Issues: Whether the Commissioner (Appeals) could condone a delay of more than seven years in filing a service-tax appeal.

Analysis: Section 85(3A) of the Finance Act, 1994 requires an appeal to be filed within two months of receipt of the adjudication order and permits condonation, on sufficient cause, only for a further one month. The statutory appellate authority has no jurisdiction to condone delay beyond that outer limit; the merits of the underlying dispute are immaterial while deciding limitation.

Conclusion: The appeal filed more than seven years after receipt of the original order was barred by limitation and could not be entertained. The issue is decided against the assessee.

Outcome: The appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution under Rule 20 of the CESTAT Procedure Rules, 1982.

Outcome: The appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution under Rule 20 of the Customs, Excise and Service Tax Appellate Tribunal (Procedure) Rules, 1982.

Issues: Whether cancellation of GST registration for continuous non-filing of returns should be set aside and registration restored.

Analysis: The cancellation was founded solely on non-filing of returns, without any allegation of a dubious process to evade tax. Continued cancellation would prevent the petitioner from conducting business and raising invoices, and would consequently impair tax recovery. A pragmatic approach therefore required an opportunity to regularise the defaults through filing of returns and payment of statutory dues.

Conclusion: The cancellation of registration was set aside, conditional upon filing all defaulting returns and payment of tax, interest, fine and penalty within the stipulated period; on compliance, registration is to be restored.

Issues: Whether the applicant should be granted regular bail in a prosecution alleging fraudulent availment and passing of input tax credit.

Analysis: The investigation was completed and the final complaint had been filed. The prosecution case rested on documentary and electronic material already held by the Department, and further custodial detention was not warranted. The applicant had remained in custody since 22.01.2026 and the trial was likely to take considerable time.

Conclusion: Regular bail was granted to the applicant.

Outcome: The writ petition was disposed of with liberty to pursue rectification before the proper officer.

Issues: (i) Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to rule on a claim for refund of GST paid on the upfront lease amount; (ii) Whether input tax credit of GST paid or payable on the upfront amount for a long-term lease of industrial land, intended for construction of a factory, is admissible.

Issue (i): Whether the Authority has jurisdiction to rule on a claim for refund of GST paid on the upfront lease amount.

Analysis: The matters on which an advance ruling may be sought are exhaustively specified in Section 97(2). Refund of tax paid is not among those specified matters, whereas admissibility of input tax credit is expressly covered.

Conclusion: The Authority lacks jurisdiction to answer the refund query; the refund claim was rejected.

Issue (ii): Whether input tax credit of GST paid or payable on the upfront amount for a long-term lease of industrial land, intended for construction of a factory, is admissible.

Analysis: Input tax credit is blocked for goods or services received for construction of an immovable property on the recipient's own account, other than plant and machinery. Land, buildings and civil structures are expressly excluded from plant and machinery. The leased plot was intended for construction of a factory building; consequently, the upfront lease service was treated as pertaining to land acquired for construction of an immovable property.

Conclusion: Input tax credit of GST charged on the upfront lease amount is inadmissible, against the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The refund component could not be entertained in advance-ruling jurisdiction, and the tax paid on the upfront lease consideration remains blocked credit.

Ratio Decidendi: GST paid on a long-term lease of land obtained for constructing an immovable property on the recipient's own account is blocked input tax credit where the leased land and resulting civil construction do not qualify as plant and machinery.

Outcome: Application for condonation of delay and the Special Leave Petition dismissed on the ground of delay.

Issues: (i) Whether revocation proceedings could validly be initiated without an offence report as required by the applicable licensing regulations; (ii) Whether the Customs Broker violated its obligations by processing exports subsequently alleged to be overvalued.

Issue (i): Whether revocation proceedings could validly be initiated without an offence report as required by the applicable licensing regulations.

Analysis: Regulation 17 of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018 prescribes the mandatory procedure for revocation of a Customs Broker licence and imposition of penalty. The proceedings were founded on findings from separate adjudication against the exporter rather than on a valid offence report contemplated by that Regulation.

