Issues: Whether unconditional release of detained gold and gold jewellery could be directed under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, when compliance with Section 124 of that Act through an alleged oral show cause notice was factually disputed.

Analysis: Section 110(2) mandates return of seized goods if notice under Section 124(a) is not issued within the prescribed or validly extended period. The first proviso to Section 124 permits an oral notice and oral representation at the concerned person's request; however, a mere printed waiver or recital cannot by itself establish a valid oral notice. The contemporaneous statements relied upon by the Department, their voluntariness, the alleged absence of translation, the circumstances of execution, and the relevant records, including CCTV footage, gave rise to disputed factual and evidentiary questions. These questions required determination by the competent adjudicating authority rather than factual adjudication in writ proceedings.

Conclusion: Unconditional release was declined; the competent adjudicating authority must independently determine whether the documents and proceedings constituted valid compliance with Sections 110(2) and 124 of the Customs Act, 1962, after granting a personal hearing and completing adjudication within the stipulated period.

Issues: Whether unconditional release of seized gold could be directed in writ jurisdiction under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, where the Department asserted issuance of an oral show cause notice under the proviso to Section 124 and the validity of that assertion was factually disputed.

Analysis: Section 110(2) requires return of seized goods where the requisite notice under Section 124(a) is not given within the prescribed period, subject to the statutory extension. Section 124 ordinarily requires written notice but permits oral notice at the concerned person's request. The mandatory consequence of Section 110(2) remains applicable where no requisite notice has been issued. Here, however, the Department specifically asserted that an oral show cause notice was issued on the seizure date, while the petitioner disputed both that assertion and the voluntariness and evidentiary value of the statement recorded under Section 108. Those disputed matters, including the alleged non-declaration, the validity of the oral notice, and confiscation or penalty liability, required statutory adjudication and could not be resolved through a writ-directed fact-finding exercise before an Order-in-Original.

Conclusion: Unconditional release of the seized gold was not warranted at the writ stage; the disputed questions must be determined independently by the adjudicating authority after affording the petitioner a hearing.

Issues: Whether unconditional return of seized gold could be directed under Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, despite the Revenue's assertion that an oral notice under Section 124(a) had been issued and the underlying facts were disputed.

Analysis: Section 110(2) mandates return of seized goods where the notice contemplated by Section 124(a) is not issued within the prescribed or validly extended period. The first proviso to Section 124 permits an oral notice and oral representation at the request of the person concerned. A mere waiver does not dispense with the statutory notice requirement; however, the Revenue specifically recorded that an oral notice was issued on the date of seizure. The contemporaneous statement, coupled with that assertion, raised disputed factual questions as to the oral proceedings, the request for oral notice, and the voluntariness and contents of the statement. Such evidentiary disputes could not be resolved in writ jurisdiction. The absence of a personal hearing did not by itself establish entitlement to return under Section 110(2), which turns on issuance of notice under Section 124(a).

Conclusion: The Petitioner was not entitled to unconditional release of the gold under Section 110(2) on the mere absence of a written notice; the asserted oral notice and disputed factual foundation required determination by the competent Customs authority. The conclusion is against the assessee.

Issues: Whether writ jurisdiction should be exercised against a customs confiscation order despite the availability of a statutory appellate remedy.

Analysis: The challenge involved disputed factual questions concerning the recording and voluntariness of the statement, issuance of notice, waiver of notice and hearing, and procedural compliance in confiscation proceedings. These matters required appraisal of the adjudication record and were appropriately examinable by the statutory appellate authority. Mere allegation of breach of natural justice did not warrant bypassing the efficacious appellate remedy on these facts.

Outcome: The petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue the statutory appellate remedy.

