Prior testamentary disposition by sole coparcener survives later adoption; estate duty applies only to the cesser of the widow's life interest.

A sole surviving coparcener can validly execute a will before a later adoption, and the doctrine of relation back does not invalidate that prior testamentary disposition. The adopted son therefore takes subject to the earlier will where the widow was given only a life interest and the son was to succeed thereafter. For estate duty, only the property or benefit representing the cesser of the widow's limited interest is brought to charge on her death; the whole estate is not liable. Valuation must be confined to the interest actually ceasing, with the applicable estate duty provisions operating only to that extent.

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Issues: (i) Whether the will executed by the sole surviving coparcener before the adoption was binding on the subsequently adopted son and whether the doctrine of relation back invalidated that will; (ii) Whether, on the death of the widow, the whole estate or only the limited interest represented by the cesser of her life interest was liable to estate duty.

Issue (i): Whether the will executed by the sole surviving coparcener before the adoption was binding on the subsequently adopted son and whether the doctrine of relation back invalidated that will.

Analysis: The will was executed when the testator was the sole surviving coparcener and had full power to dispose of the property. The subsequent adoption did not divest prior testamentary disposition. The doctrine of relation back was held to operate only to continue lineage and not to defeat an earlier valid disposition. The terms of the will and the adoption deed showed that the widow was to enjoy the properties during her lifetime and the adopted son was to take only thereafter.

Conclusion: The will was valid and binding, and the subsequently adopted son could not challenge the prior testamentary disposition.

Issue (ii): Whether, on the death of the widow, the whole estate or only the limited interest represented by the cesser of her life interest was liable to estate duty.

Analysis: The disposition conferred only a life interest on the widow and vested remainder rights in the adopted son. On her death, only the benefit arising from the cesser of that limited interest could be treated as property passing under the Estate Duty Act. The valuation had to be confined to the income-yielding or interest-bearing property actually affected by the cesser of the life interest, and the house property used merely as residence was not automatically includible to the full extent. Section 5 was held inapplicable, while section 7(1) applied subject to valuation under section 40.

Conclusion: Only the limited estate representing the cesser of the widow's life interest was liable to estate duty, not the entire property.

Final Conclusion: The revenue succeeded in part: the earlier disposition remained effective, but the estate duty assessment had to be restricted to the value of the interest ceasing on the widow's death and not the whole estate.

Ratio Decidendi: A Hindu who is the sole surviving coparcener may validly dispose of coparcenary property by will before a later adoption, and such prior disposition is not defeated by relation back; on the death of a limited owner, estate duty is attracted only to the extent of the interest that ceases and the corresponding benefit that accrues.

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