valid; the issue is decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether interest earned on fixed deposits and Kisan Vikas Patras, though assessable under the head income from other sources, must be included in book profit for computing the ceiling of partners' remuneration under Section 40(b) of the Income-tax Act, 1961.

Analysis: Explanation 3 to Section 40(b) adopts the net profit shown in the partnership firm's profit and loss account as the basis for book profit. The applicable measure is the commercial profit reflected in that account, rather than only the income computed under the head profits and gains of business or profession. The interest income formed part of the profit and loss account, and no contrary authority was shown to justify its exclusion from book profit.

Conclusion: Interest on fixed deposits and Kisan Vikas Patras included in the profit and loss account cannot be excluded while determining book profit for allowable partners' remuneration; the consequential disallowance was deleted.

Issues: Whether the notice issued under Section 148 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for Assessment Year 2016-17 was barred by limitation, thereby invalidating the reassessment.

Analysis: Section 149(1)(a) permitted reassessment notice within three years from the end of the relevant assessment year. The extended period under Section 149(1)(b) was available only where the prescribed material revealed escaped income of at least Rs. 50 lakhs. The recorded figure of Rs. 57,57,235 included Rs. 17,00,500 twice, as that amount formed part of the total cash deposits of Rs. 26,30,500. After excluding the duplicate counting of income, the alleged escaped income was Rs. 40,56,735, below the statutory threshold. A valid jurisdictional notice within limitation was necessary to assume reassessment jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The notice dated 27.03.2023 was barred by limitation; consequently, the reassessment order was without jurisdiction and stood quashed.

Issues: (i) Whether renewal registration under Section 12AB could be refused solely because the educational society charged substantial fees and generated surplus; (ii) Whether the delay in filing Form 10AB should be condoned.

Issue (i): Whether renewal registration under Section 12AB could be refused solely because the educational society charged substantial fees and generated surplus.

Analysis: Section 2(15) recognises education as a charitable purpose, and the inquiry at the registration stage under Section 12AB focuses on the society's objects and the genuineness of its activities. The educational objects and their implementation were undisputed. The surplus was generated from educational activities, applied or accumulated for those objects, and was not diverted for non-charitable purposes or for the benefit of members. Fees charged and the quantum of surplus, by themselves, do not establish a profit-making motive where the surplus is incidental to imparting education.

Conclusion: Renewal registration under Section 12AB cannot be denied merely because fees are substantial or surplus is generated; the society is entitled to registration.

Issue (ii): Whether the delay in filing Form 10AB should be condoned.

Analysis: The authority did not specifically adjudicate limitation, while the society had filed a condonation request explaining the delay. The explanation furnished warranted condonation.

Conclusion: The delay in filing Form 10AB is condoned.

Final Conclusion: The authority is required to condone the delay and grant registration under Section 12AB pursuant to the renewal application.

Ratio Decidendi: At the registration stage, incidental surplus from educational activities cannot alone negate charitable status where the institution pursues its educational objects and does not divert funds for non-charitable purposes.

Issues: (i) Whether refusal to condone the delay in filing the first appeal warranted restoration for examination of the addition for unexplained money; (ii) Whether the penalty founded on the addition could survive after the quantum matter was restored for fresh adjudication.

Issue (i): Whether refusal to condone the delay in filing the first appeal warranted restoration for examination of the addition for unexplained money.

Analysis: The assessment was completed ex parte by treating cash deposits as unexplained money under Section 69A of the Income-tax Act, 1961 and applying Section 115BBE of the Income-tax Act, 1961. The explanation that the deposits related to transactions undertaken as a Banking Mitra on behalf of the bank and its customers, with only commission constituting income, had not been tested against supporting material. In the interest of substantial justice, verification of bank records, appointment documents, transaction particulars and commission statements was required with a reasonable opportunity of hearing.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the assessment and appellate orders were set aside and the matter was restored for de novo adjudication of the nature and source of the deposits.

Issue (ii): Whether the penalty founded on the addition could survive after the quantum matter was restored for fresh adjudication.

Analysis: The penalty under Section 271AAC(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was consequential upon the addition that had been set aside for fresh determination.

Conclusion: In favour of the assessee, the existing penalty was deleted, without precluding fresh penalty proceedings in accordance with law if warranted by the reassessment outcome.

Final Conclusion: The taxability of the deposits requires fresh evidentiary verification, and the existing penalty order ceases to operate pending that determination.