Conclusion: In the absence of a valid offence report, the revocation proceedings were unsustainable, in favour of the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the Customs Broker violated its obligations by processing exports subsequently alleged to be overvalued.

Analysis: No evidence established the Customs Broker's connivance, knowledge, or involvement in the alleged overvaluation. The Broker had undertaken KYC verification, acted on documents appearing genuine, and filed shipping bills that were assessed and cleared by Customs authorities. A Customs Broker is a processing agent and is not required to investigate the correctness of export valuation or independently verify matters already supported by authentic government-issued records.

Conclusion: The Customs Broker did not violate Regulations 10(d), 10(e), 10(m), or 10(n) of the Customs Brokers Licensing Regulations, 2018, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The legal basis for revocation, security forfeiture, and penalty was absent because the statutory initiation requirement was not met and no breach of the Broker's regulatory duties was proved.

Ratio Decidendi: A Customs Broker acting on genuine client documents and complying with KYC obligations cannot be held liable for an exporter's later-detected overvaluation without proof of the Broker's knowledge, connivance, or breach of a specific regulatory duty; revocation proceedings also require a valid statutory offence report.

Issues: Whether penalty for abetting alleged improper importation could survive after the principal allegations against the importer had been rejected.

Analysis: The appellant was not alleged to be the importer; the case against him rested entirely on alleged abetment of the importer's transactions. In the connected principal proceedings arising from the same show-cause notice, the imported components, lacking an electric motor and battery, were found not to possess the essential character of complete electrical tricycles under Rule 2(a) of the General Rules for Interpretation. The goods were correctly declared as parts/components, the dispute was one of tariff classification without misdeclaration, and the confiscation, differential-duty demand and penalties against the importer and its directors were unsustainable. Since the principal contravention no longer existed, there was no independent basis to impose derivative penal liability upon the alleged abettor.

Conclusion: The penalty under Section 112(a)(ii) of the Customs Act, 1962 was unsustainable and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the seized gold was liable to absolute confiscation; (ii) whether the seized Indian currency was liable to confiscation as sale proceeds of smuggled gold; (iii) whether penalty on the person from whose possession the gold was recovered was sustainable; (iv) whether penalties on the other two appellants were sustainable.

Issue (i): Whether the seized gold was liable to absolute confiscation.

Analysis: Gold is notified goods for purposes of Section 123 of the Customs Act, 1962. The gold was recovered from conscious possession, and no documentary evidence established its lawful importation, acquisition or possession. The statutory burden was therefore not discharged. The statements and attendant circumstances independently corroborated the illicit nature of the goods; the claimant had also relinquished his claim over them.

Conclusion: The gold was rightly held liable to absolute confiscation under Sections 111(b) and 111(d) of the Customs Act, 1962, against the assessee.

Issue (ii): Whether the seized Indian currency was liable to confiscation as sale proceeds of smuggled gold.

Analysis: The material on record showed that the person in possession collected and retained gold and its cash sale proceeds in the course of the bullion dealings. No contrary evidence explained the currency, and the claim over it had been relinquished.

Conclusion: The Indian currency was rightly confiscated as sale proceeds of smuggled gold under Section 121 of the Customs Act, 1962, against the assessee.

Issue (iii): Whether penalty on the person from whose possession the gold was recovered was sustainable.

Analysis: The recovery from conscious possession, statements recorded under Section 108, transaction records, substantial currency recovery, and absence of verifiable details regarding suppliers and intended recipients cumulatively established knowing involvement in transporting and dealing with smuggled gold.

Conclusion: The penalty under Sections 112(a) and 112(b) of the Customs Act, 1962 was sustained, against the assessee.

Issue (iv): Whether penalties on the other two appellants were sustainable.

Analysis: In respect of one appellant, awareness arising from a family relationship did not establish an active act of abetment or conscious dealing. In respect of the employee, the allegations rested substantially on his statement, without recovery from him or independent evidence proving knowledge and active complicity. Penal liability requires cogent corroborative evidence of conscious participation and cannot arise merely from relationship or employment.