Issues: Whether unconditional release of the detained gold bars could be directed solely because no separate written show-cause notice was issued within the period contemplated by Section 110(2) of the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 permits the notice and representation contemplated therein to be oral at the request of the person concerned. Although no separate written notice was issued, the departmental record asserted that an oral show-cause notice had been given on the date of detention and contained a contemporaneous statement concerning concealment, non-declaration and waiver of notice and hearing. The recital of waiver was not conclusive of statutory compliance. Whether an oral notice was actually given, the grounds communicated, the voluntariness of the statement, and the effect of the contemporaneous proceedings required examination of evidence, including the asserted CCTV material, and could not appropriately be determined in writ jurisdiction.

Conclusion: Unconditional release was not warranted at this stage; the competent adjudicating authority must determine compliance with Section 124 of the Customs Act, 1962 after affording the petitioner a personal hearing.

Issues: Whether extraordinary writ jurisdiction could be invoked to challenge a concluded customs adjudication order despite an available statutory appeal and prolonged unexplained delay.

Analysis: Article 226 jurisdiction is not barred absolutely by an alternative remedy, but exhaustion of an efficacious statutory remedy remains the governing rule. The challenge involved disputed questions concerning service of notice, the purported waiver, adjudication records and findings of confiscation, all of which were amenable to appellate scrutiny under Section 128 of the Customs Act, 1962. The petitioner had knowledge of the seizure, did not respond to the public notice, did not pursue the statutory appeal against the adjudication order, and furnished no satisfactory explanation for the prolonged inaction.

Conclusion: Exercise of writ jurisdiction was declined; the issue was decided against the petitioner.

Issues: Whether a customs claim arising from a pre-CIRP import transaction, which the Customs Department did not submit during CIRP, could be adjudicated and enforced after approval of the resolution plan.

Analysis: A claim under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 arises from the underlying right to payment and need not have been adjudicated, quantified or crystallised before the insolvency commencement date. The public announcement mechanism obligated the Customs Department to file its pre-CIRP claim with the Resolution Professional. Approval of the resolution plan under Section 31(1) made it binding upon governmental authorities, and the plan expressly extinguished unfiled pre-CIRP claims. Although customs authorities may determine liability during CIRP, that power cannot be exercised after plan approval to enforce an extinguished pre-CIRP claim. Section 238 gives the IBC overriding effect where the Customs Act conflicts with the binding consequences of the approved plan.

Conclusion: The unfiled customs claim arising from the pre-CIRP import stood extinguished upon approval of the resolution plan and could not thereafter be adjudicated or enforced against the corporate debtor.

Issues: (i) Whether Article 24 of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area ousted the jurisdiction of Customs Authorities to initiate proceedings under the Customs Act, 1962; (ii) Whether Customs Authorities lacked power, before insertion of Section 28DA, to recover duty on an incorrect preferential-tariff claim.

Issue (i): Whether Article 24 of the ASEAN-India Free Trade Area ousted the jurisdiction of Customs Authorities to initiate proceedings under the Customs Act, 1962.

Analysis: Article 24, containing the inter-State dispute-resolution mechanism, was not incorporated into Indian municipal law. The Rules of Origin, 2009 gave effect to origin criteria for preferential treatment but did not incorporate that dispute-resolution mechanism. An unincorporated treaty obligation cannot be enforced by a private party to displace statutory jurisdiction conferred on Customs Authorities under domestic law.

Conclusion: Article 24 did not oust the jurisdiction of Customs Authorities under the Customs Act, 1962. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether Customs Authorities lacked power, before insertion of Section 28DA, to recover duty on an incorrect preferential-tariff claim.

Analysis: The pre-amendment statutory scheme of Sections 28 and 46 empowered recovery of duty short-levied or short-paid because of suppression of facts. The importer was required to make a truthful declaration in the bill of entry and supporting documents, including particulars underlying the certificate of origin and regional value content. Section 28DA introduced an additional verification mechanism for preferential-origin claims; it did not create or curtail the pre-existing recovery jurisdiction under Section 28.

Conclusion: Customs Authorities possessed the requisite power under the unamended Customs Act, 1962 to proceed on an incorrect or suppressed preferential-duty declaration. The issue was decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The jurisdictional objections to the orders denying preferential customs-duty benefit failed, while questions concerning duty quantification, confiscation and penalty remained open for statutory appellate consideration.

