Territorial jurisdiction and limited review power govern Article 226 challenges where business consequences arise in Bombay.

A Bombay High Court note explains that territorial jurisdiction under Article 226 can arise where an impugned order, though passed outside Bombay, directly affects business carried on in Bombay. It also states that a review application under the Handbook depends on the statute or scheme: the term "person aggrieved" is confined to one whose legal rights are affected, and review power conferred on the Chief Controller cannot be exercised by an unauthorised delegate. The note further emphasises that review is limited to recognised review grounds and cannot be used to reappreciate evidence or substitute a fresh merits-based decision for the earlier order.

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Issues: (i) whether a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226; (ii) whether the review application could be maintained at the instance of the registering authority and whether the power of review under the Handbook could be exercised by the Additional Chief Controller; and (iii) whether the impugned order amounted to a permissible review or an impermissible reappraisal of the merits.

Issue (i): whether a part of the cause of action arose within the territorial jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226.

Analysis: The impugned order was passed outside Bombay, but its consequences were directly visited upon the petitioners in Bombay where they carried on the export business. The question under Article 226(2) was whether the cause of action arose wholly or in part within the Court's jurisdiction. Since the order vitally affected the petitioners' business in Bombay, a part of the cause of action was held to have arisen there.

Conclusion: The High Court had territorial jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

Issue (ii): whether the review application could be maintained at the instance of the registering authority and whether the power of review under the Handbook could be exercised by the Additional Chief Controller.

Analysis: The expression "person aggrieved" in the relevant review provision was confined to a person whose legal rights were adversely affected and did not include the registering authority merely because it was dissatisfied with the appellate order. However, the more substantial defect was that the review power under paras 155(2) and 156 was conferred on the Chief Controller alone. The power was discretionary in nature and was not shown to be delegable to the Additional Chief Controller. The definition clause relied on for delegation in another order could not be imported to enlarge the Handbook provision.

Conclusion: The review was not vitiated on the ground that it was sought by the registering authority, but the impugned order was without jurisdiction because it was passed by an other than the Chief Controller.

Issue (iii): whether the impugned order amounted to a permissible review or an impermissible reappraisal of the merits.

Analysis: Review jurisdiction is limited and cannot be exercised as if it were an appeal. The impugned order reappreciated facts and evidence and substituted a contrary conclusion on the merits for the appellate determination. That exceeded the proper scope of review, which is confined to recognised review grounds such as error apparent or similar grave mistake, and did not permit a fresh adjudication on evidence.

Conclusion: The impugned order was an impermissible exercise of review power and was liable to be set aside.

Final Conclusion: The petition was allowed, the impugned review order was quashed, and the appellate order restoring the petitioners' registration remained operative.

Ratio Decidendi: A review power conferred on a specified authority cannot be exercised by an unauthorised delegate, and review cannot be converted into an appeal by reappreciating evidence and substituting a merits-based decision for the earlier order.

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