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Issues: Whether the copy of the Tribunal's order was duly communicated to the Commissioner when it was tendered through the usual peon-book procedure but refused by the Commissioner's nominee, and whether the reference application under section 256(1) of the Income-tax Act, 1961 was therefore barred by limitation.
Analysis: The statutory scheme required the Tribunal to send or communicate a copy of its order to the Commissioner under section 254(3), section 256(1), and rule 35 of the Income-tax (Appellate Tribunal) Rules, 1963. Those provisions spoke of communication or service of notice of an order, not of service in the manner of summons or the strict procedure applicable to notices or requisitions under section 282 of the Income-tax Act, 1961 or Order V of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Tribunal had followed its established practice of dispatching orders through the peon-book system, and the refusal by the Commissioner's nominee did not invalidate tender of the copy. The later re-sending of the order was treated as an administrative act and did not undo the earlier valid tender and communication.
Conclusion: The copy of the order was duly tendered and communicated to the Commissioner on the earlier dates of dispatch and refusal. The reference application was time-barred and the objection to limitation succeeded.
Ratio Decidendi: For communication of a Tribunal's order to the Commissioner, the law does not require service in the manner of summons or notices under the Code of Civil Procedure; due tender through a reasonably expected mode of delivery is sufficient, and refusal to accept the copy does not prevent commencement of limitation.