Ratio Decidendi: An unincorporated treaty dispute-resolution provision cannot override domestic customs jurisdiction, and a later preferential-origin verification mechanism does not negate the pre-existing statutory power to recover duty arising from suppression in import declarations.

Issues: Whether duty demand, redemption fine and penalty for alleged non-compliance with EPCG notification conditions could survive after issuance of the Export Obligation Discharge Certificates and cancellation of the bonds.

Analysis: Installation certificates covering the imported capital goods and Export Obligation Discharge Certificates for all six EPCG authorisations established fulfilment of the stipulated conditions. The EODC had not been produced during adjudication because its issuance by the licensing authority was pending despite the assessee having submitted the required material. Customs subsequently accepted the EODCs and cancelled the corresponding bonds. Confirmation of duty for non-production of documents was consequently inconsistent with the subsequent acceptance of those documents and bond cancellation.

Conclusion: The duty demand, redemption fine and penalty were legally unsustainable; the issue was decided in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether a PCM had a statutory duty and regulatory visibility to verify TM clients' debit/credit positions before liquidating collateral; (ii) Whether the NCL/MCSGFC could order restitution of liquidated securities; (iii) Whether TM clients could recover from a PCM for the TM's default.

Issue (i): Whether a PCM had a statutory duty and regulatory visibility to verify TM clients' debit/credit positions before liquidating collateral.

Analysis: Under the applicable F&O Regulations and the CM-TM arrangement, a PCM's constituent was the TM. The restrictions on use of client margins required a TM to preserve its individual clients' collateral and prevented a PCM from using one TM's collateral for another TM's dues; they did not impose on a PCM a duty to ascertain the debit/credit position of each individual client of its TM. The reporting regime then in force did not provide real-time client-level position data. The later daily client-level reporting and pledge/re-pledge framework confirmed that such visibility and segregation were introduced subsequently.

Conclusion: A PCM had no statutory duty to verify individual TM-client debit/credit positions before liquidation, and the then applicable regulatory mechanism did not provide such visibility. This issue is decided in favour of the PCMs.

Issue (ii): Whether the NCL/MCSGFC could order restitution of liquidated securities.

Analysis: The statutory byelaw-making power permits fines, expulsion, suspension and like penalties not involving payment of money. Disgorgement powers were expressly vested in SEBI under separate provisions, but no corresponding authority was conferred on a stock exchange, clearing corporation or its committee. An order requiring restoration of securities, or alternatively blocking their value with an additional amount, was monetary in substance and could not be sustained as restitution based on equity where the liquidation was not contrary to the governing regulatory framework.

Conclusion: The NCL/MCSGFC lacked statutory power to direct restitution of the liquidated securities. This issue is decided against the NCL/MCSGFC.

Issue (iii): Whether TM clients could recover from a PCM for the TM's default.

Analysis: The losses resulted from the TM's default and its unauthorised assured-return arrangements, in which the investors had furnished securities as collateral. The PCM neither had privity with those individual clients nor breached a regulatory obligation in liquidating the collateral to meet the TM's unpaid obligations. Any remedies of the affected clients lay against their respective TMs, subject to lawful exceptions.

Conclusion: TM clients cannot lay a claim against a PCM for the TM's default in these circumstances. This issue is decided against the investors.

Final Conclusion: The restitution directions lacked statutory foundation, and the regulatory regime applicable during the relevant period did not shift the TM's client-level obligations or losses to the PCMs.

Ratio Decidendi: A clearing member cannot be subjected to monetary restitution for a trading member's client-level default unless the governing statutory and regulatory framework both imposes the relevant client-level obligation and authorises that remedial power.

Issues: (i) Whether the Railways can be treated as a dealer under the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975; (ii) Whether the transfer of rolling stock to the financing corporation constituted sales by the Railways; (iii) Whether sales established between the Railways and the financing corporation were liable to tax in Delhi.

Issue (i): Whether the Railways can be treated as a dealer under the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975.