Conclusion: The penalties on the two appellants were unsustainable and were set aside, in favour of the assessee.

Final Conclusion: The confiscation of the gold and currency and the penalty upon the person in conscious possession were maintained, while penalties lacking independent proof of knowing involvement were annulled.

Ratio Decidendi: Penalty for abetment or dealing with confiscable goods requires cogent evidence of conscious and active participation; family relationship or employment alone does not establish such liability.

Issues: (i) Whether a statutory auditor who is not a person specified under the relevant provisions may be prosecuted for non-compliance with requirements concerning the company's balance sheet and profit and loss account; (ii) Whether the allegations disclosed an offence of making false statements by the statutory auditor; (iii) Whether the allegations established wilful non-compliance by the statutory auditor with audit-reporting requirements.

Issue (i): Whether a statutory auditor who is not a person specified under the relevant provisions may be prosecuted for non-compliance with requirements concerning the company's balance sheet and profit and loss account.

Analysis: Liability for non-compliance concerning the form and contents of accounts is confined to the managing director, manager, directors, officers or employees identified by the statutory scheme, or a person specifically charged by the management with securing such compliance. The auditor was neither within those specified categories nor alleged to have been charged with that duty.

Conclusion: The petitioner could not be prosecuted for the alleged non-compliance concerning the company's accounts.

Issue (ii): Whether the allegations disclosed an offence of making false statements by the statutory auditor.

Analysis: The complaint did not allege that the petitioner made a materially false statement in the audit report or omitted a material fact while knowing it to be material. An alleged failure to report accounting-standard non-compliance by an auditor is specifically addressed by the separate provision governing auditor default and does not, without the required knowledge and false statement or knowing omission, constitute the offence alleged.

Conclusion: The allegations did not make out an offence of false statements against the petitioner.

Issue (iii): Whether the allegations established wilful non-compliance by the statutory auditor with audit-reporting requirements.

Analysis: The complaint itself recorded that the audit reports contained qualifications concerning deficient fixed-asset records and inventory verification. The asserted failures to make further enquiries or observations, even if accepted, indicated at most want of due care or dereliction of duty. Neither the complaint nor its allegations asserted a wilful default, which is indispensable for penal liability of an auditor.

Conclusion: The allegations did not establish wilful auditor default and could not sustain prosecution of the petitioner.

Final Conclusion: As none of the invoked penal provisions was attracted on the pleaded allegations, the criminal proceedings against the petitioner were unsustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A statutory auditor cannot be criminally prosecuted for account-related defaults or false statements absent the statutorily required status, a knowingly false statement or material omission, and, where prescribed, a pleaded and supportable allegation of wilful default.

Issues: (i) Whether discounted trade receivables acquired by a bank under a TReDS reverse-factoring arrangement constitute financial debt or operational debt; (ii) Whether the alleged erroneous recording of a concession regarding precedent vitiated the impugned order; (iii) Whether a claim filed in an incorrect category required inclusion in the resolution plan despite the creditor's delayed filing in the correct category; (iv) Whether relief could be granted after approval and full implementation of the resolution plan.

Issue (i): Whether discounted trade receivables acquired by a bank under a TReDS reverse-factoring arrangement constitute financial debt or operational debt.

Analysis: Financial debt under Section 5(8) requires disbursal against consideration for the time value of money. Under the TReDS mechanism, suppliers assigned to the bank their pre-existing receivables arising from goods supplied to the corporate debtor after the bank discounted the invoices and paid the suppliers. No funds were disbursed to, or placed at the disposal of, the corporate debtor. The debtor's obligation remained the trade payable for goods received, merely payable to the assignee rather than the suppliers. The discount and charges for delayed payment were compensation for early realisation of trade receivables, not consideration for an independent loan. An assignment does not transform operational debt into financial debt; the financier steps into the suppliers' position as an operational creditor. The claimant's status as a scheduled commercial bank does not alter the substance of the transaction.

