Disjunctive reading of "or" under excise jurisdiction provisions requires duty and penalty to be considered separately.

The expression "or" in Section 35D(3)(a) and Section 35D(3)(b) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 was held to be plain and disjunctive, not read as "and". Duty and penalty were required to be assessed separately for determining the appropriate Bench, so if either amount individually crossed the prescribed monetary limit, the matter would lie outside Single Member jurisdiction.

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Issues: Whether the word "or" in Section 35D(3)(a) and Section 35D(3)(b) of the Central Excises and Salt Act, 1944 is to be read disjunctively or as "and", and whether duty and penalty are to be considered independently for determining the appropriate Bench.

Analysis: The provision used the word "or" in both sub-clauses. The Tribunal held that the expression was plain and unambiguous and that duty and penalty had to be reckoned separately. On that construction, if either the duty or the penalty individually exceeded the prescribed monetary limit, the appeal would not fall within the Single Member jurisdiction. The Tribunal rejected the contention that "or" should be read as "and".

Conclusion: The word "or" was held to retain its independent disjunctive meaning, and duty and penalty were required to be considered separately for jurisdictional purposes.

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