Analysis: The statutory definitions of business and dealer are broad, make profit motive immaterial, and expressly include the Central Government when carrying on the business of selling goods. The Railways' public functions do not confer immunity from sales-tax legislation. Its statutory capacity as a dealer is distinct from whether a particular transaction is a sale.

Conclusion: The Railways can be a dealer under the Delhi Sales Tax Act, 1975. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the transfer of rolling stock to the financing corporation constituted sales by the Railways.

Analysis: A sale requires transfer for consideration of property that vested in the Railways. Possession, procurement functions and commissioning responsibilities are relevant but not conclusive of title. Where the Railways acted as agent of the financing corporation in procurement from private manufacturers, property passed directly from the manufacturer to the financing corporation and no intermediate sale arose. Conversely, rolling stock manufactured and owned by the Railways, or privately procured by it as principal, was sold when title was transferred to the financing corporation against adjustment of funds advanced by it. Agency could arise without a separate agency fee. An adverse inference from non-production of records could not eliminate the necessary distinction between these legally different classes of transactions.

Conclusion: Transfers of rolling stock previously owned by the Railways constituted sales, whereas stock procured by the Railways on behalf of the financing corporation did not. This issue is partly in favour of the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether sales established between the Railways and the financing corporation were liable to tax in Delhi.

Analysis: The burden of proving exclusion from levy arises only after a sale is established. The assessee was required to prove, transaction-wise, that the sale occasioned inter-State movement or occurred outside Delhi under the applicable statutory tests. Manufacture, dispatch or subsequent use outside Delhi did not by themselves establish that the sale between the Railways and the financing corporation was an inter-State or outside-State sale. The parties' head-office locations and a lease stipulation deeming appropriation in Delhi were not conclusive, but contemporaneous records could be considered in the absence of contrary transaction-specific material.

Conclusion: Sales established as having been made by the Railways were not proved to be excluded from the Delhi levy. This issue is decided against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The taxable turnover must be confined to rolling stock owned by the Railways before transfer to the financing corporation, excluding stock procured by the Railways as its agent; classification and computation require assessment-year-wise determination on the stipulated legal basis.

Ratio Decidendi: A financing arrangement for acquisition of goods constitutes a taxable sale only where the intermediary previously held title as principal and transferred that property for consideration; agency procurement does not create an intermediate sale.

Issues: (i) Whether purse-seine vessels may transit State territorial waters to fish in the EEZ under the distinct Union and State regulatory regimes; (ii) Whether pending applications for EEZ Access Passes may be left unprocessed by the State verifying authority.

Issue (i): Whether purse-seine vessels may transit State territorial waters to fish in the EEZ under the distinct Union and State regulatory regimes.

Analysis: Fishing in the EEZ falls within the Union's legislative and executive sphere, whereas fishing in territorial waters is regulated by the State. The EEZ Rules, 2025 provide for Access Passes for EEZ fishing, while the Tamil Nadu Marine Fishing Regulation Rules, 2020 regulate activity within territorial waters. These autonomous regulatory fields do not conflict. Cooperative federalism requires implementation that enables regulated access to the EEZ while preserving the State's power to regulate transit and fishing within territorial waters. The State must designate transit channels under Rules 15(5) and 15(6), with due regard to the Expert Committee's recommendations.

Conclusion: Purse-seine vessels possessing the requisite EEZ permissions may obtain regulated transit access through Tamil Nadu's territorial waters to fish in the EEZ; the State must frame rules or regulations for specified transit channels. This is in favour of the applicants.

Issue (ii): Whether pending applications for EEZ Access Passes may be left unprocessed by the State verifying authority.

Analysis: The Access Pass framework requires coordination between the Union issuing authority and the State verifying authority. Prolonged non-verification of applications defeats the regulatory scheme and, in practical effect, creates an impermissible unwritten prohibition on the pursuit of the applicants' occupation, subject to lawful regulation.

Conclusion: The State must ensure effective, efficient and timely verification and clearance of applications in accordance with the governing rules and regulations. This is in favour of the applicants.