Conclusion: The TReDS reverse-factoring claim is operational debt, not financial debt, and the bank is an operational creditor.

Issue (ii): Whether the alleged erroneous recording of a concession regarding precedent vitiated the impugned order.

Analysis: The classification issue was independently determined on merits and reached the same conclusion as the adjudicating authority. Therefore, even assuming that the alleged concession was incorrectly recorded, it had no effect on the outcome.

Conclusion: The alleged error regarding concession does not vitiate the impugned order.

Issue (iii): Whether a claim filed in an incorrect category required inclusion in the resolution plan despite the creditor's delayed filing in the correct category.

Analysis: The resolution professional classified the claim as operational debt and specifically directed filing in the appropriate form. The creditor instead persisted with its financial-creditor claim and filed the operational-creditor claim only after dismissal of its application and after approval of the plan by the committee of creditors. A verifiable claim cannot be said to have been improperly ignored where the creditor did not timely lodge it in the category identified by the resolution professional.

Conclusion: The delayed operational-creditor claim did not require inclusion in the resolution plan.

Issue (iv): Whether relief could be granted after approval and full implementation of the resolution plan.

Analysis: The resolution plan had been approved, fully implemented, payments made, and the monitoring committee dissolved. Reclassification at that stage would unsettle a completed insolvency resolution process, and no ground within the limited scope for challenging an approved plan was established.

Conclusion: No relief capable of disturbing the completed resolution process can be granted.

Final Conclusion: The classification of the bank's TReDS receivables as operational debt remains undisturbed, and the completed resolution process cannot be reopened on that claim.

Ratio Decidendi: A financier acquiring discounted invoices under a TReDS reverse-factoring arrangement, without disbursing funds to the corporate debtor for the time value of money, acquires assigned operational receivables and does not become a financial creditor.

Issues: (i) Whether the Adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to determine and protect access to a liquidation asset; (ii) Whether the Corporate Debtor had a subsisting prescriptive right of way over the appellants' adjoining land and whether its obstruction was connected with the liquidation process.

Issue (i): Whether the Adjudicating Authority had jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to determine and protect access to a liquidation asset.

Analysis: Section 60(5)(c) extends to questions of law or fact arising out of or relating to insolvency or liquidation. The disputed obstruction arose after commencement of CIRP and directly affected inspection, saleability and value realisation of land forming part of the liquidation estate. Protection of an existing access right required for liquidation does not amount to creating a fresh civil right or usurping an exclusive statutory forum's jurisdiction.

Conclusion: The application under Section 60(5)(c) was maintainable, in favour of the Liquidator.

Issue (ii): Whether the Corporate Debtor had a subsisting prescriptive right of way over the appellants' adjoining land and whether its obstruction was connected with the liquidation process.

Analysis: The non-agricultural permission of 1999 recorded access from the National Highway through the adjoining blocks. The access was openly and continuously used for approximately two decades without contemporaneous objection, including after the appellants acquired the servient land. The alternate route crossed third-party land and was not a legally secure access. Satellite imagery and the timing of the obstruction supported the finding that the established access was blocked after CIRP in a manner detrimental to value maximisation.

Conclusion: The Corporate Debtor possessed a subsisting right of way under Section 15 of the Indian Easements Act, 1882, and the obstruction was connected with and prejudicial to liquidation, in favour of the Liquidator.

Dissenting Opinion: Justice N. Seshayee considered that a contested prescriptive easement imposes a burden on third-party property and requires proof of a defined route, adverse user as of right, uninterrupted twenty-year enjoyment, and examination of evidence. Such a civil dispute falls outside the Tribunal's summary jurisdiction and must be pursued before a civil court with leave under Section 33(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

Final Conclusion: The existing access was validly protected as integral to effective realisation of the liquidation estate, and consequential measures to keep it unobstructed were sustained.

Ratio Decidendi: Section 60(5)(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 permits protection of a pre-existing access right where post-insolvency obstruction has a direct and proximate nexus with liquidation and asset value realisation.

