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Issues: (i) Whether section 177 of the Indian Penal Code was impliedly repealed by section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and whether prosecution under both provisions for false statements in income-tax proceedings was competent. (ii) Whether prosecutions under section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, were saved after repeal by the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether section 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Issue (i): Whether section 177 of the Indian Penal Code was impliedly repealed by section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, and whether prosecution under both provisions for false statements in income-tax proceedings was competent.
Analysis: Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code was a general penal provision covering false information to a public servant, while section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922 created a narrower offence confined to false verification in specified income-tax proceedings. The two enactments operated in different fields, with different legislative objects, and did not cover an identical subject-matter. The later Act did not expressly repeal section 177, and the differences in compoundability, sanction, forum, and bar of prosecution after penalty were held not to create such inconsistency or repugnancy as to make the provisions wholly incompatible. The principle under section 26 of the General Clauses Act permitted prosecution under either enactment where the same act constituted offences under both, subject to the rule against double punishment.
Conclusion: Section 177 of the Indian Penal Code was not impliedly repealed, and prosecution under both provisions was competent; the objection failed.
Issue (ii): Whether prosecutions under section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, were saved after repeal by the Income-tax Act, 1961, and whether section 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was violative of article 14 of the Constitution of India.
Analysis: The repealing provision in section 297 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, read with section 6 of the General Clauses Act, preserved pending legal proceedings unless a contrary intention appeared. The expression relating to assessment proceedings was held wide enough to include prosecution for offences committed while the old Act was in force, especially since offences committed during the life of a statute remain punishable after repeal when the saving provision so indicates. The classification between returns filed before and after commencement of the new Act was treated as a reasonable classification, and no constitutional infirmity under article 14 was established. The sanction exercised by the Inspecting Assistant Commissioner was also held valid for prosecutions launched under the old Act while it remained in force.
Conclusion: The prosecutions under section 52 of the Income-tax Act, 1922, were saved and maintainable, and section 277 of the Income-tax Act, 1961, was not unconstitutional; the objections failed.
Final Conclusion: The petitions raised no sustainable legal objection to the continuance of the prosecutions, and the proceedings were liable to go on in accordance with law.
Ratio Decidendi: A later fiscal statute creating a narrower offence does not impliedly repeal an earlier general penal provision unless the two are wholly incompatible, and repeal of a taxing statute does not extinguish liability for offences committed under it where the saving provisions preserve pending proceedings.