Plain-roller calendering of cotton fabrics was held not to be manufacture under the extended excise definition.

Plain-roller calendering of cotton fabrics was considered against the extended definition of manufacture, where the residuary phrase "any other process" must share the characteristics of the specified processes in Section 2(f)(v) and Item 19I(b). The process was found to merely iron the fabric and produce a smooth, lustrous surface with only temporary effect, with no evidence of chemical addition or lasting change in the fabric. Applying the Supreme Court's later ruling on calendering, the process was held not to fall within the contemplated class of manufacturing processes and therefore did not amount to manufacture.

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Issues: Whether plain-roller calendering of cotton fabrics amounted to "any other process" within Section 2(f)(v) of the Central Excises & Salt Act, 1944 and Item 19I(b) of the Central Excise Tariff.

Analysis: The process had to satisfy the test laid down by the Supreme Court that the residuary expression "any other process" in the extended definition of manufacture must share the characteristics of the preceding specified processes. The record showed that the appellants used plain-roller calendering, that the process merely ironed the fabric and gave it a smooth and lustrous surface, and that the effect was only temporary. No material showed addition of chemicals or a lasting change in the fabric. Applying the later Supreme Court ruling on calendering, the process did not bring the fabric within the contemplated class of processes.

Conclusion: Plain-roller calendering did not amount to "any other process" and therefore did not constitute manufacture under Section 2(f)(v) or Item 19I(b).

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