Issues: (i) Whether the appeal was time-barred and whether a clerical rectification of the original order restarted the appellate limitation period; (ii) Whether the Section 9 application was time-barred, including whether the balance confirmations constituted valid acknowledgments extending limitation; (iii) Whether a pre-existing dispute barred initiation of insolvency proceedings under Section 9.

Issue (i): Whether the appeal was time-barred and whether a clerical rectification of the original order restarted the appellate limitation period.

Analysis: Section 61(2) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 permits filing within 30 days, with condonation limited to a further 15 days. Limitation runs from pronouncement of the original order. The subsequent order corrected only the date of pronouncement and made no substantive alteration to the findings; hence it did not create a fresh limitation period. Section 60(6) applies to suits and applications by or against a corporate debtor during moratorium and does not extend the period for an appeal under Section 61. Administrative delay in authorising the appeal could not enlarge the statutory outer limit.

Conclusion: The appeal was barred by limitation; the clerical rectification did not restart limitation.

Issue (ii): Whether the Section 9 application was time-barred, including whether the balance confirmations constituted valid acknowledgments extending limitation.

Analysis: Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to a Section 9 application, and limitation runs for three years from the date of default. The admitted default date was 07.03.2015, whereas the application was filed on 23.09.2021. A valid acknowledgment under Section 18 must be written, proved, unequivocal, and made before expiry of the applicable limitation period. The balance confirmations were unproved and reflected materially inconsistent outstanding amounts; together with the creditor's own inconsistent credit-balance communication, they did not establish an unequivocal acknowledgment of an ascertained liability.

Conclusion: The Section 9 application was time-barred and was not saved by a valid acknowledgment of liability.

Issue (iii): Whether a pre-existing dispute barred initiation of insolvency proceedings under Section 9.

Analysis: Correspondence predating the demand notice recorded objections concerning account reconciliation, set-offs and the correctness of ledger figures. These communications disclosed a genuine and continuing dispute concerning the debt claimed, rather than a spurious, hypothetical or illusory defence. The shifting amounts in the balance confirmations reinforced that the debt was not crystallized.

Conclusion: A genuine pre-existing dispute existed, independently rendering the Section 9 application unsustainable.

Final Conclusion: The operational creditor could not invoke the insolvency process for a stale and disputed claim, and the refusal to commence CIRP remained legally sustainable.

Ratio Decidendi: A clerical rectification that does not substantively modify an insolvency order does not reset appellate limitation, and a Section 9 application cannot proceed where the claim is time-barred or subject to a genuine pre-existing dispute.

Issues: Whether the extended period of limitation could be invoked for the excise-duty demand where the relevant facts and records had been made available during audit.

Analysis: The demand covered April 2011 to November 2013, while the audit had issued a deficiency memo on 10.03.2014 based on the assessee's records. The show-cause notice was issued only on 13.04.2016 by invoking the extended period. Availability of the material records to audit did not establish suppression or any conduct justifying invocation of the extended limitation period.

Conclusion: The extended period of limitation was not invocable; the demand raised by its invocation was time-barred and was set aside in favour of the assessee.

Issues: (i) Whether the additional input tax credit benefit was fully passed on to eligible homebuyers; (ii) whether free additional construction work could substitute commensurate reduction in prices; (iii) whether interest was payable on the unpassed benefit; and (iv) whether penalty was attracted for the contravention.

Issue (i): Whether the additional input tax credit benefit was fully passed on to eligible homebuyers.

Analysis: Section 171(1) requires the benefit of additional input tax credit to reach each recipient through a commensurate reduction in price. The supplementary verification accepted that the benefit had been passed to four homebuyers, but determined a remaining differential amount of Rs. 99,435 for two homebuyers. The revised computation and supporting material disclosed no factual or legal infirmity.

Conclusion: The Respondent failed to pass on Rs. 99,435 of the additional input tax credit benefit to the concerned homebuyers, contrary to Section 171(1), in favour of Revenue.

Issue (ii): Whether free additional construction work could substitute commensurate reduction in prices.