Final Conclusion: The governing Union and State regimes must operate harmoniously to secure lawful, regulated EEZ fishing access and timely regulatory clearances.

Ratio Decidendi: Where Union law regulates fishing in the EEZ and State law regulates territorial waters, their distinct constitutional fields must be implemented cooperatively, and administrative delay cannot operate as an unwritten bar to regulated access.

Issues: Whether the writ petition should continue after the GST Appellate Tribunal became functional.

Analysis: The writ petition had been entertained because the statutory appellate tribunal was non-functional. Since the tribunal had subsequently been constituted and made functional, the statutory appellate remedy under Section 112 was available. No merits of the penalty proceedings were adjudicated.

Outcome: The petitioner was directed to pursue the statutory appeal before the GST Appellate Tribunal, which must entertain it without a limitation objection.

Issues: Whether an adjudication initiated by a show-cause notice uploaded only under the 'Additional Notice and Orders' tab, without separate intimation, could be sustained when the taxpayer was unable to respond.

Analysis: Uploading the show-cause notice only under the specified portal tab, without separate intimation, prevented the taxpayer from filing a reply. This amounted to a breach of the principles of natural justice. The circumstances warranted interference and a fresh opportunity to answer the proposed demand.

Conclusion: The show-cause notice and adjudication order were quashed, with fresh notice, reply, personal hearing, and reasoned adjudication directed.

Issues: Whether the blocking of the Electronic Credit Ledger under Rule 86A required reconsideration after affording the petitioner an opportunity to substantiate its input-tax-credit claim.

Analysis: The material prima facie disclosed reasons to believe that the suppliers were non-existent and their registrations had been cancelled, warranting protective action under Rule 86A. To preserve audi alteram partem, the petitioner was to receive a post-decisional personal hearing and an independent, reasoned consideration of its documentary representation.

Outcome: The petitioner was directed to submit a representation, and the competent authority was directed to decide it by a reasoned order after personal hearing.

Issues: Whether sufficient cause was established for condoning the 31-day delay in filing the income-tax appeal.

Analysis: The cumulative explanation concerning movement of records, legal opinion, administrative approval, preparation of the appeal and execution of the memorandum demonstrated bona fide diligence and prompt pursuit of the remedy. The delay was short and not attributable to negligence or inaction. Section 260A(2A) of the Income-tax Act contains no restrictive expression excluding the power to condone delay after expiry of the prescribed period, subject to sufficient cause. The merits of the proposed appeal could not be assessed at the delay-condonation stage.

Conclusion: The issue was answered in favour of Revenue; the explanation constituted sufficient cause for condoning the 31-day delay.

Issues: Whether deduction for profits from generation of solar electricity was allowable where the requisite approval, agreement and permission were not in the name of the proprietary concern claiming the deduction.

Analysis: Deduction under Section 80-IA required an audit report in Form 10CCB accompanied by the agreement, approval or permission issued by the competent Government or local authority under Rule 18BBB. Although Form 10CCB was furnished, the solar-plant approval and completion certificate were issued in the name of a separate partnership firm, not the proprietary concern. The electricity generated from the solar project was also sold by that firm to the electricity supplier.

Conclusion: The deduction under Section 80-IA was not allowable to the assessee; the issue was decided against the assessee.

Issues: Whether the 10% tolerance margin under the third proviso to Section 50C(1) applied to the assessee's transfer where the difference between declared consideration and the DVO valuation was 8.5%.

Analysis: Section 50C deems the stamp-valuation figure to be full consideration for capital-gains computation, while Section 50C(2) permits valuation by the DVO upon objection. The DVO valuation exceeded the declared consideration by 8.5%. The 10% safe-harbour margin introduced by the third proviso to Section 50C(1) was treated as retrospective in operation; consequently, a difference within that margin could not trigger substitution of the declared consideration.

Conclusion: The 8.5% variation fell within the applicable 10% tolerance margin, and the addition sustained under Section 50C was liable to be deleted, in favour of the assessee.