Reasonable apprehension of bias disqualifies an adjudicating authority that has already sanctioned prosecution and formed a concluded view.

A reasonable apprehension of bias can disqualify an adjudicating authority where it has already sanctioned prosecution and expressed a concluded view on confiscability and guilt. On those facts, the remand for fresh adjudication by another authority was justified. The department's commencement of de novo proceedings after remand did not amount to waiver or estoppel, because it did not abandon its statutory right to seek reference. The reference application therefore failed on merits, while the bias objection succeeded and the estoppel objection was rejected.

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Issues: (i) Whether the adjudicating authority, having accorded sanction for prosecution, was disqualified from adjudicating the same matter on the ground of bias and violation of natural justice; (ii) Whether the department was estopped from seeking reference because it proceeded with de novo adjudication after remand.

Issue (i): Whether the adjudicating authority, having accorded sanction for prosecution, was disqualified from adjudicating the same matter on the ground of bias and violation of natural justice.

Analysis: The sanction order disclosed that the authority had reached a concluded view on the alleged illegal import, confiscability of the goods, and the need for prosecution. In quasi-judicial proceedings, the governing test is not proof of actual bias but whether a litigant could reasonably apprehend bias. Where the same authority has expressed a firm view on guilt and the party has raised a bona fide apprehension of unfair adjudication, the requirements of natural justice and fair play are not satisfied. The surrounding correspondence showed a live controversy and continuing lack of confidence in the neutrality of the adjudicating authority.

Conclusion: The authority who sanctioned prosecution was not a fit adjudicating authority in the facts of the case, and the order of remand for fresh adjudication by another authority was justified.

Issue (ii): Whether the department was estopped from seeking reference because it proceeded with de novo adjudication after remand.

Analysis: The subsequent commencement of fresh proceedings pursuant to the remand order did not extinguish the department's pre-existing statutory right to seek a reference. Compliance with the remand order was only a post-decisional step and did not amount to waiver or abandonment of the right to challenge the Tribunal's view.

Conclusion: The plea of estoppel was rejected.

Final Conclusion: The reference application failed on merits because the Tribunal's view on bias and the need for adjudication by a different authority was upheld, while the objection based on estoppel was negatived.

Ratio Decidendi: In adjudicatory proceedings, a reasonable apprehension that the deciding authority has already formed a view on guilt after sanctioning prosecution is sufficient to disqualify that authority on the ground of bias, and post-remand compliance does not destroy the statutory right to seek reference.

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