Analysis: The statutory mode of passing on tax or input tax credit benefit is commensurate reduction in price. An equivalent commercial advantage, including free additional construction work, does not fulfil that prescribed mode even where its asserted value exceeds the differential benefit.

Conclusion: Free additional construction work is not valid compliance with the obligation to pass on input tax credit benefit through commensurate reduction in prices, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iii): Whether interest was payable on the unpassed benefit.

Analysis: Rule 133(3)(b) mandates interest where an amount has not been passed on by commensurate reduction in prices. The affected recipients were deprived of the monetary benefit from the dates on which the higher amounts were collected.

Conclusion: Interest at 18% per annum is payable on the differential profiteered amount from collection of the higher amount until actual payment, in favour of Revenue.

Issue (iv): Whether penalty was attracted for the contravention.

Analysis: The contravention continued after Section 171(3A) came into force on 01.01.2020. The statutory proviso preserves the consequence that no penalty is leviable if the profiteered amount is deposited within thirty days of the order.

Conclusion: The Respondent is liable to penalty under Section 171(3A), in favour of Revenue.

Final Conclusion: The remaining input tax credit benefit must be passed to the affected recipients with statutory interest, and the contravention attracts the applicable anti-profiteering penalty regime.

Ratio Decidendi: The benefit of additional input tax credit under Section 171 must be transmitted to each recipient by commensurate reduction in price and cannot be replaced by in-kind or other commercial benefits.

Issues: (i) Whether the Inland Container Depot is a public place under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988; (ii) Whether a Reach Stacker used within the Inland Container Depot is a motor vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Issue (i): Whether the Inland Container Depot is a public place under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Analysis: A public place requires a right of access vested in the public. The Inland Container Depot is a customs bonded area where ingress and egress are controlled and access is confined to duly authorised persons. Its specially designed internal roads, used for movement of heavy machinery and containers, are not places to which members of the public can claim entry as of right.

Conclusion: The Inland Container Depot and its internal roads are not a public place under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This conclusion is against the claimant.

Issue (ii): Whether a Reach Stacker used within the Inland Container Depot is a motor vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988.

Analysis: The requirement that a mechanically propelled vehicle be adapted for use upon roads entails its suitability and dominant utility for ordinary roads. The Reach Stacker substantially exceeds prescribed road-weight limits, is transported in dismantled form, lacks ordinary road-safety features, and operates on specially reinforced internal roads for limited container-handling functions. Though wheeled and mechanically propelled, it is a special-purpose vehicle adapted only for use in enclosed premises and falls within the statutory exclusion. Its non-registration is consistent with this classification, since registration is required only for a motor vehicle.

Conclusion: A Reach Stacker of this nature is excluded from the definition of motor vehicle under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988. This conclusion is in favour of the appellant.

Final Conclusion: The compensation claim under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 cannot be maintained in respect of the accident involving the Reach Stacker within the restricted Inland Container Depot; the clarification preserves claims involving regular road-going vehicles entering that area.

Ratio Decidendi: A special-purpose mechanically propelled vehicle whose dominant use is confined to enclosed premises and which is not suitable for ordinary public roads is excluded from the statutory definition of a motor vehicle, notwithstanding its wheels and mechanical propulsion.

Issues: Whether a person required to furnish information in an ongoing SFIO investigation has an enforceable right at the preliminary stage to obtain the Central Government's investigation orders and the material underlying those orders.

Analysis: The notice under Section 217 disclosed that the information was sought in connection with an investigation into identified companies and because of the petitioner's financial transactions with them, and specified the categories of records required. The investigation was ongoing, involved multiple entities, and the investigation orders and underlying material contained sensitive information. Disclosure at that stage could prejudice the wider investigation and connected proceedings. No prejudicial action against the petitioner had yet reached a stage warranting disclosure or invocation of remedies based on natural justice.

Conclusion: The petitioner had no enforceable right to disclosure of the investigation orders or underlying material at the preliminary stage; it may pursue remedies available in law if prejudicial action is taken subsequently.