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Issues: Whether the notice issued under section 33B of the Indian Income-tax Act, 1922, satisfied the requirements of law and whether the Commissioner validly exercised jurisdiction under that section.
Analysis: Section 33B did not prescribe a particular form of notice, but it required that the assessee be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard. A reasonable opportunity in such a proceeding required disclosure of the basic grounds on which action was proposed, so that the assessee could know what case had to be met. The impugned notice merely stated that there were prima facie reasons and grounds to hold that the partnership was not genuine, without revealing the specific basis of that conclusion. Such a notice left the assessee to speculate about the charge and did not amount to fair disclosure. The proceeding under section 33B was quasi-judicial, and compliance with natural justice was therefore essential. The notice was distinguished from the notice considered in the earlier Supreme Court decision, where the basic materials had been disclosed.
Conclusion: The notice did not meet the requirements of law, and the Commissioner did not validly exercise jurisdiction under section 33B.
Ratio Decidendi: A notice initiating revisionary action that affects civil rights must disclose the basic grounds of proposed action with sufficient clarity to afford a real and reasonable opportunity of defence; a vague notice that leaves the assessee to speculate is invalid for breach of natural justice.